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1 
Challenges of Globalization for International Mobility, Social 
Security and Environmental Sustainability 
An Empirical Analysis  
 
PREFACE 
Globalization is the tighter integration of the world’s economies and societies through 
trade, capital and migration flows, and diffusion of ideas. Advances in these areas pose a 
multitude of challenges on individuals, the nation states, as well as the international 
community.  
The motivation to address challenges of globalization for international mobility, 
social welfare and environmental sustainability from an economic perspective arises 
from the wish to structure and understand these complex, yet poorly studied 
phenomena. For that reason each chapter establishes clear hypotheses which are based 
on economic models explaining the incentive structure of agents or the political economy 
of institutions. Each empirical analysis uses existing macroeconomic observational 
evidence to test the predictions and establish meaningful implications for the relevant 
actors. Taking the multitude of challenges posed by globalization into account, this 
dissertation contributes to the understanding of three challenges contemporary global 
politics is facing. 
 
Globalization and International Mobility 
International mobility is affected in different ways by globalization: first, new 
communication technologies and their accessibility reduce the obstacles of geographical 
distances and increase the availability and diffusion of information in ever larger 
quantities in less time. Besides the implications for the global economy and political 
processes, individuals are affected through enhanced mobility as well as professional 
opportunities. Increasing internationalization of markets and enterprises, and the 
specialization of production and labor, lead to a tremendous flow of individuals beyond 
national boundaries. People face the challenge of increased competition not only with 
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individuals from the same communities, but also with workers from other countries and 
cultural contexts, who attended different educational systems and grew up in diverse 
backgrounds.  
The opportunities provided by internationalization go hand in hand with dangers 
of victimization in informal activities. New forms of slavery emerge where people freely 
emigrate but get enslaved upon arrival in their destination country making human 
trafficking the third largest criminal activity worldwide (U.S. Department of State, 2004; 
ILO, 2005; Interpol, 2009). Governments are confronted with attacks against their 
sovereignty by these growing illicit markets, rendering the assessment of legal issues 
more complex and demanding in terms of flexibility, states often fail to muster. In this 
regard, Naím (2003) highlights the illegal trade in people as one of The Five Wars of 
Globalization1 governments face due to the emergence of globalized criminal networks. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO, 2005) estimates that at least 2.4 million 
adults and children are victims of forced labor and sexual servitude as a result of 
trafficking in persons (TIP). Revenues from this form of exploitation are calculated to be 
at least US $30 billion annually. 
The research community has increasingly turned its attention to human trafficking 
as a challenge of globalization in recent years. Therefore, it is of great importance to 
know what drives human trafficking flows (Chapter I) and to quantify the prevalence of 
this illicit activity (Chapter II). Both aspects advance the existing literature and 
contribute to an understanding of the trafficking process which may help to strengthen 
the toolbox in the fight against the exploitation of individuals. 
  
                                                 
1 The other four wars are the illicit trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property and money (Naím, 2003).  
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Globalization and Social Security 
The challenge of globalization for social security is addressed in Chapter III. 
Technological advances and social change (e.g., different requirements in education, 
skills and on the labor market as well as in health care provision) lead, on the one hand, 
to declines in fertility rates and to improvements in life expectancy. On the other hand, 
these processes lead to growth of the world’s population for decades to come, rising 
from its current 7.2 billion to somewhere between 8 and 10 billion by 2050 (United 
Nations, 2014).2 
These projected trends have several implications that are visible already today: 
first, the proportion of the population above the age of 65 rises throughout the world 
(`greying of society’). Consequently the viability of national social security systems is 
endangered by increasing old-age dependency ratios.3 Second, coverage rates of 
earnings-related pensions are not high enough to prevent old-age poverty, burdening 
scarce government resources even more. Both challenges are on the international agenda 
already for the past three decades and have led to changes in policy approaches of 
national governments (Holzmann, 2005). 
In an article entitled “Age invaders”, published in April 2014, The Economist 
addresses the ageing of societies and points out that increased dependency ratios 
already affect labor markets, productivity levels, savings, and inequality. The United 
Nations World Population Prospects (United Nations, 2014) show that the number of 
people older than 65 will rise to 1.1 billion, amounting to a share of 13 percent of the 
general population, by 2035. This trend is projected to increase the dependency ratio 
especially in developed, but also in developing countries. Figure 1 visualizes these 
different trends and projections. Japan and Germany are predicted to have dependency 
ratios larger than 60 percent with the average reaching almost 50 percent in 2035 in all 
developed countries.  
                                                 
2 The major share of population growth will take place in the least developing countries where fertility 
rates resume high and mortality declines. Nevertheless, population aging occurs in both developed and 
developing countries (United Nations, 2014). 
3 Dependency ratio is the share of old people to those of working age between 25 and 64. 
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Figure 1: Dependency ratios world wide 
 
Notes: Data from the United Nations Population  
Division (2014), figure taken from The Economist  
“Age invasion” (April, 2014). Old-age dependency  
is the share of the population aged 65 and older  
per 100 people aged 25-64. 
*Forcast for 2035. 
For China, a doubling of the share is forecasted. In the developing countries in general, 
the dependency ratio is expected to grow to more than 20 percent. Together with low 
coverage rates in contribution-based pensions these trends have lead many countries to 
introduce reforms in their pension systems. The aim is to reach the broader population 
and guarantee the sustainability of pension systems. In other words, pension reforms 
focus increasingly on basic protection for the vulnerable elderly and at the same time 
consider the capacity of the funded schemes (Holzmann, 2012). In Chapter III of the 
present work, a systematic analysis of the provision of social pension finds first evidence 
for both country and institutional characteristics that support its beneficial 
implementation. 
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Globalization and Environmental Sustainability 
The relation between globalization and environmental sustainability is another global 
issue widely discussed in civil society, politics and scientific research. In the process of 
globalization human demands on the environment have increased manifold, exploiting 
resources and creating ecological pressures (Crutzen, 2006). Land use changes, resource 
extraction and depletion (e.g., deforestation and overfishing), emissions of waste and 
pollution, and the modification and movement of organisms are just a few to name 
(UNEP, 2012). The resulting environmental impacts are for instance climate change, 
ozone depletion, land degradation, loss of biodiversity and pollution, among many 
others (IPCC, 2014; MEA, 2005; UNEP, 2012). Together they make environmental 
sustainability a global concern since ecological processes seldom respect national 
boundaries. 
Effects are felt worldwide, but the poor and vulnerable in developing countries are 
particularly affected through famine, water shortages, and competition over resources 
(IPCC, 2014). The future trajectory is rather an acceleration of this trend than a 
slowdown based on ongoing population growth and intensified need for access to food, 
water and energy (Steffen et al., 2011).  Reducing the downsides of global change in 
terms of environmental stressors is thus a great challenge.  
The evidence on global environmental change strongly suggests that society is 
currently still not able to effectively reduce environmental exploitation. The shifting of 
the consequences of ecological pressures in time and space make its assessment even 
more difficult (Steffen et al., 2015a). A better empirical understanding of the underlying 
drivers and causes of human demands on ecosystems, with a special focus on the role of 
globalization is thus a pre-requisite for effectively addressing these challenges. The 
complexity of the role of globalization and its impacts on environmental human demand 
and environmental sustainability are evaluated in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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OVERVIEW  
Chapter I 
In Chapter I (joint work with Diego Hernandez) the determinants of observed human 
trafficking flows to Western European countries are investigated. New victim statistics 
are collected from national police forces, service organizations and international agencies 
that are in direct contact with trafficked individuals. According to Danailova and Belser 
(2006) their credibility is high since all of these organizations are in direct contact with 
affected individuals. A large and detailed dyadic database including host country and 
source country characteristic is constructed based on the obtained numbers. Thereby the 
drivers of supply and demand of this illicit market formation are empirically analyzed. 
The gravity-type panel setting even allows controlling for data reporting quality by the 
adoption of county fixed-effects. In a separate specification the influence of the 
institutional set-up is explicitly addressed. The analysis contributes new insights on how 
victim flows are influenced, by a) the institutional set-up of destination countries, and b) 
the role of policies towards immigrants.  
The following set of Hypotheses is tested: 
Hypothesis 1  
a)  More intense flows of human trafficking victims are observed between 
country pairs that have larger income differentials. 
b)  More intense flows of human trafficking victims are observed between country 
pairs that have larger populations. 
c)  Flows between countries are larger if the countries are geographically closer to 
each other. 
d)  Well-established routes for migrants and refugees encourage human trafficking 
and increase the number of victims. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
a)  Legal enforceability in host countries is a positive determinant of trafficking in 
persons (TIP) flows. 
b)  Border controls, such as visa requirements and recognition of asylum seekers 
determine TIP flows between countries. 
c)  Legislation on prostitution determines TIP flows between countries.    
d)  Social trust is expected to reduce TIP flows in both host and source countries.  
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Hypothesis 3 Trafficking flows are more common between country pairs with higher levels of 
criminal activity. 
 
Hypothesis 4 There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between women’s rights and human 
trafficking. 
Four major factors are identified in shaping victim flows to Western Europe. First, 
income differentials in favor of the destination country as well as larger shares of 
immigrants and of refugees increase trafficking flows to these countries. This suggests 
that higher migration flows to Western Europe result in an increased pool of potential 
victims. This correlation is associated with decreasing recruitment costs and increasing 
prospected profits by criminal networks. 
Second, victim flows are also more numerous between large, geographically 
adjacent countries, indicating that reduced transportation costs also increase recruitment 
and exploitation profits. Third, more effective legal institutions with a higher assertive 
capacity reduce exploitation in destination countries, but do not have an effect on the 
recruitment operations in countries of origin. Additionally, human trafficking flows are 
increasing when border controls are relaxed, and short-term visa requirements are less 
strict. This suggests that exploitation opportunities are foremost existent when people 
are allowed to move unrestricted. There is no systematic relation if migrants are allowed 
to stay longer and take up work in the destination countries. In other words, if they are 
allowed to take up jobs the incentives and opportunities for exploitation seem to vanish. 
Interestingly, we find that the legal setting of the prostitution market does not affect the 
size of victim movements, neither in the originating countries nor in the host countries.  
Forth, social attitudes shape the intensity of human trafficking flows. The 
perception of general trustworthiness in the population in Europe significantly decreases 
victim numbers. Social trust seems to reduce exploitation opportunities in destination 
countries, presumably, because more trusting relationships are associated with a sound 
institutional environment, hindering traffickers' efforts to find loopholes for exploitative 
placements.  
The results of Chapter I suggest that stricter and more assertive legal rules of 
prosecution and convictions of offenders are effective tools in order to reduce the 
number of human trafficking victims. 
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Chapter II 
In this Chapter, a quantification of the intensity of the multi-dimensional process of 
human trafficking is provided, based on the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes 
(MIMIC) approach. An investigation of the economics of human trafficking is generally 
confronted with the hidden nature of participating actors in this underground activity 
(Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). This makes a direct assessment difficult for policy 
makers and legal activists alike. To render human trafficking visible, the application of 
the MIMIC makes use of the observed causes and consequences of human trafficking.  
Observed human trafficking relies on the identification of victims and on the 
prosecution of traffickers, but may only tackle the tip of the iceberg. The quantification 
suggested in this analysis relies on covariance information of observed causes and on 
observed indicators to measure the prevalence of human trafficking in destination 
countries. This approach to assess unobservable phenomena has been used in economics 
to measure the size of the shadow economy (e.g., Buehn and Schneider, 2012) or 
corruption (Dreher et al., 2007) among others.  
Here, the application of the structural equation approach contributes to the 
literature in two ways: first, it allows a detailed analysis of the mechanism behind the 
criminal processes of human trafficking and of the process of the exploitation of 
vulnerable individuals. Second, the approach allows a relative country ranking 
according to the intensity of the phenomenon.  
The following eight Hypotheses are brought to the data: 
Hypothesis 1 A large extent of human trafficking in a country leads to a high number of 
identified victims, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 2 The larger the scale of HT in a country the more intense the fight against this 
crime, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 3 The more HT takes place in a country the higher the crime rate, ceteris paribus.  
  
Hypothesis 4 The richer the country, the larger is the extent of HT, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 5 The larger the demand for low-skilled services where exploitation takes place, 
the higher the prevalence of HT in the country, ceteris paribus. 
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Hypothesis 6 International investment connectedness increases HT presence in the country, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 7 HT is increased by factors that force migration and attract people to a specific 
(rich) country, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 8 Other crime activities also have causal effects on HT, ceteris paribus. 
 
The estimation results support the main hypotheses on the drivers and indicators of 
human trafficking. After scrutinizing the validity of the approach and applying a 
multitude of sensitivity tests regarding outliers and model fit, the estimates are used to 
generate an intensity index of human trafficking in destination countries. Since the 
measure is calculated on a yearly basis over the 2001-2010 period, this index offers the 
opportunity to analyze the development of human trafficking inflows in the last decade. 
Compared to other measures of legal aspects and to visibility of human trafficking, the 
index shows the expected properties. It is positively correlated with the tier rank of the 
US Department of State (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2001-2012) and reported human 
trafficking incidences (UNODC, 2006). Additionally, in a simple regression framework 
the intensity of human trafficking, measured by the index, is shown to reduce after the 
ratification of the anti-trafficking protocol of the UN (United Nations, 2000). 
The applications and the relevance of the intensity index make the MIMIC 
approach a suitable instrument to quantify human trafficking intensity in destination 
countries. It will allow for future in depth analysis of related aspects. Approximating 
human trafficking by this measure provides policy makers with an effective tool to 
assess international human trafficking at both ends of the trafficking process in terms of 
victim protection and prosecution of traffickers alike.  
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Chapter III 
In Chapter III, the provision of social pensions is analyzed. Social pensions refer to non-
contributory funds that provide cash transfers to the elderly with little or no link to 
previous contributions or work history. They are supposed to be an effective tool to 
tackle low coverage rates of earnings-related pensions and to counter act old-age poverty 
(Willmore, 2007; World Bank, 2009; ILO, 2014; UNDP, 2014). A new comprehensive data 
set on 185 countries observed on an annual basis over the years 1960-2012 offers the 
opportunity to examine trends and the distribution of social pension provision in the last 
five decades. Previously, the literature on social pension has not examined a 
comprehensive sample of countries, and therefore little is known about its distribution 
and trends. However, large variations of social pension provision exist worldwide which 
shows that previous studies only partly acknowledged the importance of the 
phenomenon when focusing on a specific country group (i.e., OECD countries). Figure 2 
shows the adoption of social non-contributory pensions since 1960 across world regions. 
Figure 2 shows that Europe has the greatest coverage with 20 countries providing 
social pension already in the 1960s. In each decade following the 60s, several countries in 
Europe and Central Asia have adopted a non-contributory pension, amounting to 38 
countries in 2012 or a share of 67 percent. An interesting trend in Figure 2 is also visible 
in Latin America, where a constant increase of countries adopting social pension is 
observed. In 2012 a share of 63 percent (26 countries) provides social pension in this 
region. Similarly, a steady increase in the provision in East Asia and the Pacific, with a 
share of 39 percent (14 countries) in 2012, is visible. It should be noted that in the 1980s, 
when the focus of both international and national policy was on privatization efforts in 
the course of the Washington Consensus,4 the introduction of social non-contributory 
public pensions slowed down worldwide. Regions that lag behind in provision levels are 
the Middle East, Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, where implementation is 
rarely noticeable from 1960-2012.  
                                                 
4 The Washington Consensus is named after the headquarter location of Washington DC based 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the US 
Treasury Department. It is a set of economic market-based reforms which formed lending conditions for 
credits from these institutions for many crisis struck Latin American countries. The consequence was 
privatization in different economic spheres (Gore, 2000).  
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Figure 2: Social pension provision per region 
 
Notes: Own calculation based on ILO (2014). EAP = East Asia and the Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central 
Asia, LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, NAmerica = 
North America, SAsia = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Sahara Africa. The data for the 1960s include 
implementation of social pension which took place earlier. 
After the description of facts and figures in Chapter III, country characteristics are 
investigated in more detail that shape the provision of social pension. The political 
economy literature of social security spending and on the supply of public goods 
provides a useful platform to derive testable hypotheses. 
These hypotheses are:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The provision of social pension is more likely in democratic countries, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of governments and its socialist orientation increase the 
probability of social pension provision, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 3: International leverage through trade and aid provision increases the probability 
of social pension implementation, ceteris paribus.  
 
The theoretical and empirical results show that economic and demographic factors shape 
state capacity, efficiency concerns, and financial viability as well as the demand for social 
pension provision. These form the core variables. However, economic and demographic 
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variables play a different role for developed and developing countries. In countries 
where traditional intergenerational support structures break down, due to falling 
fertility rates the demand for public old-age support increases. Consequently, the 
probability of social pension adoption rises as well. In developing countries state 
capacity is systematically related to the adoption. Traditional family support is still 
strong in many low income countries, but the projected demographic trends may make 
public support necessary. The provision of social pension hinges on the capacity of states 
to provide public funds, which is necessary to satisfy this future demand.  
In terms of political economy factors the study shows that, compared to 
autocratic regimes, democracies have a higher probability of social pension introduction, 
foremost in developing countries. The effect increases when the system is older and 
more stable. In countries with more fractionalized governments the probability of social 
pension adoption decreases. This effect is particularly strong in the case of developing 
countries. Socialist governments are more inclined to state interventions, which in 
developed countries seem to increase the probability of social pension provision. 
Although Chapter III does not address the effectiveness of social pension 
provision, the findings show important factors that are systematically related to the 
provision of public funds targeted to disadvantaged populations. Structural reforms that 
focus on old-age poverty reduction may take these results into account to increase the 
viability of social pension systems. 
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Chapter IV 
In Chapter IV (joined work with Lukas Figge), the change in human demands and 
implication on environmental degradation are addressed. International “green” 
initiatives and agreements try to curb climate change and environmental stressors, and 
to stop the increased depletion of resources. Against this background, Chapter IV 
provides a systematic analysis of the drivers of the Ecological Footprint (EF). The EF is 
the most complete measure of human demands on the environment. It includes six bio-
productive land-use types: i) cropland, ii) grassland and pasture (food and fiber), iii) 
fishing grounds (seafood), iv) forest land (timber and paper products) as well as v) areas 
required to build infrastructure (e.g., roads and buildings), and vi) land for carbon 
sequestration. The EF thus aggregates a wide range of human demands on the 
environment. It is also available for different perspectives of human environmental 
demands – consumption, production, imports and exports. While the relationship 
between ecological pressures and globalization is often claimed to be unambiguously 
positive, there is a substantial gap in the literature regarding systematic evidence. The 
analysis in Chapter IV fills this gap by empirically disentangling the nexus between 
globalization and ecological pressure. At the same time, the analysis takes the 
multidimensionality of both concepts into account, extending the view beyond 
international trade. Globalization is measured by the KOF index, including three 
dimensions: economic, political and social globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 
2008). 
The presented empirical analysis is based on information for 146 countries 
observed over the 1981-2009 period. The Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), as suggested 
by Sala-i-Martin (1997), Sturm and De Haan (2005) and Gassebner et al. (2010b), is 
applied to test a variety of earlier findings in the environmental sociology and ecological 
economics literature and to identify a robust set of control variables. The construction of 
the EF further allows disentangling the relation between components and dimensions of 
ecological pressure. For instance, globalization may be differently related to human 
environmental demands of non-carbon or carbon pollutants. 
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In terms of globalization six hypotheses disentangle the complex relationship between 
economic, political and social globalization: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: 
 
Economic globalization helps in the diffusion of clean production 
and creation of markets for the global environment decreasing 
ecological pressures. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: Economic globalization intensifies "dirty production" and 
displacement of pollution which increases ecological pressures.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Political globalization creates global environmental governance that 
still lags behind in managing adverse environmental effects 
increasing ecological pressures. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Political globalization creates a global environmental governance 
structure that through joint capacity decreases ecological pressures. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Social globalization increases global environmental awareness and 
thereby decreases ecological pressures. 
  
Hypothesis 3.2: Social globalization shapes cultural distancing through global 
mobility and physical distancing of local environmental 
degradation. 
 
The results suggest that globalization is related to ecological demands in various ways. 
While we do not find a robust relation to the EF of consumption, we do find that human 
pressures through imports and exports are positively and robustly correlated. The most 
important factor of multidimensional globalization seems to be social globalization 
through personal contacts, information, and cultural proximity, which is negatively 
related to the EF of consumption and production. With regard to the EF of imports and 
exports, we find a negative relation. Socially globalized societies seem to sustainably care 
about both their national consumption and production, whereas these societies are more 
ignorant when it comes to imports or exports. This finding suggests a transfer of 
ecological pressures to other countries. As expected, we find that economic globalization 
is positively associated with environmental degradation, however, not consistently 
across EF perspectives. Political globalized is found to be of lesser importance. 
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In a set of sensitivity tests we address endogeneity concerns in terms of reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias. We find evidence that globalization affects 
ecological pressures; however, we cannot rule out reverse causality for all dimensions of 
globalization.5 The same holds for potential omitted dynamic factors that might jointly 
affect the Ecological Footprint and globalization. No clear results are obtained through 
the application of system GMM estimators which suggests that we cannot entirely rule 
out endogeneity concerns. 
In summary, Chapter IV shows that globalization and ecological pressures are 
multidimensional concepts with diverse interlinked causal pathways. The investigation 
of the nexus between the two phenomena adds to the literature new insights that go 
beyond claims of single determinants, such as standard of living.  
 
                                                 
5 Migration flows indicate that environmental degradation triggers international migration leading to 
increased mobility and social globalization which would suggest the reverse direction of causality (e.g., 
UNEP 2012). 
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I. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have seen an increase in migratory flows between countries. These 
flows have been facilitated and fueled by decreased costs of communication and 
transportation and people's desire to move to more prosperous and politically stable 
regions. The combination of the means and desire to migrate with strict border controls and 
limited working opportunities for foreigners in destination countries creates a fertile ground 
for the development of organized criminal organizations that deal in illegal migration 
services. Human trafficking (HT), often acknowledged to be “modern day slavery”, bases its 
source of profits on the exploitation of human rights by using people as commodities.6 In an 
effort to raise awareness and to seek a joint solution to this form of crime, the United 
Nations (UN) issued its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
defining human trafficking as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” For instance, the U.S. Department of State 
(2006) states that between 600,000 and 800,000 people fall victim to trafficking mafias every 
year. The International Labor Organization (ILO, 2005) estimates that at least 2.4 million 
adults and children are victims of forced labor and sexual servitude as a result of trafficking 
in persons (TIP). Revenues from this form of exploitation are calculated to be at least US $30 
billion annually, making human trafficking the most profitable illicit activity after drug and 
weapon smuggling (ILO, 2005; Interpol, 2009). 
Despite the magnitude of these figures, few quantitative studies have been done in this 
area. This is mainly because acquiring the relevant data is difficult and its collection process 
is not homogeneous across countries. Uniform data collection is largely affected by 
government effectiveness in identifying relevant actors (both victims and traffickers), as they 
belong to the “hidden population” (Heckathorn, 1997). In addition, given how politicized 
the topic is, identification efforts may be directed towards specific human trafficking 
                                                 
6 “Modern day slavery” is widely used to describe the phenomenon of human trafficking and its characteristics 
today in delimitation to the historical slave trade. See for instance Danailova-Trainor and Laczko (2010). 
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segments, above all sexual exploitation (Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). Therefore, the scarce 
quantitative research on human trafficking bases its analysis on self-constructed estimations 
and proxies or on surveys implemented for specific case studies. Despite the importance of 
these approaches, they limit comparability and impede identification of relevant factors 
driving human trafficking. Recent attempts to empirically address the subject are a response 
to the increased attention human trafficking has received internationally.  
One part of the literature focuses on the impact and effectiveness of policies combating 
human trafficking (Di Tommaso et al., 2009; Akee et al., 2014; Avdeyeva, 2010; Simmons and 
Lloyd, 2010; Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012). In line with this strand of research, Cho et al. 
(2014) have developed an anti-trafficking policy index measuring the three main dimensions 
of the fight against trafficking: prosecution, protection and prevention.7 A second and less 
developed strand of the literature focuses on the analysis of TIP by using binary outcome 
measures. Akee et al. (2010, 2014) consider factors in the countries of origin and destination 
of victims within a binary gravity-type model.8 With a similar methodology, Akee, Basu, 
Chau and Khamis (2010) highlight the importance of ethnic fragmentation, conflict and 
internally displaced persons in source countries as determinants of trafficking flows. Cho 
(2015) models the determinants of human trafficking in- and outflows by using an extreme 
bounds analysis for numerous push and pull factors in a cross-country analysis.9 These 
results show that crime prevalence, institutional quality and vulnerable conditions of 
migrants all influence the level of human trafficking.  
The above four studies provide some initial insights into the factors driving human 
trafficking – migration flows, institutions, regulations on TIP as well as crime prevalence. 
We build on this literature by extending the analysis to human trafficking victim flows to 
Europe and identify robust determinants. Government efforts have been undertaken in 
recent years to construct more comprehensive and reliable databases on TIP victims. Several 
                                                 
7 Thus, the index is called the 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index. It is available at http://www.human-trafficking-
research.org/. 
8 The binary variable indicates the reporting of at least 100 victims of human trafficking between a specific 
source and host country. This is based on the US Department of State TIP Report (2003) and the Protection 
Project (2002) Human Rights Report.  
9 This study makes use of information on total in- and outflows per country, rather than bilateral flows. In 
addition, given its cross-sectional nature, it disregards the change of victim flows over time.  
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official institutions in Europe systematically collect such data, which to date remain largely 
unexplored.10 These national reports include the number of TIP victims observed in a 
country in a given year, as well as the nationality of every victim. Their identification is 
largely based on the TIP definition provided by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons (United Nations, 2000a), guaranteeing that the statistics are 
comparable across European countries. According to The Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons (UNODC, 2009a) Europe is one of the top destination regions for human trafficking, 
and all countries under study are classified among the largest recipients of TIP victims in 
this document.11 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has recorded the 
largest proportion of TIP cases in Europe (IOM, 2011). Analyzing Europe as a major 
destination region thus provides us with detailed insights into the trafficking process in this 
region. The data obtained for this study describes the intensity and direction of TIP flows, 
enabling a consistent and accurate analysis of the flow of victims between countries.  
This paper contributes to quantitative studies of human trafficking flows in three 
important ways. First, it is based on the analysis of officially recorded victim flows, which 
are more accurate in describing their pattern than other self-constructed estimations or 
proxies used in previous studies. By employing a fixed-effects set-up and controlling for 
data collection and reporting institutions, we show that the data are comparable across 
reporting countries. Second, given the inclusion of multiple host countries, our model allows 
for the analysis of the characteristics of countries where victims are exploited, which is a 
relevant factor in shaping the direction of TIP flows. Finally, as our data set contains 
information for several years, our study captures the evolution of policies over time, namely 
those during the expansion of the European Union. 
The gravity-type model of TIP flows from 120 countries worldwide to 13 host 
countries over the 1998-2009 period shows that human trafficking into Europe occurs via 
well-established migratory and refugee routes. In addition, the findings suggest that victims 
                                                 
10 Institutions include official anti-trafficking centres, national police offices, and ministries of interior and 
immigration offices, among others. A complete list of institutions contacted for this study is given in  
Table I. 1. 
11 Other important destination countries for victims of TIP outside Europe had not published comprehensive 
figures on the size and origin of victim flows at the time this research was conducted. 
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more often originate from source countries whose nationals do not require a visa for short 
term visits, and they are more likely to be exploited in host countries with low levels of 
institutional quality. We also find that recognition rates of asylum seekers and the legislation 
of prostitution in host countries do not affect trafficking flows significantly. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section I. 2 describes the 
phenomenon of human trafficking and presents preliminary figures. We discuss our 
hypotheses regarding host and source countries in Section I. 3, while Section I. 4 describes 
the data set and outlines the empirical strategy used. Section I. 5 shows the results, revealing 
which factors are crucial in the determination of TIP in Europe. Finally, in Section I. 6, we 
summarize and draw conclusions. 
I. 2  FRAMING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Human trafficking is a complex, multi-national issue that requires a shared definition across 
countries to effectively measure and stop it. The most precise definition of TIP is given by 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also called the Palermo 
Protocol), issued in December 2000 and adopted by the United Nations.12 The Protocol is the 
most serious attempt to internationally harmonize the definition of human trafficking 
covering not only exploitation in prostitution, but also other forms of social and economic 
misuse, as well as forced organ donation. It also highlights three core components of 
trafficking, namely the use of deception or coercion, the movement or harboring of an 
individual, and the placement of the individual in exploitative situations. All host countries 
considered in this study have signed the Protocol. It obliges states to make TIP a criminal 
offense and take measures to combat it and every form of exploitation in which it occurs, 
regardless of the sector.13 Regional programs encouraging the prosecution of offenders and 
protection of victims, such as the EU Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in 
                                                 
12 The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons is a supplement to the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, together with the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants (United Nations 2000b). Both were issued in December 2000. In addition, the UN inaugurated a Global 
Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) in 2007 (www.ungift.org). 
13 From our countries of focus, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom signed the protocol in December 2000, Poland in October 2001, and Czech 
Republic and Switzerland in December 2002.  
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Human Beings (2002), require national legislation in anti-trafficking to be consistent with the 
directives and definition of TIP given by the Protocol. Narratives and figures from national 
trafficking in persons reports across the countries analyzed are, therefore, expected to follow 
the specifications of the Protocol.14 
To get a first impression of the phenomenon the Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons (UNODC, 2009a) presents an insight into the business of human trafficking 
worldwide. Observing the distribution of victims, it becomes clear that women are the main 
targets of traffickers, comprising 66 percent of all identified victims (ibid.: 11). The report 
maintains that trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation is the 
most common case of human trafficking, accounting for 79 percent of all cases identified. 
Trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation is the second most common, accounting for 
18 percent of all cases identified. Existing evidence suggests that more than a fifth of all 
victims are children. 
In order to understand the multidimensional process of trafficking used below to 
develop our hypotheses, the modus operandi of trafficking are described and clarified. 
Human trafficking-based criminal organizations can range from individual operators, such 
as freelancers, to highly structured organizations, such as organized criminal networks 
(UNESCO, 1994; Savona et al., 1996; Schloenhardt 1999; U.S. State Department, 2003). The 
largest profits are realized during the exploitation or selling of individuals in the destination 
country, which is possible through physical coercion, fraud or deception at any point during 
the trafficking process, and is made easier when victims owe debts to traffickers. Human 
trafficking does not necessarily involve illegal international border crossing. In some cases, 
potential victims can legally enter the country of destination with official documents after 
they have been promised a job as waitress, model or construction worker, for example, and 
only realize their victimization upon arrival. In other cases, individuals can enter the 
country with a valid short-term visa and accept a job offer that requires them to remain in 
the country illegally after the document expires. In such situations, individuals often have to 
                                                 
14 In addition, The Hague Program (2004) and Stockholm Program (2009), the main guidelines for justice and 
home affairs for member states of the EU, stress the importance of international harmonization on data collection 
in the area of human trafficking.  
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pay exorbitant amounts of money for the journey to the host country and/or their legal 
documents might be retained, facilitating exploitation (Aronowitz, 2001). 
Accordingly, there are three broad scenarios in which people might fall into the hands 
of traffickers: in the first case, an individual willing to migrate contacts a border crossing 
service and either before, during or after the crossing is made, incurs a debt to the 
traffickers. If the client has outstanding debts it sharply increases the chances of them being 
exploited and psychologically and physically coerced. In the second scenario, individuals 
are deceived by a job offer abroad that appeared legitimate, and are then forced to work 
under exploitative conditions upon their arrival. In these cases, their personal identification 
is usually removed from their belongings and they are physically coerced to remain within 
the criminals’ space of influence. The final scenario is one in which individuals are 
kidnapped in their home country and transported against their will to a different place, 
where they are subsequently exploited.15 These modus operandi of traffickers play an 
important role in identifying the factors that determine TIP. Taking the different trafficking 
scenarios into account, in the next section we closely examine the possible determinants of 
human trafficking. 
I. 3 DETERMINANTS AND HYPOTHESES 
We now identify country characteristics influencing the direction and intensity of TIP flows. 
Many of these characteristics have been discussed in other papers investigating human 
trafficking (see e.g., Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; Jakobson and Kotsadam, 2013; Cho, 
2015). A summary of the ideas is presented to develop testable hypotheses.  
Every factor shaping and strengthening international movements of people is 
categorized as either a “pull” or “push” factor (Ravenstein, 1885, 1889; Sjaastad, 1962; Lee, 
1966). Push factors are source country characteristics that trigger outflows of people or 
increase the pressure to leave the country. Such factors also support human trafficking 
outflows, because the higher the willingness to emigrate, the more likely it is that an 
                                                 
15 One can imagine an additional situation in which victimization can occur when parents send their children 
away in the hope that they will gain better living or economic conditions (Jac-Kucharski, 2012). Such a scenario 
mainly takes place inside national borders, and is therefore not captured in our data as we cover international 
victim flows. 
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individual will come into contact with trafficking organizations. Pull factors, on the other 
hand, are conditions in host countries that attract migratory inflows. Trafficking flows also 
react to such factors, since the main targets of trafficking mafias are vulnerable groups 
among the population that are highly exposed to exploitation (Stark, 1991; Castles and 
Miller, 2003). Large costs for traffickers ly in finding potential victims. In cases of well-
established routes for migrating and refugees, this cost is greatly reduced, creating an ideal 
market for traffickers (Salt and Stein, 1997).  
Generally, criminal organizations prefer to look for victims where it is less costly to do 
so (push factors), transporting them through less risky routes, and exploiting them where 
revenues are higher (pull factors) (Schloenhardt, 2001). We include factors facilitating 
trafficking activities in countries of recruitment and exploitation, which equally impact upon 
mafia profits and decisions on where to locate in order to identify the most important aspect. 
Following the literature, we cover conditions in host and source countries affecting the three 
aforementioned scenarios of the human trafficking business. These factors are grouped 
within one of the following categories (Cho, 2015): movement of people, institutional quality 
and regulation, crime, and women’s rights.16 We now develop empirically testable 
hypotheses.17 
I. 3.1 Movement of people 
The international movement of people is an essential component of human trafficking. The 
expectation of higher income, better living conditions, and greater employment 
opportunities abroad encourage the choice to migrate. Theoretically it is plausible to assume 
that people are inclined to take the risk to migrate when the income gap is high, even if they 
have a stable source of income in their home country (Harris and Todaro, 1970). In empirical 
works this assumption has been challenged, with mixed results (Sjaastad, 1962; Rotte and 
Vogler, 1998). An identified trigger for migration into developed countries is a generous 
welfare system in the destination country, which attract individuals even without job 
                                                 
16 The grouping of the determinants into the four pillars as well as the selection of some variables follows Cho 
(2015). A preliminary version of this work was presented in a joint project meeting in the University of 
Goettingen in May 2010. 
17 Table A I. 3 gives an overview of the literature and corresponding hypotheses. Table A I. 4 summarizes our 
hypotheses, variables and results. 
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certainty (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Jean and Jimenez, 2011). Turning to the perspective 
of criminal organizations, it is advantageous to carry out human trafficking operations in 
countries that have a potentially sizeable population willing to migrate. This creates a large 
potential market for those offering smuggling services and/or the (false) promise of 
international job prospects.  
Evidence suggests that high income countries have a substantial demand for cheap 
labor in insecure and informal service sectors (for instance domestic and factory work, and 
prostitution) as such positions are rarely filled by nationals (ILO, 2003; O’Connell, 2011).18 
Given this market fragmentation and restricted opportunities for legalization, migrants are 
left with no other option than to subsist in the shadow economy (Friebel and Guriev, 2006; 
Akee et al., 2010).19 Poor labor conditions in informal services make the exploitation and 
strict control of victims possible, which, together with language barriers and the fear of 
deportation, deter victims from seeking legal support. Belser (2005) asserts that the 
vulnerable situation of migrants combined with the high demand and large profits from 
offering informal services in host countries creates an ideal environment for traffickers 
seeking high exploitation yields. Profits from sexual exploitation in industrialized countries 
are calculated to be around US$ 15.5 billion per year, making up half of all profits made 
worldwide in this sector (ibid.: 14). We thus conclude that income differences and 
population size of countries matter for victim flows. 
Geographical distance between countries of origin and destination is also relevant 
regarding the pattern of international movements of people. Wealthier countries that are 
geographically closer are preferred as destinations for migration due to the fact that shorter 
journeys reduce costs and risks (see, e.g., Greenwood, 1975; Jac-Kucharski, 2012). Similarly, 
professional traffickers prefer to locate their recruitment and exploitation activities closer to 
each other as moving victims within shorter distances minimizes logistical complications, 
transportation costs, as well as the risk of detection. 
                                                 
18 These insecure and informal positions are called “3-D jobs: dirty, degrading and dangerous” (ILO, 2003: 4). 
19 Since 1992, European countries limited accessibility to their territory beyond the existing restrictions 
impeding economic and non-economic migration, especially for asylum seekers and refugees. (Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2008). The role of this migrant population is further explored in Section I. 4.2. 
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Finally, criminal organizations can take advantage of well-established migratory 
flows. Using existing, often-used migratory routes makes sense for traffickers as it reduces 
costs and the chance of being caught. Joint logistic operations of recruitment, transportation 
and exploitation are simplified if criminal organizations are certain about where potential 
victims are coming from, and where they wish to go. The involvement of traffickers within 
migration networks makes it easier to manipulate the trusting relationships that exist 
between friends and relatives of an individual crossing an international border. Mahmoud 
and Trebesch (2010) show the importance of networks and family ties in a small set of 
Eastern-European countries. For these reasons, trafficking should occur more often within 
areas which exhibit intense migratory flows. A similar argumentation applies for established 
refugee flows. Besides possessing very similar characteristics to migrants, this population, 
given its vulnerable nature, is also willing to give up certain liberties and even accept being 
exploited in order to reach a destination. Both populations can be classified as people at risk 
of being trafficked (Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis, 2010). 
Traffickers will be highly interested in focusing their activities along the travel paths of both 
groups. Based on this reasoning, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: More intense human trafficking flows are observed within country pairs that 
have larger income differentials. 
Hypothesis 1b: 
Human trafficking is most likely to occur between countries with larger 
populations. 
Hypothesis 1c: 
Flows between countries are larger if the countries are geographically closer to 
each other. 
Hypothesis 1d: 
Well-established routes for migrants and refugees encourage human trafficking 
and increase the number of victims. 
I. 3.2 Institutional quality and regulation  
Institutional quality and regulatory factors determine the capacity of governments to 
uncover and prosecute criminal actors. Legal enforceability is guaranteed by the 
effectiveness of the prevailing institutions and the ability of the judicial system to prosecute 
traffickers. Human trafficking organizations therefore locate their operations where the 
probability of detection and conviction is low. Poor law enforcement and low risk of 
exposure when carrying out illicit activities are associated with larger informal economies 
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and higher rates of undetected crimes – ideal conditions for trafficking activities to flourish 
(Friedman et al., 2000). The quality of institutions also impacts the effectiveness of 
government efforts to protect vulnerable populations, including TIP victims. These activities 
comprise the control of international borders and legislation on commercial sex services. 
Furthermore, social trust has been shown to be related to institutional quality as well as to 
illegal activities and the size of the informal economy, on which many victims subsist 
(Bjørnskov, 2011; D'Hernoncourt and Méon, 2012).20 This applies to both victims' country of 
origin and destination. 
Border controls in destination countries should affect the scope of trafficking 
operations. We capture the entrance regulations into destination countries by using two 
measures: visa requirements to enter a host country, and recognition rates of asylum 
applicants. These two elements reflect border controls for migrants and refugees, 
respectively. First, the effect of visa requirements on the intensity of human trafficking is a 
priori unclear. On the one hand, when an international border is closed, a trafficking 
opportunity is created because unwanted immigrants will look for assistance in crossing the 
border illegally (Feingold, 2005; Gathmann, 2008; Akee et al., 2010; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 
2010). The ILO (2003) reports that the trafficking business becomes increasingly lucrative in 
response to this observed increase in demand. On the other hand, it can be argued that when 
an international border is open, traffickers will face little risk and low transportation costs 
when bringing victims to destination countries where labor demand in the informal sector is 
growing (ibid: 4). As mentioned in section I. 2, international borders do not necessarily need 
to be closed for human trafficking to occur. Migrants can cross international borders legally 
with a short-term visa but remain in host countries longer than they are legally allowed. 
Once they have gained an illegal status, migrants often turn to the shadow economy as the 
only possible source of income, where exploitation, and therefore trafficking, is 
commonplace (ibid). In the European context, the question of the direction of the effect of 
border controls on human trafficking is especially relevant; the expansion of the European 
                                                 
20 Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that in South Africa social trust and slavery are directly related. The 
authors look at the impact of slavery on trust relationships today and find a negative correlation. Although they 
argue that causality runs from slavery to trust, the impact of trust on trafficking seems plausible, because a lack 
of social trust probably reflects a lack of moral norms that would prevent human trafficking.  
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Union in the last decade has brought substantial changes regarding bilateral border 
controls.21 
Turning to recognition rates of asylum seekers, these illustrate the willingness of a 
country to receive international refugees. As before, the effect of rigid requirements on 
refugees wishing to settle within a country is also a priori unclear. If refugees lack the legal 
means to remain in a country, they are more likely to seek the help of criminal organizations 
and consequently are exploited (Friebel and Guriev, 2006). In contrast, granting legal status 
to victims might increase the incentive to traffic. As the stock of potential victims in 
destination countries declines, the returns from exploitation soar, promoting further 
trafficking (Akee et al., 2010, 2014). This paper seeks to reveal the direction of this 
relationship by analyzing the declining trend of asylum acceptance rates in European 
countries over the last decade.22 
As referred to above, the victims of trafficking are often subjected to sexual 
exploitation. We therefore expect levels of prostitution legislation to play a key role in 
determining trafficker's choice of destination countries; these levels determine the expected 
payoffs from and opportunities to exploit. Several empirical studies have already explored 
this relationship (e.g., Di Tommaso et al., 2009; Akee at al., 2014; Jacobson and Kotsadam, 
2013; Cho et al., 2013), but there is still no consensus on the statistical significance or 
direction of the effect of commercial sex activity legislation and levels of trafficking. There 
are two diametrically opposed lines of argumentation: abolitionists and supporters. 
Abolitionists claim that prohibiting prostitution activities considerably reduces the room for 
trafficking to occur in the commercial sex market, and thus expected profits (Aghatise, 2004; 
Jakobson and Kotsadam, 2013). Supporters, on the other hand, argue that legalizing 
commercial sex services reduces the price paid for prostitution and the opportunity for 
exploitation, consequently reducing trafficking incentives (Feingold, 2005; Akee et al., 
2014).23 We contribute to finding an answer to this debate, by examining the additional effect 
                                                 
21 For detailed information on bilateral visa requirements in the European Union, please refer to EU Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of March 15th 2001, and its subsequent updates in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009. 
22 For comprehensive statistics on asylum recognition rates, we refer to UNHCR (2009). 
23 The result in Akee et al. (2010) for legislation on prostitution in host countries is not robust. The effect 
becomes insignificant when controlling for law enforcement.  
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of regulating the market for sexual services, after controlling for the level of law enforcement 
in host countries. We expect legislation on prostitution to have differing effects on 
trafficking opportunities and risks, depending on the capacity of a government to 
implement and monitor such legislation.  
Finally, we expect that the level of social trust in destination and source countries will 
play a role in determining the levels of TIP flows. In their study of developing and 
developed countries, D'Hernoncourt and Méon (2012) find a negative relationship between 
social trust and the size of the informal economy in relation to the formal economy's share of 
total economic activity. Bjørnskov (2011) also shows that an increase in social trust decreases 
corruption significantly and is correlated with better institutional quality. Therefore we 
expect social trust to reduce opportunities to exploit victims in host countries via improved 
institutional quality and contracted informal economies. We also anticipate that social trust 
in source countries reduces the probability of victims being deceived. In summary, we 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2a:  Legal enforceability in host and source countries impacts TIP flows negatively. 
Hypothesis 2b: 
After controlling for legal enforceability, visa requirements in host countries 
and acceptance rates of asylum seekers further impact human trafficking; the 
direction of the effect for both aspects is a priori ambiguous.  
Hypothesis 2c: 
Considering the level of legal enforceability, legislation on prostitution affects 
trafficking opportunities. The direction of the effect is a priori ambiguous. 
Hypothesis 2d: Social trust reduces TIP flows in both host and source countries. 
 
I. 3.3 Crime 
Trafficking flows should flourish in countries with higher levels of criminal activity. Due to 
its scale and international nature, TIP relies on the support of intermediaries at every stage 
of the process. These intermediaries operate during the recruitment stage, where they offer 
individuals misleading job offers abroad; in the mobilization stage, where they illegally 
traffic individuals across international borders; and in the exploitation stage, where criminal 
organizations realize most of their revenue (Salt and Stein, 1997). Coordination among 
intermediaries during these three core phases is often guaranteed by larger international 
criminal organizations flexible in adapting to a constantly changing environment (Bruckert 
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and Parent, 2002; Salt, 2000; Stoecker, 2000). To some extent, trafficking mafias are likely to 
work jointly with businesses engaged in other illicit activities (drugs or arms trafficking, for 
example). Schloenhardt (2001) describes how criminal enterprises tend to share similar risks, 
such as being discovered and being forced to dismantle their operations along trafficking 
routes and prosecution. Evidence suggests that traffickers can take advantage of the 
presence of well-established criminal networks in order to commence or even deepen their 
activities. As a result, human trafficking is frequently part of a broad portfolio of activities 
carried out by large criminal organizations. Europol states that “criminal groups are 
increasingly multi-commodity and poly-criminal in their activities” (2011: 5), indicating that 
TIP can be seen as an opportunity for criminal groups to diversify their operations and 
spread their risks. 
Given the difficulties involved with homogeneously defining crime (especially in a 
multi-country context), as well as with measuring an activity whose actors are part of the 
underground population, we evaluate the extent of criminal activity by observing offenses 
which have a high probability of detection, such as homicides (Bruckert and Parent, 2002; 
Soares, 2004). Based on the above we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3: Trafficking flows are more common between country pairs with higher levels of 
criminal activity. 
 
I. 3.4 Gender dimension 
Finally, as the majority of human trafficking victims are women (see section I. 3.1), hostile 
societies towards them could increase recruitment opportunities for traffickers and thus 
increase victim numbers. Besides regular “push” factors, female migration is decisively 
affected by their social roles and their capacity to make decisions and exert autonomy in 
their country of origin (United Nations, 2006). Consequently the pressure for females to 
migrate and their likelihood of being trafficked rises as women’s degree of political 
participation and/or employment opportunities deteriorate. Cho (2013) finds that this effect 
is enhanced when the abuse and exploitation of foreign women is widely tolerated in a 
society. When societies allow women to be active and equal participants their chance of 
being exploited decreases as their general awareness of and ability to avoid trafficking 
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operations increases (Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; Cooray and Potrafke, 2012). Therefore, 
we expect that women with more equal and secure rights in a society should be less likely to 
be trafficked. 
On the other hand, however, the scope for international human trafficking should also 
be small if the norms of a society severely restrict women’s rights. Such societies do not 
allow women to make their own decisions, e.g., socializing with people other than close 
relatives or moving from one place to another.24 As a result, women are prevented from 
establishing contact with groups involved in human trafficking. If women are under 
constant supervision from their families and are not allowed to participate in the labor 
market or travel abroad, for example, they will have far fewer opportunities to come into 
contact with illegal migration services or to look for dubious job offers abroad.25 For this 
reason, we expect less human trafficking outflows from countries where women's rights are 
restricted. Taking both arguments into account we anticipate: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a non-linear relationship between women’s rights and human 
trafficking. Trafficking is less common in source countries in which women’s 
rights are either fully guaranteed or very deprived. 
I. 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our model of the determinants of victim flows uses data on 120 source countries and 13 
European destination countries in a gravity-type model, taking Akee, Basu, Chau and 
Khamis (2010) and Akee et al. (2014) as point of reference. In contrast to these authors our 
analysis draws on bilateral victim flows, allowing for more precise estimates.26 The 
following section provides a detailed description of the institutions we contacted, the data 
set we collected, and the empirical strategy we employ to account for the characteristics of 
our data. 
                                                 
24 For example, women in Saudi Arabia do not have the right to drive an automobile (BBC News, 2007; New 
York Times, 2009); and women in Yemen must obtain an approval from their husbands or fathers to receive an 
exit visa to leave the country (U.S. Department of State, 2004). 
25 In line with this argument Potrafke (2013) finds that religion matters for the implementation of anti-
trafficking policies: in countries with Christian majorities policies are stricter in the fight against human 
trafficking compared to countries with Muslim majorities. 
26 Please refer to Gassebner et al. (2010a) for a discussion on count variables estimates. 
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I. 4.1 Data  
In order to assess the intensity and origin of human trafficking inflows into Europe, we 
collected statistics from national institutions across Europe that produced TIP reports.27 
These included official anti-trafficking centers, national police offices, ministries of interior, 
immigration offices, service centers, research centers, and universities.28 To guarantee that 
victim recognition followed a homogeneous definition, we contacted only those institutions 
that incorporated the Palermo Protocol in their reports. We requested information on the 
size and origin of victim inflows to the reporting country on an annual basis. From the 37 
institutions contacted, 22 provided us with the information requested, while 10 provided 
incomplete data, and 5 did not publish their statistics. The list of institutions contacted and a 
short description of the data is presented in Table I. 1. In those countries where more than 
one institution provided complete data, the data covering the largest period were chosen for 
the analysis.29 It is also worth noting that neither France nor Italy collect data on victims of 
human trafficking following the standards of the Palermo Protocol, while Germany only 
partially publishes its TIP statistics. Therefore, these three countries were excluded from the 
analysis.30 The final data include 13 host countries in Europe and extend to 120 source 
countries, covering the 1998-2009 period. 
  
                                                 
27 Identification of victims might also occur in a transit country. However, TIP reports by national institutions 
include only victims identified after exploitation has occurred, therefore we do not consider countries of transit 
in our framework. 
28 In the EU Parliamentary Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating TIP and protecting victims, 
issued on April 5, the EU Council and EU Parliament encourage intensified data collection on human trafficking 
as well as the implementation of national rapporteurs that include “[…] gathering of statistics in close 
cooperation with relevant civil society organizations active in the field.” Hence, we include data in our analysis 
from public as well as civil society organizations.  
29 This is the case in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and 
Switzerland. In Poland and Portugal, more than one institution provided exactly the same information; in 
Denmark, the data collection process is split into two institutions, depending on the legal status of victims; in the 
remaining four countries, the institution that provided the largest series was chosen.  
30 In France, the Central Office for the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons produces statistics on victims of 
soliciting prostitution, while the Central Office for the Fight against Illegal Migration produces statistics on 
victims of labor and living conditions against human dignity - both statistics do not refer exclusively to TIP. 
Similarly, in Italy, the Ministry of Interior produces a joint statistic on victims of prostitution and TIP together. 
The German Federal Criminal Police Office publishes only the 10 largest source countries of victims. 
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Table I. 1: Institutions providing TIP Victims Statistics used 
Institution 
 
Country 
 
Range 
Inquiry 1455/J XXIV.GP (Austrian Parliament)   Austria   2005-2008 
Institute for International Research on Criminal 
Policy - IRCP   
Belgium   1999-2005 
La Strada   Czech Republic   2006-2009 
Danish Anti-Trafficking Centrea 
 
Denmark  
2009 
Danish Immigration Service     2008-2009 
Hellenic Police (Ministry of Citizen Protection)   Greece   2003-2009 
Ruhama   Ireland   2007-2009 
National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings 
- BNRMb   
Netherlands   1998-2008 
Unit for Trafficking in Human Beings (Ministry of 
Interior) 
 Poland 
 
2005-2008 
Central Team Trafficking in Human Beings (Police 
Headquarters)c   
  2005-2008 
Observatory on Trafficking in Human Beings 
(Ministry of Interior)   
Portugal   2008-2009 
Ministry of Interiord   Portugal   2008-2009 
National Police Corps of Spain   Spain   2000-2005 
Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department   Sweden   2002-2008 
Advocacy and Support for Migrant Women 
 
Switzerland  2005-2008 
and Victims of Trafficking - FIZ     
United Kingdom Human trafficking Center - UKHTC 
(Serious Organized Crime Agency - SOCA)   
United Kingdom   2008-2009 
Notes:  
a In Denmark, TIP victims legally residing are referred to the Danish Anti-Trafficking Centre, and TIP victims 
illegally residing to the Danish Immigration Service. The total number of TIP victims is therefore the sum of 
both figures. 
b Victims identified by the Dutch Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV Comenscha). 
c Numbers provided by Police Headquarters are the same as the ones from the Ministry of Interior. 
d Numbers provided are the same as the ones of the Observatory on Trafficking in Human Beings. 
One concern regarding officially recorded data is the amount of resources allocated to the 
fight against trafficking and the institutional set up (IOM, 2005). Arguably countries with 
more resources and sound legal systems might detect more human trafficking and thus 
report more victims. However, given that we focus mostly on countries that are members of 
the European Union data collection efforts as well as institutional resources should be 
similarly allocated to fight human trafficking. We use the 3P-Anti-trafficking Policy Index of 
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Cho et al. (2014) to scrutinize this assumption. The Index evaluates countries every year 
according to their performance in implementing policies to directly combat human 
trafficking, namely prosecution of traffickers, crime prevention and protection of victims. 
The Index ranges from a minimum of 3 points to a maximum of 15 points.31 Twelve of 13 
countries received an average index score between twelve and 14 for the 2000 – 2009 
period.32 These scores precisely show that policy approaches as well as the overall 
assessment within countries to fight TIP is comparable and of high standard. In order to 
account for any data collection differences in the 13 countries under consideration that 
might still be prevalent we use host country and time fixed-effects in our estimation 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, the information reported by the institutes differs in a number of ways. 
These characteristics might affect the number of victims reported by each and it is of interest 
to test the extent to which they affected the recording of flows. Three different data features 
are identified: first, victim recognition is either done through a public agency or 
individually. Public agencies recognize victims once the police and the public prosecution 
service perform investigations. If recognition is done individually, victims declare 
themselves in service centers, and professionals evaluate whether they present indications of 
human trafficking. Both types of institutes produce TIP reports and are considered in this 
study. Arguably, service centers tend to report fewer victims than police forces as they 
include the number of victims they shelter, and this is constrained by their assigned budget 
and available accommodation.33 From the 13 host countries analyzed, three TIP reports were 
generated by service centers: the Czech Republic, Ireland and Switzerland. Second, 
reporting institutes also differ in the types of exploitation they reported. Some only included 
victims of sexual exploitation, while others accounted for additional types (labor, organ 
removal, etc.). Naturally, the overall numbers reported are likely to be higher when the full 
set of exploitation types was counted. Indeed, host countries that only included sexual 
                                                 
31 More details on the construction and scoring of the 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index are available online 
under www.human trafficking-research.org. 
32 Greece was the only country in our sample to score on average lower than 12 points in the 2000 – 2009 
period. However, it has rapidly improved over time, receiving a score of 13 points in 2009.  
33 Host countries collecting statistics from service centres report 71 victims yearly on average; national police 
offices report 140.  
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exploitation scenarios reported on average 100 victims annually, whereas those that 
included all exploitation cases on average reported 135 annually. In our sample, Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland reported only victims of sexual exploitation. This might be a 
response to the politicization of human trafficking towards this segment in these countries 
(Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). And third, TIP reports also varied in the method used to 
count victims. Statistics either included the number of confirmed victims or the number of 
suspected victims (not yet confirmed by prosecution authorities). Source institutions 
counting confirmed victims reported smaller numbers, as not all persons suspected of being 
TIP victims turn out to be actual victims. Host countries counting confirmed victims 
reported on average 91 victims annually, and countries counting possible TIP victims, 
showed on average 488 victims. Best quality data is expected to come from public agencies, 
which counted confirmed victims of all types of exploitation, meaning that the reporting 
entity is fulfilling all three features. We include three data quality control dummies covering 
these dimensions in a separate specification.34 
A description of our data set is provided in Figure I. 1 and Table I. 2.35 Taking yearly 
averages as the baseline, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands reported the largest 
numbers of victims per year, 447 and 308 respectively, while Ireland and Portugal reported 
the lowest numbers, 31 and 21 respectively.  
  
                                                 
34 As later described in Section I. 4.2, we cannot consider both host country fixed-effects and the three quality 
controls simultaneously, given that the latter usually do not change over time.  
35 The figures in Table I. 2 are comparable to those published in the TIP reports by the U.S. State Department 
and the UNODC. These statistics provide only registered cases and therefore a lower bound approximation of 
the actual numbers, as in any other criminal activity. We are aware of this fact and use a carefully designed 
identification strategy to address these specific characteristics of our data and any possible reporting biases. 
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Figure I. 1: Reported number of victims per year in host countries 
 
Notes: TIP reports, refer to Table I. 1. 1998-2009 average reported. 
Moreover, as can be seen in Table I. 2, the largest proportion of victims originates from 
Eastern Europe. In nine of the 13 host countries, this region makes up at least six of the top 
ten source countries of victims. Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Nigeria and Bulgaria are 
generally the countries of origin of most victims. The distribution of victims is not 
concentrated among the top 10 source countries in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom, with more than 20 percent of the victims originating from outside 
of this group. The opposite case is true in Portugal and Poland, where only four (Brazil, 
Mozambique, Romania and Ukraine) and five (Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Russia) source countries, respectively, make up the entire number of victims. The origin of 
victims also reveals that these are nationals from common emigration countries that do not 
necessarily face strict border restrictions in the European context. 
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Table I. 2: Source countries of reported victims per year by host countries 
 
Notes: TIP reports, refer to Table I. 1. Listed are the first ten source countries with the most victims per year for 
every host country, all additional countries are aggregated to “other”, 1998-2009 average reported. 
  
Source  Ctry. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims
Hungary 19 Nigeria 16 Ukraine 12 Nigeria 19 Romania 35
Romania 18 China 9 Bulgaria 4 Thailand 10 Russia 26
Moldova 9 Romania 9 Romania 4 Romania 5 Bulgaria 15
Bulgaria 7 Bulgaria 8 Russia 4 Latvia 2 Ukraine 8
Slovak Rep. 7 Albania 7 Vietnam 3 Slovak Rep. 2 Moldova 5
Belarus 5 Russia 5 Kyrgyz Rep. 3 Ukraine 2 Nigeria 5
Ukraine 4 Moldova 4 Macedonia 2 Cameroon 1 Albania 4
Nigeria 4 Ecuador 4 Slovak Rep. 2 Cote d'Ivoire 1 Belarus 3
Czech Rep. 3 Morocco 3 Brazil 1 Hungary 1 Lithuania 3
Russia 3 Ukraine 3 Indonesia 1 Portugal 1 Uzbekistan 2
Other 14 Other 25 Other 4 Other 2 Other 8
Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims
Nigeria 16 Nigeria 46 Ukraine 37 Brazil 8 Romania 84
Romania 3 Bulgaria 38 Belarus 12 Mozambique 8 Colombia 35
Cameroon 1 Romania 22 Bulgaria 3 Romania 5 Brazil 25
Malawi 1 China 21 Romania 2 Ukraine 1 Russia 7
Zimbabwe 1 Russia 15 Russia 1 Other 0 Ukraine 7
Congo D. Rep. 1 Sierra Leone 15 Other 0 Lithuania 6
Kenya 1 Poland 11 Paraguay 5
Moldova 1 Ukraine 11 Ecuador 3
Somalia 1 Czech Rep. 9 Venezuela 3
Venezuela 1 Hungary 9 Germany 2
Other 5 Other 111 Other 8
Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims Source  Cty. Victims
Estonia 17 Brazil 29 Nigeria 68
Russia 10 Thailand 25 China 60
Poland 3 Romania 16 Romania 44
Lithuania 2 Hungary 12 Vietnam 33
Romania 2 Bulgaria 8 Slovak Rep. 26
Hungary 1 Dominican Rep. 8 Poland 17
Slovak Rep. 1 Russia 5 India 16
Nigeria 1 Serbia 5 Czech Rep. 13
Albania 1 Cameroon 4 Uganda 12
Azerbaijan 1 Ukraine 3 Zimbabwe 11
Other 1 Other 29 Other 150
Host Cty.: UK
Host Cty.: Greece
Host Cty.: Ireland Host Cty.: Netherlands Host Cty.: Poland Host Cty.: Portugal Host Cty.: Spain
Host Cty.: Sweden Host Cty.: Switzerland
Host Cty.: Austria Host Cty.: Belgium Host Cty.: Czech Rep. Host Cty.: Denmark
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I. 4.2 Estimation strategy 
Our variable of interest is the number of human trafficking cases identified in a host country 
from a source country within a given year. By employing a gravity-type model,36 these 
bilateral victim flows are modeled, allowing us to observe the effects of the characteristics of 
both sending and receiving countries. Our model specification is a zero inflated negative 
binomial, given two particular characteristics of the dependent variable: left skewed 
distribution caused by a large proportion of zeros, and over-dispersion.37 Data omissions for 
a country pair and a given year are assumed to be a true absence of victims rather than a 
missing value within that flow, given that the origin of every single victim is listed in the TIP 
reports. This produces a large proportion of zero values. In the raw data set, these account 
for close to 90 percent of all observations. Moreover, the sample mean and variance for our 
variable of interest are 0.66 and 18.66, respectively, a sign of over-dispersion. 
The first model specification in Eq. (I. 1) includes host country- and source country-
fixed-effects to control for unobserved country characteristics.38 In the second specification in 
Eq (I. 2), host country fixed-effects are not considered given the inclusion of the three data 
quality dimensions described in the previous section, which are time-invariant within 
countries. Year dummies are introduced in both specifications to correct for common shocks. 
Following the use of applied gravity models in the economic literature our basic model 
setting includes income level differences and population sums of host and source countries, 
as well as the geographical distance between country pairs. This basic setting is kept fixed 
and then subsequently enlarged to test the remaining hypotheses. The following equations 
summarize our model specifications: 
                                                 
36 Gravity models were initially conceptualized in economics of trade to identify the determinants of 
commercial trade and foreign direct investment flows. They have also been used to examine flows of migration 
and human trafficking. See, for instance, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for a gravity model application on 
trade flows, Gassebner and Méon (2010) on cross-border mergers and acquisitions flows, Sjaastad (1962), 
Greenwood (1975), Borjas (1987, 1989), Karemera et al. (2000), and Kim and Cohen (2010) on migration flows, or 
Akee et al. (2010, 2014) and Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis (2010) on human trafficking. 
37 Following Long and Freese (2006), an assessment of the differences between observed and average estimated 
probabilities from different count data models suggests the use of a zero inflated negative binomial model in our 
specification. Furthermore, a zero inflated negative binomial is preferred to a negative binomial specification 
according to Akaike's and Schwarz's Information Criterions (AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC). The same specification choice is also supported by Vuong’s likelihood ration test (Vuong, 1989).  
38 Country pair fixed-effects could lead to incidental parameter problems. If the number of variables in the 
model is substantially high, estimates might be biased (Neyman and Scott, 1948). 
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𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  ß𝐺𝐺 + ß𝑋𝑋 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜔𝑗 +  𝛾𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (I.1) 
𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  ß𝐺𝐺 + ß𝑋𝑋 + ß𝑄𝑄 +  𝜔𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (I.2) 
The dependent variable is denoted with victimsijt and is the number of TIP victims reported 
in host country i, coming from source country j, in a given year t. On the right hand side of 
the equation, const is the constant and the three variables of our basic setting are grouped in 
Matrix G. Variables to test our remaining hypotheses are found in Matrix X. Matrix Q 
contains data quality controls considering the three reporting dimensions. Host country, 
source country and time ﬁxed effects are specified by μ, ω, and γ, respectively. Our interest 
lies in the identification of the coefficient vectors βs (s = G, X, Q) and ε is the idiosyncratic 
error term. All regressions include standard errors clustered at the country pair level to 
avoid spuriously small p-values. The data sources for our three variables in Matrix G 
forming the basic model setting are the following:39 Income level differences between source 
and host countries are calculated using GDP per capita in current dollars provided by the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2010). With this variable we also test 
Hypothesis 1a. The sum of populations in source and host countries is estimated with the 
population data from the WDI and tests for Hypothesis 1b. Geographical distance within 
country pairs is taken from the Institute for Research on International Economy (CEPII, 
2010), measuring the distance in kilometers between both countries' largest agglomerations, 
to test Hypothesis 1c. All three variables are expressed in logs and are maintained as ﬁxed 
control variables in the subsequent regressions. 
The remaining hypotheses are tested with the variables in Matrix X. The stock of 
migrants and refugees coming from source country j and residing in country i, in a given 
year, are used for Hypothesis 1d. Both variables are taken from the Eurostat Population 
Statistics (EUROSTATS, 2010) and the UNHCR Refugee Statistics (UNHCR, 2009), 
respectively, and given in logs.40 Hypothesis 2a is tested with a law and order index for 
source country j and host country i taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 
2010). This index accounts for the impartiality of the legal system, as well as the capability of 
                                                 
39 Descriptions and sources for all variables are provided in Table A I. 2. 
40 A value of one is added in both statistics to include zero observations.  
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institutions to monitor activities measuring both law objectiveness and effectiveness. It takes 
a value of 1 in the worst scenario, and a value of 6 in the best one.41 The impact of border 
controls, as formulated in Hypothesis 2b, is tested with two dummy variables addressing 
visa requirements together with a continuous variable considering the recognition rate of 
asylum seekers. In the ﬁrst case, a dummy takes a value of 0 if citizens of source country j 
need a visa to enter host country i, regardless of the purpose or length of stay, for a given 
year t, and a value of 1 if such a document is not required to enter the host country for short 
visits.42 The second dummy takes a value of 1 if, in addition, citizens of source country j 
are allowed to permanently remain in the host country i without having a visa. Values 
taken by these two dummies are based on speciﬁc clauses of EU council regulations, 
Irish immigration acts, and UK immigration acts.43 The recognition rates are taken from 
the UNHCR Refugee Statistics (UNHCR, 2009) and are calculated as the number of asylum 
applications approved in host country i for asylum seekers from source country j, for a given 
year t, divided by the total number of decisions taken (approvals, rejections and closed 
cases) in the host country.  
Legislation on prostitution in host countries is addressed with two dummy variables 
that test for Hypothesis 2c. Similar to Cho et al. (2013) and Di Nicola et al. (2005), one 
dummy takes a value of 0 if the exchange of money for any type of sexual services is 
prohibited in host country i, and a value of 1 if prostitution activities are legalized in the 
same country. The other dummy takes a value of 1 if there is further prohibitive regulation 
in host country i for a given year t.44 Thus the first dummy tests the influence of legal 
                                                 
41 As host countries are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), one 
could expect a fairly similar level among them in the effectiveness of their legal systems. However, we observe 
that in our sample of host countries the law and order index takes a minimum value of 3 and a maximum value 
of 6, with a mean of 5.28 and a standard deviation of 0.74. This is an indication of sufficient variation. 
42 A short term visit cannot exceed three months according to the Council of the European Union.  
43 Council Regulation (EC) 574/1999 of March 12th 1999; Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of March 15th 2001; 
Council Regulation (EC) 2414/2001 of December 7th 2001; Council Regulation (EC) 453/2003 of March 6th 2003; 
Council Regulation (EC) 851/2005 of June 2nd 2005; Council Regulation (EC) 1791/2006 November 20th 2006; 
Council Regulation (EC) 1932/2006 of December 21st 2006; Council Regulation (EC) 1244/2009 of November 30th 
2009; Irish Immigration Act of 2004 (No. 2) Order 2006; United Kingdom Borders Act of 2007; United Kingdom 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2009. 
44 Further regulation includes allowing the operation of brothels and solicitation of sexual services. 
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prostitution per se whereas the second dummy looks at the effect of further regulation.45 
This hypothesis can only be tested in specification Eq. (I.2) because, for the most part, the 
law remains constant over time, and they are therefore perfectly collinear with the host 
country fixed-effects. The same is true for our social trust variable. As suggested by the 
literature, we take the social trust measure from the World Value Survey 2010,46 which has 
become the standard in economic research. It accounts for the percentage of the population 
in the survey that answer “yes” to the question “In general, do you think most people can be 
trusted?” Bergh and Bjørnskov (2013) show this variable to be correlated with other 
measures of trust such as honesty and also to be stable over time for most countries. We use 
this variable in model specification Eq. (I.2) to test the relationship between social trust and 
human trafficking expected from Hypothesis 2d. 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we include the intentional homicide rates in source 
country j and host country i to account for the prevalence of criminal activity. Data are taken 
from the Crime Trend Survey of the UNODC (UNODC, 2009b). The statistic on intentional 
homicides captures a wide range of acts, including domestic disputes that end in a killing, 
interpersonal violence, and violent conflicts over land resources, inter-gang violence over 
control of territory, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups, and excludes 
deaths arising from armed conflict. Even though the line between large-scale criminal 
violence and low level armed conflict is sometimes blurred, the international homicide rate 
is the best measure we are aware of for distinguishing criminal activity from social unrest. It 
acts as a proxy for the incidence of criminal activities and should ignore violence emerging 
from civil wars. And finally, we test Hypothesis 4 using the women’s political rights index 
from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI, Cingranelli and Richards, 2006). 
The indicator covers the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold 
                                                 
45 National laws define the values taken by these two dummies. Articles 104 to 106 and 214 to 217 of the 
Austrian Criminal Code; articles 136 and 379 to 380 of the Belgian Criminal Code; article 204 of the Czech 
Republic Penal Code; articles 228 to 233 of the Danish Penal Code; Article 349 of the Greek Criminal Code; Irish 
Criminal Law (Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Offenses) Bill of 2006; article 273 of the Dutch Criminal Code; 
articles 203 to 205 of the Polish Penal Code; articles 169 to 170 of the Portuguese Penal Code; articles 187 to 189 of 
the Spanish Penal Code; chapter 6 of the Swedish Penal Code; article 195 of the Swiss Criminal Code; United 
Kingdom Sexual Offenses Act of 2003. 
46 The social trust measure has been taken from Bergh and Bjørnskov (2013) who construct a measure that is the 
average of all available observations per country.  
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elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right 
to petition government officials. We take these rights as indicative of personal freedoms of 
women. These rights are the most fundamental guarantee of equal opportunities for women 
in a society. The index addresses the limitation of women’s options and decisions coming 
from a restriction in their participation in the political process rather than those coming 
solely from economic disadvantages.47 A value of 0 indicates the worst scenario, i.e., little or 
no women’s rights, and a value of 3 indicates the best-case scenario. The index is introduced 
in the data analysis with dummy variables. Given that the index is never equal to zero in our 
time frame, only two dummy variables are needed for the regressions. One dummy takes a 
value of 0 if the index is equal to 1, and a value of 1 if the index is equal to 2. The other 
dummy takes a value of 1 if the index is equal to 3, and 0 otherwise.  
Matrix Q in specification Eq. (I.2) contains three dummy variables controlling for the 
data quality dimensions described above. The first dummy takes a value of 0 if the TIP 
report in host country i is based on information provided by a public agency and a value of 1 
if it is provided by a service center. The second dummy takes a value of 0 if the TIP report 
only includes cases of sexual exploitation and a value of 1 if it also considers other types of 
exploitation. The third dummy takes a value of 0 if the TIP report counts confirmed victims, 
and a value of 1 if it takes suspected victims into account. Summary statistics of the 
explanatory variables are shown in appendix Table A I. 1. Table A I. 4 lists and describes the 
explanatory variables and provides an overview of the sources.  
I. 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents results for the hypotheses developed in Section I. 3. Estimates refer to 
the number of victims identified by the authorities; they have been interpreted carefully 
with the acknowledgement that they do not completely capture the entire victim population. 
However, the estimation strategy allows us to provide valuable insights into the drivers of 
the phenomenon. Results suggest that TIP data collection by official institutions in Europe is 
                                                 
47 Economic disadvantages of women are expected to influence human trafficking as well. However, we expect 
that the other variables in model specification Eqs. (I. 1) and (I. 2), such as income level differences between host 
and source countries, capture this effect.  
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comparable across countries and time and its examination helps to increase the 
understanding of human trafficking. 
I. 5.1 General findings 
In Tables I. 3 and I. 4 results for model specification Eqs. (I. 1) and (I. 2) are presented, 
respectively. We display marginal effects with robust p-values in brackets indicating levels 
of significance. The alpha coefficient at the bottom of the table is the dispersion parameter.48  
Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c predict that trafficking flows between country pairs 
increase with income disparity and population sizes while they decrease with geographical 
distance, respectively. Results confirm that this is indeed the case. As can be seen in columns 
1 to 7 in Table I. 3 and columns 1 to 9 in Table I. 4, the average marginal effects (AMEs) for 
all three basic variables have the expected signs in both model specification Eqs. (I. 1) and (I. 
2), however, the magnitudes and levels of significance are higher in model specification Eq. 
(I .2) for the income disparity and population size variables. Given that our data sample 
covers a short period of time, the effect of income disparity and population size is most 
likely captured by the host country fixed-effects in model specification Eq. (I. 1). 
                                                 
48 This parameter must be different from zero in order to validate the assumption of over-dispersion of the 
data, therefore also testing whether the zinb model is appropriate. If alpha is not equal to zero, a negative 
binomial model is a more appropriate specification than a Poisson-type model. Clearly this is the case in our data 
set.  
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Table I. 3: TIP victim flows, 1998-2009 (unbalanced panel) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral TIP victim flows to 13 countries in Europe. Estimation method is a 
zero inflated negative binomial (zinb) including host country, source country and time fixed-effects. Reported 
values are average marginal effects, robust p-values in brackets; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. The whole sample, without restriction of observations is used (full sample).  
These initial findings are also in line with Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis (2010) and Akee et 
al. (2014). The results for income inequality between host and source countries reflect push 
and pull factors of international movements of people, as individuals are more inclined to 
migrate when the gap between income at home and potential income abroad is high. It also 
reveals traffickers’ preferences towards operation locations. Higher incomes in host 
countries make it more attractive for traffickers to exploit victims in these locations due to 
higher profit expectations, while higher income in source countries makes it more difficult 
for traffickers to find potential victims, given the associated smaller number of vulnerable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) GDP pc differences 0.372 1.208*** 0.544* 0.405 1.058 0.842 0.727**
[0.164] [0.000] [0.061] [0.281] [0.169] [0.236] [0.019]
(log) Population sum 1.173 0.783 0.112 1.925 0.651 -0.854 -0.735
[0.329] [0.589] [0.927] [0.314] [0.857] [0.822] [0.594]
(log) Distance -1.788*** -0.974*** -1.688*** -2.509*** -4.438*** -2.351** -1.193***
[0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000]
(log) Foreign population 0.393***
[0.000]
(log) Refugees 0.276***
[0.000]
Law and order (host) -1.297*** -2.603***
[0.000] [0.000]
Law and order (source) -0.276 -0.060
[0.177] [0.877]
Visa dummy 1 1.884***
[0.001]
Visa dummy 2 0.057
[0.876]
Asylum recognition rate 0.691
[0.367]
Homicide rate (host) -0.667
[0.183]
Homicide rate (source) -0.037
[0.487]
Women's Index 2 (source) 0.225
[0.188]
Women's Index 3 (source) 0.113
[0.663]
Alpha parameter 0.789*** 0.625*** 0.749*** 0.721*** 0.706*** 0.460*** 0.749***
 (over dispersion) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Observations 11,076 8,060 11,023 7,962 4,235 3,489 9,585
Host FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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people. Findings for geographical distance show that individuals migrate to higher income 
countries that are geographically closer. In addition, they also suggest that traffickers recruit 
victims who are as close as possible to the chosen target location in order to reduce 
transportation costs. Clandestine transport of victims is costly, and the profits from 
trafficking decrease with increasing distances.  
The variables accounting for migrant and refugee flows are included in columns 2 and 
3 respectively of both Tables I. 3 and I. 4. The positive influence of both variables on human 
trafficking flows, as predicted in Hypothesis 1d, is corroborated. As can be seen, the 
marginal effects are positive and significant in both cases, at the 1 percent level, in both 
model specification Eqs. (I. 1) and (I. 2). These results imply that well-established migratory 
and refugee routes within a host-source country pair have a positive effect on the number of 
people trafficked between that pair. The magnitude of the effect is slightly larger for 
migrants than for refugees. Specifically, a threefold increase in the stock of migrants 
originating from a given source country and residing in a given host country, translates into 
one additional TIP victim being reported within the same country pair. A fourfold increase 
in the stock of refugees produces the same outcome. These findings suggest that trafficking 
mafias have a better chance of finding potential victims when there is a considerable 
population willing to relocate. This indicates a systematic pattern between migrant and 
refugee flows, and victimization, supporting the concept that these are important vulnerable 
population pools for human trafficking. For this reason, mafia operations involving human 
trafficking are most likely to be located at both ends of well-established migratory and 
refugee routes.  
Institutional quality and regulation factors in host and source countries are included in 
columns 4 and 5 in Table I. 3 and in columns 4 to 6 in Table I. 4. These are expected to impact 
the flow of victims negatively, as stated in Hypothesis 2a. Results indicate that the quality of 
the legal system in host countries seems to have a systematic influence on human trafficking 
flows. In both model specifications Eqs. (I. 1) and (I. 2), the law and order variable in host 
countries is negative and statistically significant, at the 1 percent level. Although it is 
negative for source countries, it fails to be significant at conventional levels indicating that it 
has no influence on the intensity of the human trafficking flow from that country. The 
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results suggest that sound institutions are a deterrent for trafficking operations. As expected, 
traffickers prefer to locate their activities in countries where they are less likely to be 
prosecuted and can keep their operations hidden. This appears to have no impact on the 
process of recruiting victims in source countries. It is quite possible that human trafficking is 
difficult to detect when deceiving job offers are at the heart of the decision to migrate, or 
when human trafficking does not involve the transport of persons (when borders are open, 
for example). Victims usually only come to the realization that they have been trafficked 
after they have reached their destination, making it even more difficult for source country 
authorities to identify them as victims. Therefore, trafficking mafias do not necessarily need 
a poor institutional environment during the recruitment process; this is only a factor in their 
other exploitative activities. 
The effect of border control for migrants and refugees on trafficking flows is a priori 
ambiguous, as predicted by Hypothesis 2b. Results are presented in columns 4 and 5 of 
Tables I. 5 and I. 6. Column 4 reports the impact of entrance regulations for migrants with 
two dummies. The first visa dummy identifies the change in the likelihood of being 
trafficked if visa requirements are lifted for short-term stays, while the second dummy 
indicates whether this change prevails for long-term stays. The marginal effect of the first 
dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, whereas the second dummy has no 
significant effect in either model specification Eqs. (I. 1) or (I. 2). 
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Table I. 4: TIP victim flows, 1998-2009 (unbalanced panel) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral TIP victim flow to 13 countries in Europe. Estimation of the full 
sample by zero inflated negative binomial (zinb) including source country and time fixed-effects, and data 
quality controls. Reported values are average marginal effects, robust p-values in brackets; *, **, *** significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
This shows that, even after institutional quality is held constant, better trafficking 
opportunities exist when potential victims are not required to obtain an entry permit for 
short-term stays. Within country pairs with such visa policies, there are, on average, two 
more victims when compared to other country pairs with different entry requirements. The 
scope for trafficking vanishes, however, when third country nationals are allowed to stay 
permanently. From these results, we observe that trafficking mafias in Europe do not tend to 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(log) GDP pc differences 1.761*** 1.677*** 1.523*** 2.753*** 4.327*** 2.697*** 1.971** 1.686*** 2.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.000] [0.000]
(log) Population sum 1.200*** 1.061*** 1.129*** 1.353*** 2.886*** 1.486*** 1.434** 1.023*** 1.116***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.000] [0.000]
(log) Distance -1.803*** -0.731** -1.730*** -2.390*** -4.396*** -2.483*** -2.241** -1.760*** -1.563***
[0.000] [0.025] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.000] [0.007]
(log) Foreign population 0.395***
[0.000]
(log) Refugees 0.226***
[0.000]
Law and order (host) -0.684*** -1.069*** -0.356
[0.000] [0.004] [0.135]
Law and order (source) -0.219 -0.071 -0.260
[0.335] [0.867] [0.273]
Visa dummy 1 2.545***
[0.001]
Visa dummy 2 -0.125
[0.719]
Asylum recognition rate 0.989
[0.204]
Prostitution legal (host) 0.994
[0.122]
Prostitution regulation (host) 0.449
[0.147]
Social trust (host) -0.029**
[0.034]
Social trust (source) -1.851
[0.549]
Homicide rate (host) 0.229
[0.256]
Homicide rate (source) 0.090
[0.756]
Women's Index 2 (source) -0.274
[0.201]
Women's Index 3 (source) -0.073
[0.235]
Institution type -1.271*** -1.285*** -1.219*** -0.857** -2.364*** -0.557 -1.160*** -1.290*** -1.420**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.025] [0.009] [0.183] [0.009] [0.001] [0.027]
Exploitation type 1.256*** 1.602*** 1.427*** 1.181*** 2.823*** 0.526 0.898** 1.350*** 1.670**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.242] [0.016] [0.001] [0.019]
Confirmed victims 1.457*** 0.695*** 1.214*** 2.609*** 4.424*** 2.346*** 2.187*** 1.405*** 1.154*
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.055]
Alpha parameter 0.913*** 0.762*** 0.886*** 0.883*** 0.683*** 0.889*** 0.887*** 0.622 0.905***
(over dispersion) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.159] [0.000]
Observations 11,076 8,060 11,023 7,962 4,235 7,962 7,925 3,489 9,585
Host FE No No No No No No No No No
Source FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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operate through assisting illegal migration, but rather through the provision of deceptive job 
opportunities. Borders are open for a large proportion of potential victims and the room 
for victim exploitation disappears when residence is not constrained. Likewise, the 
impact of entrance regulations for refugees is tested by the asylum recognition rate in 
column 5. The marginal effects of this variable fail to be significant at conventional levels 
in both, suggesting that human trafﬁcking is not affected by border controls for refugees 
after considering the inﬂuence of legal system quality. Therefore, such restrictions do not 
affect the chances of refugees being victimized, but rather it is the institutional quality 
within the host country that exposes the refugee population to more exploitative situations. 
Contrary to our expectations from Hypothesis 2c, the empirical analysis suggests that 
legislation of prostitution activities in host countries has no systematic influence on victim 
numbers, as shown in column 6 of Table I.4. Please note that the two dummy variables 
addressing legislation on prostitution are only introduced in model specification Eq. (I.2), 
due to low variability over time. The first dummy captures the additional effect of legalizing 
the commerce of sexual services in host countries after controlling for institutional quality, 
while the second dummy captures the additional effect of further regulation of the market 
for prostitution. The marginal effects of both dummies turn out to be insignificant at 
conventional levels, implying similar trafficking opportunities regardless of the legal status 
and regulation of commercial sexual activities in host countries. Legislation of prostitution 
activities seems to play a minor role in creating incentives for human trafficking, in contrast 
to deficiencies in legal systems. These results are in contrast to the findings of Cho et al. 
(2014) and Jacobson and Kotsadam (2013). Exploitation and/or coercion into the prostitution 
market are a consequence of poor institutional quality to monitor these activities, rather than 
specific legislation in this segment. Results might also respond to the growing importance of 
other non-sexual forms of exploitation in TIP inflow patterns.49  
                                                 
49 For example, according to the Dutch Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV Comensha), segments 
other than sexual exploitation accounted for 51 percent of all human trafficking cases in the Netherlands in 2009. 
The same figures are 55 percent for the United Kingdom in 2009, and 69 percent for Belgium in 2010 - according 
to the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) and the Belgium National Immigration 
Department, respectively.  
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We also find that generalized trust effects matter in host countries but not in source 
countries, as shown in column 7 of Table I.4. In host countries, social trust is associated with 
less intense TIP flows, which is in line with our expectations in Hypothesis 2d. The larger 
the population that thinks most people can be trusted in a society the fewer the exploitation 
opportunities for traffickers in host countries. Social trust leads to a sound institutional 
environment, hindering traffickers' efforts to find loopholes for exploitative placements. We 
do not find any systematic relationship of trust levels in source countries suggesting no 
influence on recruitment operations.  
Turning to Hypothesis 3 we find no effect of crime levels on human trafficking flows. 
The marginal effect in column 6 of Table I.3, and column 8 in Table I.4 is probably a 
consequence of the sample size induced by the low availability of this variable. The Crime 
Trend Survey of the UNODC is still the most comprehensive compilation of crime statistics 
we are aware of, but the number of observations drops sharply, to almost a third of the size 
of other specifications, when the homicide rate is included in the regression. Thus, results 
obtained here are based on incomplete information.50 
The Empirical results do not suggest a gender dimension in the intensity of victim 
flows as suggested by Hypothesis 4. Column 7 in Table I.3 and column 9 in Table I.4 report 
the results. Women’s political rights in source countries do not show a non-linear 
relationship. The marginal effects of both dummy variables are not significant, although the 
p-value of the first dummy is considerably lower than that of the second dummy. We find 
no support for the argument that the level of political rights for women in source countries 
has an impact on recruitment opportunities, although the signs of the coefficients and size of 
the respective p-values point to a possible inverted U-shape relationship.  
Finally, we turn to the reporting quality controls, included only in model specification 
Eq. (I.2) – reported in Table I.4 – that ensure data comparability across countries in a 
framework without host country fixed-effects. With the exception of model 6, all three 
variables are significant at conventional levels. The negative sign for the institution type 
variable indicates that public agencies tend to report fewer victims than do service centers. 
                                                 
50 Subsection I. 5.2 shows that insignificant results for homicide rates are very likely to be driven by the quality 
of the data sample. 
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This outcome might reflect the fact that victims are often hesitant to contact or work together 
with the police, as they fear deportation or punishment (Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). In 
addition, institutes report significantly larger victim numbers when their statistics include 
victims of all kinds of exploitation, rather than only sexual exploitation, and also if they 
count suspected victims, rather than confirmed victims. These results suggest that reporting 
characteristics of institutions producing TIP statistics require special attention, as their 
inclusion in the empirical analysis has a systematic influence. Our main findings are 
therefore based on the fixed-effects setting where we control for all potential unobserved 
time invariant factors inducing TIP flows.  
I. 5.2 Robustness checks 
We use numerous approaches to check the robustness of the results. First, as the sample size 
changes substantially from one regression to another, we perform the analysis with different 
sample sizes but hold the number of observations equal across all regressions. We then 
check if coefficient signs, sizes and significance levels remain similar, regardless of sample 
size. We construct three sample sizes, excluding observations with missing values for the 
law and order index variable, then for the asylum recognition rate variable, and finally for 
the homicide rate variable, respectively. Here, we show regression results for the first case 
only.51 Tables I.5 and I.6 present the analysis outcome when we exclude observations with 
missing values for the law and order index and for our two model specifications, 
respectively.   
                                                 
51 Results excluding observations with missing values for the asylum recognition rate and homicide rate 
variables are available upon request.  
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Table I. 5: TIP victim flows, reduced sample, 1998-2009 (unbalanced panel) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral TIP victim flows to 13 countries in Europe. Estimation by zero 
inflated negative binomial (zinb) including host country, source country and time fixed-effects. Reported values 
are average marginal effects, robust p-values in brackets; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. Sample size reduced 
in order to match availability of host country law and order variable.  
The results remain similar in direction and magnitude, at similar levels of significance. 
Likewise, when we exclude observations with missing values for the asylum recognition 
rate variable, results do not change noticeably. It is worth noting that under this setting, as 
in previous specifications, the effect of border controls for refugees does not turn out to be 
significant at conventional levels either. Reducing the sample by excluding observations 
with missing values for the homicide rate variable does, however, change the picture. But 
for a few exceptions, the coefficients in all regressions are significant. This supports the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) GDP pc differences 0.538 1.682*** 0.683 0.405 1.058 0.860 0.925**
[0.137] [0.000] [0.107] [0.281] [0.169] [0.270] [0.035]
(log) Population sum 1.593 0.653 -0.484 1.925 0.651 -1.245 -1.112
[0.392] [0.747] [0.794] [0.314] [0.857] [0.782] [0.597]
(log) Distance -2.278*** -1.178*** -2.320*** -2.509*** -4.438*** -2.569*** -2.184***
[0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(log) Foreign population 0.532***
[0.000]
(log) Refugees 0.400***
[0.000]
Law and order (host) -1.297*** -2.603***
[0.000] [0.000]
Law and order (source) -0.276 -0.060
[0.177] [0.877]
Visa dummy 1 1.884***
[0.001]
Visa dummy 2 0.057
[0.876]
Asylum recognition rate 0.691
[0.367]
Homicide rate (host) -0.758
[0.127]
Homicide rate (source) -0.036
[0.520]
Women's Index 2 (source) 0.333
[0.190]
Women's Index 3 (source) 0.081
[0.829]
Alpha parameter 0.922*** 0.741*** 0.903*** 0.969*** 0.706*** 0.632*** 0.870***
(overdispersion) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 7,962 5,940 7,935 7,962 4,235 3,226 7,138
Host FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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suggestion that the number of observations in this regression is driving the results for this 
variable, which is not significant at conventional levels in any of the specifications. 
Consequently, except for regressions including homicide rates, differences in sample size do 
not seem to influence regression outcomes, an indication of consistency in the determinants 
of TIP victim inflows into the 13 host countries.  
Second, we check whether the results hold for different estimation methods. Here, we 
run the regressions using negative binomial and probit models, as well as an OLS model 
with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, and obtain very similar results.52 Although 
Negative Binomial models do not account for the excess zeros in the dependent variable, 
unlike Poisson models, they do address over-dispersion. The results from the negative 
binomial specifications are almost identical to those from the initial zero inflated negative 
binomial specification. Sizes, signs and significance levels remain (almost) unaffected, 
adding further support to the suggestion that the results predominantly reflect 
interdependent behavior of the explanatory variables, and to a lesser extent model 
specification selection. Probit models test for the probability of the occurrence of human 
trafficking. We construct a binary variable which takes a value of one if at least one TIP 
victim is reported within a country pair, and zero otherwise. Results do not differ 
qualitatively from base results. The three gravity variables take the expected sign and are 
significant at conventional levels. All other results are also supported. The OLS estimator 
with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors assumes heteroskedasticity, time trend as well as 
correlation between groups (country pairs) is used. The coefficients resemble those in Tables 
I.5 and I.6 in terms of sign and statistical significance. We conclude that our results are 
robust to the assumption of contemporaneous dependence between country-pairs as well.  
 
  
                                                 
52 Results for the negative binomial, probit and OLS with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors specifications as well 
as for the exclusion of Greece are available upon request.  
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Table I. 6: TIP flows, reduced sample, 1998-2009 (unbalanced panel) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral TIP victim flows to 13 countries in Europe. Estimation is a zero 
inflated negative binomial (zinb) including source country and time fixed-effects, and data quality controls. 
Reported values are average marginal effects, robust p-values in brackets; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
Sample size reduced in order to match availability host country law and order variable. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(log) GDP pc differences 2.553*** 2.468*** 2.244*** 2.753*** 4.327*** 2.697*** 2.707*** 2.146** 2.335***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.000]
(log) Population sum 1.652*** 1.467*** 1.544*** 1.353*** 2.886*** 1.486*** 1.333*** 1.568*** 1.333***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000]
(log) Distance -2.462*** -1.026** -2.349*** -2.390*** -4.396*** -2.483*** -2.410*** -2.421** -2.286***
[0.000] [0.025] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [0.000]
(log) Foreign population 0.551***
[0.000]
(log) Refugees 0.329***
[0.001]
Law and order (host) -0.684*** -1.069*** -0.356
[0.000] [0.004] [0.135]
Law and order (source) -0.219 -0.071 -0.260
[0.335] [0.867] [0.273]
Visa dummy 1 2.545***
[0.001]
Visa dummy 2 -0.125
[0.719]
Asylum recognition rate 0.989
[0.204]
Prostitution legal (host) 0.994
[0.122]
Prostitution regulation (host) 0.449
[0.147]
Social trust (host) -0.031**
[0.015]
Social trust (source) -2.992
[0.440]
Homicide rate (host) -0.300
[0.180]
Homicide rate (source) -0.075
[0.227]
Women's Index 2 (source) 0.250
[0.382]
Women's Index 3 (source) -0.162
[0.700]
Institution type -1.327*** -1.441*** -1.215*** -0.857** -2.364*** -0.557 -0.931** -1.492*** -1.233***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.008] [0.025] [0.009] [0.183] [0.032] [0.008] [0.008]
Exploitation type 1.506*** 2.047*** 1.755*** 1.181*** 2.823*** 0.526 0.715* 1.767*** 1.561***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.242] [0.078] [0.003] [0.002]
Confirmed victims 2.100*** 0.854*** 1.760*** 2.609*** 4.424*** 2.346*** 2.528*** 1.299** 1.897***
[0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.000]
Alpha parameter 0.980*** 0.741*** 0.886*** 0.883*** 0.683*** 0.889*** 0.906*** 0.632 0.870***
(over dispersion) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.453] [0.000]
Observations 7,962 5,940 7,935 7,962 4,235 7,962 6,983 3,226 7,138
Host FE No No No No No No No No No
Source FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 CHAPTER I 
 
57 
Finally, given the concern that a comparison across reporting institutions might not be 
feasible, we exclude those observations for which a host country scored less than 10 in the 
3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index. Greece in the 2003-2005 period meets this criteria. The 
results are not different except for the specification including the homicide rate where the 
number of observations drops considerably. Overall, we do not observe a fundamental 
change of the results regardless of the constraints we put on the data.  
I. 6 CONCLUSION 
Summing up, this study is the first to quantitatively analyze the determinants of human 
trafficking by employing officially recorded victim flows. This is a new addition to the 
literature and improves upon previous work on the topic, as these had only measured 
human trafficking incidence, a common proxy in empirical analysis, rather than intensity. To 
the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies employing TIP victim numbers in 
order to identify its drivers.  
Results show that the frequency of human trafficking between country pairs increases 
with cross-country income disparity and decreasing geographical distance from each other. 
Trafficking organizations prefer to recruit victims in lower income countries, where the size 
of the vulnerable population is larger, and exploit them in higher income countries, where 
profits are higher. Recruitment and exploitation activities are more likely to be located 
between geographically closer countries presumably due to lower logistical and victim 
transportation costs. Furthermore, human trafficking appears to occur more often along 
well-established migratory and refugee routes, as the chance of finding potential victims 
increases when there is a considerable population willing to relocate and the set-up costs for 
illegal infrastructure (in the form of contacts, known drop-off points and inroads etc.) are 
already paid. 
From our findings it can be seen that good institutional quality hinders exploitation 
opportunities in host countries, but does not reduce recruitment operations in source 
countries. In addition, human trafficking seems to be more likely to occur between country 
pairs where citizens from the source country are not required to acquire a travelling 
document to enter the host country. Trafficking incentives disappear, however, when those 
same citizens are allowed to stay in the host country without constraints. These results 
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indicate the way traffickers operate in Europe. It seems to be the case that victims are more 
likely to be contacted through the offering of deceptive job opportunities rather than 
smuggling services. A large proportion of the victims (41 percent in our dataset) are not 
required to acquire a permit to enter the host countries in our analysis, and possibly only 
come to realize that they have been trafficked upon reaching their destination. This suggests 
that authorities face challenges in identifying TIP victims before they have been exploited in 
host countries. Host country recognition rates of asylum seekers, on the other hand, do not 
impact victim flows. Refugees appear not to be exposed to exploitation by trafficking mafias 
once they have reached a host country, whether or not they have been granted asylum. 
Interestingly, the legal status and regulation of commercial sex services do not impact upon 
exploitation opportunities in host countries. This finding suggests that sound institutional 
quality ensures a limited scope for exploitation and coercion in the prostitution market, 
regardless of the type of legislation, be it abolitionist or supporter. We also observe that 
higher social trust levels in host countries are associated with a lower intensity of trafficking. 
And lastly, the status of women’s rights does not affect recruitment opportunities in source 
countries. Apparently, the vulnerable position of women to trafficking is better captured by 
their lack of economic opportunities and willingness to migrate rather than inability to 
participate in the political life of their home country. 
Trafficking in persons is a business routed in the international movement of people 
and, as is the case with any other criminal activity, is driven by large profits. Even if borders 
are open, as in the European Union, governments from both sides must monitor and assist 
such movements in order to reduce trafficking opportunities. Our findings indicate that 
policies seeking to combat human trafficking should not focus exclusively on the 
implementation of optimal legislation for commercial sex services. In fact, policies should 
center on adopting and enforcing anti-trafficking law and strengthening the prosecution and 
conviction of offenders. This would lead to a more effective reduction in victim numbers in 
the future. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table A I.1: Summary statistics 
 
Notes: Summary statistics include number of observations (Obs.), mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), minimum 
(Min.) and maximum (Max.) of the respective variable. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(log) GDP pc diff 11558 2.18 1.71 -2.8 6.16 
(log) Population sum 12770 31.58 2.35 25.19 38.94 
(log) Distance (km) 12028 8.468 0.84 5.08 9.88 
(log) Foreign population 8697 4.98 2.91 0 13.04 
(log) Refugees 12782 1.39 2.12 0 10.88 
Law and order (host) 12852 5.27 0.74 3 6 
Law and order (source) 8477 3.75 1.33 0.5 6 
Prostitution dummy 1 (host) 12882 0.87 0.33 0 1 
Prostitution dummy 2 (host) 12978 0.4 0.49 0 1 
Asylum recognition rate 5604 0.14 0.22 0 1 
Visa dummy 1 12978 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Visa dummy 2 12978 0.1 0.31 0 1 
Homicide rate (host) 10148 1.14 0.62 0 2.6 
Homicide rate (source) 4038 4.6 8.07 0 90.76 
Women's Index 2 (source) 10086 0.72 0.44 0 1 
Women's Index 3 (source) 10086 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Trust (all waves) host 12976 40.15 15.39 19.31 68.08 
Trust (all waves) source 8246 24.57 13.34 3.51 68.08 
Dummy Institution type 12872 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Dummy Exploitation type 12858 0.67 0.46 0 1 
Dummy Confirmed victims 12850 0.8 0.39 0 1 
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Table A I.2: Data description and sources 
  
Variable Description Source Years
Victim flow TIP victims in host country from source country TIP reports. Refer to Table 1. 1998-2009
(log) GDP per capita 
differences
GDP per capita in current US dollars ratio 
between host and source country.
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) database.
1998-2009
(log) Population sum Total population sum of host and source 
country.
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. 1998-2009
(log) Distance Geographical distance between host and source 
country’s largest cities in terms of population 
share.
Institute for Research on the 
International Economy 
(CEPII).
1998-2009
(log) Foreign population Stock of permanent migrants in host country 
from source country.
European Union Statistical 
Office (EUROSTAT).
2001-2009
(log) Refugees Number of refugees in host country from source 
country.
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
1998-2009
Law and order (host)
Law and order (source)
Prostitution dummy 1 
(host)
Legal status of prostitution dummy in host 
country. 0 (not legal), 1 (legal).
Self-construction, based on 
national legislation.            Refer 
to page 18.
1998-2009
Prostitution dummy 2 
(host)
Regulation status of prostitution dummy in host 
country: 0 (not regulated), 1 (regulated).
Self-construction, based on 
national legislation.                    
Refer to page 18.
1998-2009
Visa dummy 1 Short term visa requirement dummy in host 
country for citizen from source country: 0 
(required), 1 (not required ).
Self-construction, based on 
multilateral and national 
legislation.                                  
Refer to page 19.
1999-2009
Visa dummy 2 Long term visa requirement dummy in host 
country for citizens from source country: 0 
(required), 1 (not required ).
Self-construction, based on 
multilateral and national 
legislation.                                 
Refer to page 19.
1999-2009
(log) Asylum recognition 
rate
Number of recognitions out of total decisions in 
host country for asylum seekers from source 
country.
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
1998-2009
Homicide rate (host)
Homicide rate (source)
Social trust (host)
Social trust (source)
Women’s index 2 Women’s political rights index dummy: 0 (index 
different to 2), 1 (index equals 2).
Cingranelli- Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Dataset.
1998-2008
Women’s index 3 Women’s political rights index dummy: 0 index 
different to 3), 1 index equals 3).
Cingranelli- Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Dataset.
1998-2008
Institution type Data quality control for type of institution: 0 
(service center), 1 (public agency).
Self-constructed, based on TIP 
reports.Refer to Table 1
1998-2009
Exploitation type Data quality control for types of exploitation 
accounted for: 0 (only sexual exploitation), 1 
(other types in addition).
Self-constructed, based on TIP 
reports.  Refer to Table 1 1998-2009
Confirmed victims Data quality control for counting victim 
method: 0 (confirmed), 1 (suspected).
Self-constructed, based on TIP 
reports. Refer to Table 1
1998-2009
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).
1998-2009
Percentage of a population that answers yes to 
the question "In general, do you think most 
people can be trusted?" Average over all 
observations.
World Value Survey (2010), 
provided by Bergh and 
Bjørnskov (2013)
2000-2010
Homicides per 100,000 people 
UN Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems (UNODC-
CTS).
2000-2008
Law and order index. From 0 (worst) to 6 (best).
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II. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Since human trafficking (HT) is the third largest illicit international commerce, after 
illegal drug and weapon smuggling (U.S. Department of State, 2004), it creates an 
underground economy of illegal labor markets and businesses where immense profits 
and great suffering go hand in hand. Profit estimates range from 1 billion dollars (Belser, 
2005) to 31.61 billion dollars (Interpol, 2012; ILO, 2005); money that is generated on tax 
evasion and presumably used for illegal businesses that traffic individuals as well as 
other associated activities. The trafficked are abused through exploitation and coercion 
and deprived of the freedom to move or choose their place of living (Gallagher, 2009a). 
Like other transnational criminal activities it is also linked with the corruption of civil as 
it bypasses borders, undermines state sovereignty and threatens state governance and 
human security (Shelley, 1999). 
To render the clandestine phenomena of human trafficking visible, the objective of 
this chapter is to render trafficking in persons visible through suggesting a new measure 
of HT addressing the extent of victim exploitation in destination countries. Based on 
observed causes and indicators, the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) 
structural equation approach allows us to explore the structural relationship between the 
causes and indicators of HT which to the best of our knowledge has not been applied 
before. Research on human trafficking is confronted with the hidden nature of the 
population active in practice, i.e., victims and traffickers (Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005). 
This makes it difficult to draw a representative sample or to get firsthand information on 
the circumstances involved. Additionally, the purely economic focus on either the 
supply side or demand side aspects does not give credit to the complexity, motivations 
and interaction of agents in the trafficking process (Laczko and Gozdzdiak, 2005). An 
integral approach is needed that combines all facets and dimensions. In order to capture 
HT as precisely as possible both aspects’ indicators and causes must be included; this has 
been neglected in earlier studies. The main idea behind the MIMIC model is to examine 
the relationship between an unobservable variable, e.g., the shadow economy, 
corruption, human trafficking, etc. and a set of observable variables using covariance 
information (Buehn and Schneider, 2012). The flexibility in estimating the correlations of 
observable factors is one of the main advantages of the MIMIC approach.  
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We disentangle these relationships and derive an index of the extent of trafficking 
in persons in destination countries by applying this single latent variable structural 
equation method. This method provides a detailed analysis of HT, which sheds further 
light on the mechanism behind the trafficking process. The construction of an index of 
the scale together with the possibility to re-estimate the model on a yearly basis over the 
period of ten years (2000-2010) has the advantage to address the question of how HT 
evolves in this decade. Given that the index not only offers a ranking of countries but 
also the possibility to interpret the relative difference between countries, future research 
will be able to build on this measure and test hypotheses with empirical analysis. 
To foreshadow basic results, the MIMIC estimates support the main hypotheses on 
the determinants and indicators of trafficking in persons; namely, richer countries see a 
larger extent of HT. The human trafficking intensity index shows the prevalence of 
human trafficking in destination countries for the 2000 to 2010 period for 142 countries. 
The measure is positively correlated with other relevant measures and shows to be 
relevant in this field of research in a simple application. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section defines human trafficking 
and presents the dynamics between causes and consequences of human trafficking. 
Testable hypotheses are established and the data are described. Section II. 3 explains the 
value of using the MIMIC approach on the extent of HT and presents a baseline model. 
In Section II. 4 we discuss in depth the application, model fit indicators and empirical 
results. Thereafter, we present the HT intensity index and demonstrate its relevance. 
Section II. 5 concludes the chapter. 
II. 2 DYNAMICS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: SOME THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Following chapter I of this thesis, we understand human trafficking in accordance with 
the international definition of trafficking in persons.53 It is not only the first successful 
international agreement on the common elements and implications of HT, but it also 
                                                 
53 The Definition is presented in the Palermo Protocol Article 3 (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children supplement to the Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2000). 
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provides an important working basis for the present research.54 The main elements are 
the incorporation of all forms of enslavement and the focus on the exploitation of victims 
through coercion or deception. These components acknowledge that most of HT’s 
victims are vulnerable through migration, not willingly enslaved, and that it is a 
clandestine business of internationally-active criminal networks. These elements are two 
sides of the same coin: individuals that are vulnerable and prone to traffickers and 
criminal networks that make use of their circumstances. Both aspects have to be 
considered when measuring HT.  
The focus of the analysis is on the extent of human trafficking in destination 
countries.55 We identify what drives people to exploit exposed individuals, i.e. the 
demand structure; and what puts people in this vulnerable position, i.e. the potential 
supply. In economic terms, HT is located in a market setting where demand and supply 
are met on the shoulders of vulnerable individuals. The main reason for the abuse and 
exploitation of people is global income disparity. Emigration is propelled by economic 
factors that drive people to migrate and take risks in searching for more prosperous 
living conditions. In particular, traffickers use their victims’ vulnerability and bring them 
to countries where both the demand for cheap labor and exploitation profits are high. 
These are the key factors that help identify the indicators and causes of HT to destination 
countries.  
II. 2.1 Indicators of human trafficking  
The extent of human trafficking is not directly measurable; therefore indicators have to 
be identified that are a function of HT in destination countries. The literature does not 
yet offer extensive guidance with respect to appropriate indicators of human trafficking. 
                                                 
54 Article 3 of the protocol states that “human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs” (United Nations, 2000).  
55 Since October 2013 a measure of the prevalence of population in slavery for 162 countries is developed 
by the Walk Free Foundation (2013). This approach is based on risk characteristics of countries at one point 
in time. In contrast to the HT intensity measure provided here, the measure does not take into account 
development over time, which restricts analysis to the recent year rather than analysis of the last decade, and 
thus makes a comparison difficult.  
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To the best of our knowledge we are the first to determine multiple indicators to 
measure its extent in destination countries. Many aspects are correlated with human 
trafficking that could partially indicate its prevalence in a country. After extensive 
research of anecdotal and country evidence (see, e.g., US Department of State, 2010-2013) 
it becomes apparent that human trafficking has a two-sided nature. Some consequences 
are visible, but its illegal nature requires most of the action to be covert. Trafficking 
victims are exposed to life-threatening conditions such as health risk, under-nutrition 
and physical and psychological stress. One prime indication of HT in the country is the 
number of identified victims in these countries. Although it is important to be aware that 
identification of victims, prosecution of traffickers and prevention of the crime largely 
depend on the awareness of the existence of human trafficking by the broader public as 
well as by legal institutions (Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005), this number is a principal 
sign of the existence of trafficking in persons. The first indicator is the observed number 
of victims as a proxy for the extent of the issue. The number of identified victims is only 
the tip of the iceberg. Given that it is directly affected by the quality of the law 
enforcement institutions in the destination country, the numbers are lower in host 
countries with better institutions (see Chapter I), not necessarily where trafficking is less 
prevalent. Nevertheless, the number of identified victims should be larger where the 
pool of all victims is larger we therefore expect a positive relationship between the real 
extent and identified victims. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
provides the number of identified victims in their Global reports on Trafficking in 
Persons (UNODC, 2009a, 2012) for a large set of countries.56  
The first hypothesis we test is:  
Hypothesis 1: A large extent of human trafficking in a country leads to a high number 
of identified victims, ceteris paribus. 
 
The extent of human trafficking is also reflected in the legal fight against the crime. 
Fighting HT through prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims and prevention of 
the crime as well as other approaches taken within countries are thus another indication 
                                                 
56 An overview of all variables used can be found in Table A II. 3. 
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of its magnitude. All three elements of the legal fight against HT (protection, prosecution 
and prevention) increase the awareness within the country’s population, the judicial 
system and the police forces. Protection policies, for instance, target victims and address 
their vulnerability, facilitating their identification. Prevention encompasses 
governmental efforts in promoting awareness about trafficking of persons by means of 
campaigns, training, information exchange and monitoring of locations prone to 
trafficking. A measure of these anti-trafficking instruments is the 3P-index provided by 
Cho et al. (2014).57 It is available for the 2001 to 2012 period for over 180 countries. The 
higher the score a country receives in the 3P-index (on a 3-15 scale), the more rigorously 
the anti-trafficking instruments are implemented. Presumably two lines of argument are 
possible as to the implications of a country having a high score in the 3P-index: first, 
countries with a high human trafficking prevalence fight more rigorously against the 
crime because they need to further curtail the spread of this criminal activity. Second, 
countries that fight more rigorously against human trafficking and thereby drive the 
prevalence of the crime downwards could also have a higher 3P-index score. The latter 
would imply a negative relationship between the 3P-index and the human trafficking 
extent while the former would imply the opposite. The Convention Against Transnational 
Crime and the Trafficking Protocol are the results of international observations “that 
technological advances, combined with the ever-growing inter-dependence of 
economies, is offering criminal groups unprecedented lucrative opportunities” (Betti, 
2001: 1). During the negotiations and the implementation of the Convention Against 
Transnational Crime and the Trafficking Protocol public awareness of the topic increased. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) intensified public awareness campaigns and 
media coverage of human trafficking as an international criminal activity became 
ubiquitous.58 This increased salience of the topic lead to a reaction by politics and 
intensification of the fight against human trafficking (Burstein, 2003 and sources cited 
there). We argue that besides the pressure the U.S. puts on countries to comply with the 
                                                 
57 We apply the overall index (3P-index) in order to not judge the importance of each of the single 
components. The fight against HT is based on all three, equally important aspects. 
58 See Ditmore and Wijers (2003) for details on the negotiations about the Trafficking Protocol. For an 
example of media coverage see Spiegel Online, Menschenhandel: Deutschland hin und zurück, 
www.spiegel.de/sptv/-extra/a-96636.html (last accessed: 22.05.2014). 
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Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), countries intensify their fight 
against HT in parallel to the intensity of the problem within their national boundaries. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the scale of HT in a country the more intense the fight against 
this crime, ceteris paribus. 
 
Third, the illicit nature of the process has to be addressed by additional aspects that 
capture the intensity of exploitation indirectly. As argued above, awareness within 
countries plays an important role in the identification of HT. Given that human 
trafficking is a large-scale illegal business, its infrastructure must be highly developed. 
This is also supported by findings in the criminology literature, which stresses the link 
between the transport of illegal migrants, human trafficking and organized crime along 
the whole process of deceiving people, transporting, and exploiting them (Salt and Stein, 
1997; Salt, 2000; Schloenhardt, 2001). This suggests that the extent of HT in the country is 
part of the entire prevalence of crime. We capture the hidden nature of the phenomenon 
by the occurrence of crime measured as the level of crime in the country. We use the 
crime rate per 100,000 people taken from United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and 
the Operations of Criminal Justice System (CTS) (UN-CTS, 2008), which is the most 
complete cross country crime data available. The third hypothesis is: 59 
Hypothesis 3: The more HT takes place in a country the higher the crime rate, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
II. 2.2 Causes of human trafficking 
Turning to the causes, we identify five main drivers. Since the application of the 
common definition of human trafficking in 2000, the number of studies on the causes of 
human trafficking has increased substantially (e.g., Akee, Basu, Chau and Khamis, 2010; 
Cho, 2013; Hernandez and Rudolph, 2015 [Chapter I]).60 We focus on the determinants 
                                                 
59 Theoretically it is plausible that other criminal activity such as drug and weapon smuggling is causing 
HT as well as indicating its prevalence. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
60 All determinants used in the empirical literature so far are tested in the meta-study by Cho (2012) where 
she identifies robust causes of human trafficking flows.  
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robustly identified as causes of HT, give an intuition for the use of each of them, and 
scrutinize them in the next section. 
One main driver of migration and human trafficking is the difference in economic 
opportunities. On the one hand, criminals seek high profits through illegal activity 
located in prosperous countries or, on the other hand, giving individuals the incentive to 
migrate in search of formal job seeking to these countries. This makes affluent countries 
one of the main targets for both traffickers and potential victims. The extent of economic 
opportunities and thus demand for HT is reflected in the income level of a country. The 
ideal destination country for HT is a high income country which can act as a breeding 
ground for this type of activity. We use income measured by GDP per capita (in logs) 
taken from the World Bank’s (2012) Development Indicators (WDI) and state  
Hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4: The richer the country, the larger is the extent of HT, ceteris paribus. 
 
Most cases of forced labor other than prostitution involve migrant workers in economic 
sectors such as agriculture and construction (Zhang, 2012). They account for 18 percent 
of identified cases of HT according to the UNODC (2009). The increased chances of 
employment caused by the increased demand for cheap unskilled labor increases the 
attractiveness of countries as destination for migration workers (Hernandez and 
Rudolph, 2015 [Chapter I]).61 In addition, high demand in the commercial sex market or 
other informal markets increases the probability of pushing people towards these 
locations (Cho et al., 2013; Jakobson and Kotsadam, 2013; Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 
2006). The optimal case would be to use a measure of demand in all possible exploitative 
low skilled labor positions including exploitation in the sex industry, construction, house 
work, agriculture as well as the number of illegal organ removals. Given the scarcity of 
data in this area we are bound to use employment in agriculture as a percentage of total 
employment, data for which is provided by the World Bank (2012). This suggests 
Hypothesis 5: 
                                                 
61 South-south migrants in particular have to rely on informal support systems rather than welfare benefits 
of their host countries, which makes them even more vulnerable (Avato et al., 2010). 
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Hypothesis 5: The larger the demand for low-skilled services where exploitation takes 
place the higher the prevalence of HT in the country, ceteris paribus. 
 
Note that international investment relations lead to increased cultural, social and 
economic interrelation between countries, which can also be associated with HT. Human 
trafficking is a negative externality of increased international connectedness, facilitated, 
but also hampered, by different aspects of the globalization processes. On the one hand, 
it is facilitated because the transport of individuals is simplified via the establishment of 
international trade routes and investment connections. International crime groups are 
large-scale business operations that are active in both the official and the informal 
economies, corrupting officials and legal networks (UNODC, 2010). Foreign investment 
connections and trade relations are captured by the stock of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a percentage of GDP (UNCTAD, 2012).62 This variable captures the international 
presence in the country and thus the extent of international connections and relations.  
Hypothesis 6: International investment connectedness increases human trafficking 
presence in the country, ceteris paribus. 
 
On the other hand, trafficking may be limited via technological advancements and more 
personal contacts. This increases information availability to individuals on migration 
opportunities as well as job offers and thus presumably reduces the risk of being 
trafficked. Therefore, international tourists and information flows should have a 
restricting effect on trafficking. Increased personal contacts are captured by tourism 
arrivals as an additional channel of information transmission. Emigration puts 
individuals in a vulnerable position which is further increased by language differences 
and incomplete knowledge of the destination country. These differences captured by 
including linguistic fractionalization and the share of international migrants in our 
model. We employ the language component of the distance-adjusted ethno-linguistic 
                                                 
62 In addition, this argument is the observation that spatial dependence has been found to work as a 
trigger for positive externalities such as the spillover-effect of advancing women’s rights (Neumayer and de 
Soysa, 2011). We argue this link can also act as a transport system for negative externalities such as 
international criminal networks transporting human beings. 
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fractionalization index (DELF) developed by Kollo (2012).63 Tourism arrivals proxies for 
personal contacts as an additional channel of information transmission using the 
variable in the WDI data set (World Bank, 2012).  
Additionally the size of the countries measured by population is presumably an 
important determinant of the demand structure and the size of the exploitation market 
within countries. The size of the population in logs, which reflects the size of the 
countries, as well as the number of international migrants and the number of refugees by 
country of origin, are all drawn from the same World Bank (2012) database. Given that 
the most vulnerable part of the migrant population is the most prone to traffickers, e.g., 
refugees fleeing situations in which they face political harassment and life-threatening 
persecution, it seems reasonable that this part of the population is also largely affected. 
This hypothetical relationship is accounted for by the number of refugees in destination 
countries.  
Hypothesis 7: Human trafficking is increased by factors that force migration and attract 
people to a specific (rich) country, ceteris paribus. 
 
Finally, as detailed before, HT is associated with organized crime groups which engage 
in other activities such as drug and weapon smuggling (Europol, 2011). These multiple 
activities are carried out by cells/groups that specialize in these different areas leading to 
a proliferation and intensification of activities (Aronowitz, 2001; Salt, 2000; Schloenhardt, 
2001). In this context it is reasonable to imagine that the trafficking routes established by 
criminal networks enable the continuance and expansion of trafficking.64 Following this 
argument, we also test whether criminal activities detected in the country are causing 
factors of HT. This hypothesized relationship is analyzed by testing how both the 
                                                 
63 This index accounts for (dis-) similarities between languages, which is crucial in human trafficking 
because potential victims are more vulnerable if the destination country's language is different from their 
own. These new data are an improvement compared to Cho (2012) and Akee et al. (2010) who use the ethnic 
fractionalization index (ELF) of Alesina et al. (2003). The ELF only considers the number of different 
languages in a country thereby disregarding the crucial aspect of the distance between languages accounted 
for in the DELF. In the context of the trafficking process language differences are crucial since small 
distances may already lead to a different understanding of exploitation. The results are not qualitatively 
different when the ELF index is employed. 
64 International criminal activity is rather successfully fought against by Interpol (Sandler et al., 2011) as 
well as other institutions, but the ability of criminal networks to adapt to changing environments often 
advances institutional adjustments which makes the fight against it difficult (Williams, 2001; Kenney, 2009). 
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amount of heroin seized in countries (as a proxy for drug trafficking) and the number of 
drug trafficking offences committed/reported creates human trafficking (Cho, 2015). We 
use the data from the UN Crime Surveys (UN-CTS, 2008) and hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 8: Crime activities also have causal effects on human trafficking, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
These eight theoretical predictions are the basis for the MIMIC model of human 
trafficking and are now brought to the data. In Table II.A1 we show an overview of the 
hypotheses.  
II. 3 A MIMIC MODEL OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
The application of the MIMIC method is introduced in economics by Jöreskog and 
Goldberger (1975). Subsequently, it has been used in numerous studies to measure 
unobservable variables such as the underground economy (e.g., Frey and Weck-
Hanneman, 1984; Loayza, 1996; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010; and Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012), corruption (Dreher et al., 2007), and international goods smuggling 
(Buehn and Farzanegan, 2012).65 Multitudinous studies explored further determining 
aspects and the development of underground activity across and within countries 
(among others Loyaza, 1996; and Buehn, 2012). The large amount of studies shows, on 
the one hand, the importance of structural equation modeling in economics and on the 
other hand, the value of this approach in addressing illicit phenomena that are difficult 
to capture due to their very nature. Given the characteristics and clandestine nature of 
the trafficking process, this estimation strategy offers a valuable method to address it in 
a holistic way. 
Several reasons speak for the application in this context: first, human trafficking is 
an economically significant criminal activity with huge profits while evading taxes. 
Second, international HT receives increased attention in the global policy arena and the 
international community is willing to fight it. This already spurred an increase in studies 
analyzing the underlying process in law, political science and economics. However, 
                                                 
65 Additionally, Di Tommaso et al. (2007) and Kuklys (2004) analyse institutional change in Eastern Europe 
and welfare, resppectivelys. Buehn and Eichler (2009) explore the connection of smuggling illegal and legal 
goods and Buehn and Farzanegan (2013) develop an index of global air pollution. 
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international trafficking in human beings is a multidimensional unobserved 
phenomenon, where the whole process happens in the underground economy and 
neither traffickers nor victims are easy to identify. A latent variable approach such as the 
MIMIC is thus well suited to address its unobservable nature. Through key determinants 
and indicators being considered at once, light is shed on the presence and magnitude of 
human trafficking in a country.  
Third, the possibility to estimate parameters of a single structural equation has 
great value over estimating numerous regressions. The MIMIC approach is based on the 
assumption that the causal factors of the latent phenomena are not considered 
independently. HT is a process with many facets where several factors shape the 
incentive structure of all the actors involved, i.e., traffickers, victims and governments. 
This was highlighted in the discussion of the causes in Section II. 2.2.  
The assumptions made about the effects of the latent variable have to be 
considered carefully. Cliff (1983: 120) argues that there might be relevant divergence 
between the observed indicators and the latent phenomenon. This is especially 
important when interpreting correlations and model estimates established from the 
latent variable specifications and relating them directly to the unobserved phenomenon. 
In order to reduce doubts we test the model in several different specifications and turn to 
fit indicators to proof that the final model fits the data well and the underlying 
assumptions can be confirmed. 
II. 3.1 The model 
The main idea behind the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model is to use 
covariance information of observed factors influencing the latent variable, i.e. human 
trafficking. The two groups of observed variables, i.e., indicators and causes, are then 
modeled according to the hypothesized relationships. The indicators are related to the 
unobserved variable in a measurement model showing the effect of the latent variable. 
The relationships of the causes to the unobserved variable are simultaneously 
considered in a structural model. The MIMIC model specifically compares the 
covariance matrix of the imposed relationships with the sample covariance and allows 
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us to estimate a measure of the extent of the latent construct.66 This leads to the following 
two equations: 
 𝐲 = β𝜂 + ε   (II. 1) 
 𝜂 = 𝛼 ′𝒙 + 𝜔  (II. 2) 
In the measurement model Eq. (II.1) the vector 𝒚 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚)
′ is the vector of 
indicators solely determined by the latent factor 𝜂, 𝛽 = (𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝑚)′ is the 
corresponding coefficient vector and 𝜀 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2, … 𝜀𝑚)′ is the disturbance vector. In Eq. 
(II.2) the structural model shows that the latent variable 𝜂 is determined by exogenous 
causes with error 𝜔. The vector 𝒙 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑠)′ includes all potential causes and 
𝛼 = (𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑠)
′ is the coefficient vector that describes the relationship between the 
causes and the latent variable. This estimation strategy not only has the advantage of 
making it possible to test the theorized relationships between the causes and indicators 
and the latent variable by estimating the parameters of the model, but it also provides us 
with the tools to test the fit of the theorized relationships with the underlying data. 
II. 3.2 Application to human trafficking 
In order to test the hypothesized relationship between the determinants and effects of 
HT the following (base line) MIMIC model of HT intensity (𝜂) is implemented. The 
measurement model is specified by the indicators: crime rate per 100,000 people, the 3P-
index of anti-trafficking policies67 and the number of identified victims. 
  [
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
3𝑃 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖
𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖
] = [𝛽1,  𝛽2,  𝛽3] × [𝜂] + [𝜀1,  𝜀2,  𝜀3] (II. 3) 
The structural model include causes of human trafficking that influence the vulnerability 
of individuals thereby pulling them towards promising destination countries as well as 
criminal aspects of the phenomenon. The basic causes used in the modeling process of 
the MIMIC model are income per capita in logs, foreign direct investment flows into 
                                                 
66 The model is presented in more detail in Appendix II.B. 
67 A detailed description of the construction of the 3P-index is available in the paper Cho et al. (2014) and 
online on the project webpage: www.human-trafficking-research.org. 
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destination countries (in logs), employment in agriculture as a percentage of total 
employment in these countries (employagri) and language fractionalization (language 
fract.) within the respective destination countries. 
 [𝜂] =  [𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛼4] × [
(log) GDP pc𝑖
(log) FDI stock𝑖
employ agri𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡.𝑖
] + [𝜔] (II. 4) 
MIMIC models are represented by path diagrams. Figure II. 1 shows the path diagram 
for human trafficking intensity in destination countries. The latent variable "HT 
intensity" is jointly estimated by its causes and indicators. On the left hand side the 
structural model indicates the relationship between the causes of human trafficking in 
destination countries measured with error 𝜔, the disturbance term of the structural 
estimation. On the right hand side of the path diagram the arrows that point towards 
crime rate, the 3P-index and identified victims show the measurement model.68 The 
figure displays the specification with the best model fit discussed in Section II. 4. 
Figure II. 1: Path diagram of MIMIC 
 
Notes: The path diagram is based on specification three, Table II.1.  
To estimate the MIMIC model we use maximum likelihood including the information 
contained in missing values, i.e., no observations are dropped (maximum likelihood 
                                                 
68 In a path diagram the circles indicate unobservable aspects of the model whereas the squares indicate 
observable variables. 
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with missing values). This is common in the application of MIMIC models (see various 
sources cited before). Collins et al. (2001) have shown that using all the information 
available leads to unbiased and efficient estimates and is therefore preferable to list-wise 
or case-wise deletion.69 Our estimates are, thus, not affected by sample selection. We 
proceed as follows: first, we implement the model for the 2000-2010 period and explain 
why we use the basic specification shown in the path-diagram. Then, we estimate yearly 
repeated cross-sections.70 For the yearly specification we use multiple imputation for the 
main control variables to again get a constant sample. This is equivalent to the 
application of maximum likelihood with missing values; both approaches are model 
based methods of dealing with incomplete data analysis (Little, 1992).71 Finally, we 
generate our HT intensity index based on these yearly estimates. 
The results reported in the next section include several combinations of causes and 
indicators. This takes stock of the fact that causes and indicators are not clearly separable 
(Dreher et al., 2007). In some cases it is theoretically plausible to interchange causes and 
indicators (Section II. 2). In these cases of uncertainty, the indicators are also 
implemented as determinants. Since the MIMIC is a special case of confirmatory factor 
analysis, a priori decisions on the model composition become necessary. However, we 
show that our main assumptions on the interplay with human trafficking are supported 
by the data.  
Following standard practice, we also include all variables with their 
contemporaneous values after having been transformed to deviations-from-mean and 
are scaled to have unit standard deviation. The reason for this transformation is that the 
different variables are measured on different scales. In order to have the same scale 
when entering the ranking estimation the variables are standardized (see, e.g., Buehn 
and Farnazegan, 2012). Concerns about endogeneity or reverse causality in these 
specifications could arise. In order to deal with this issue of simultaneity bias the results 
are re-estimated by including all quantitative causal variables with a one period lag as 
                                                 
69 Therefore the number of observations does not change across specifications (Table II. 1). 
70 Given that the model is an analytical tool for cross sections, the yearly estimates are derived by repeated 
cross-sections. 
71 The control variables (Table II. 2) are imputed using multiple imputation (MI), i.e., the standardized 
continuous variables are imputed using chained regression with 20 imputations. Application of Rubin’s 
(1987) rules of adjustment leads to efficient estimates of the coefficients and standard errors. 
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suggested by Dreher et al. (2007). The results do not change qualitatively. They are also 
fairly robust to different sensitivity tests detailed below. 
II. 4 RESULTS  
Note that the principal MIMIC specification considers only cross-country variation. All 
variables discussed above are tested in a number of models. After testing the robustness 
of the different specifications and evaluating the model fit the specification with the best 
fit is used for the final index. In this way country rankings for every single country-year 
combination are generated, which makes it possible to assess the development of the 
extent of HT over time. As discussed above the decade of 2000-2010 saw a rise in 
quantitative research on human trafficking, which was at least partially spurred by the 
United Nations officially defining trafficking in persons in 2000. Additionally, due to the 
availability of data, the years between 2000 and 2010 appear to be the most useful in 
exploring the major causes and indicators empirically. Subsequently, the general to 
specific approach is applied to exclude the variables that are insignificant at least at the 
10 percent level or above.  
Before turning to the results, we discuss the background on which we will judge 
the validity of our results. This is necessary since final judgment is based on the 
statistical importance (significance) of the causes and indicators as well as fit indices 
common in structural equation modeling (Bollen, 1989). In tandem with theoretical 
considerations the simplest specification is finally used to compare the extent of human 
trafficking in destination countries.72 
Given that structural equation modeling (SEM) is confirmatory in nature the 
significance of the variables is only one indication of model quality. The overall fit of the 
model and significance levels both indicate whether the hypothesized relationships can 
be rejected or confirmed (Bollen, 1989). The judgment of the quality of the model is 
based on whether the estimated covariance is equal or close to the true sample 
covariance. To decide which model fits the data best and thus approximates the latent 
variable most precisely, Barrett (2007: 815) argues that the chi-square hypothesis test is 
                                                 
72 The results do not change qualitatively when additional causes or indicators are included (all 11 model 
specifications are displayed in Table II. 1 and explained in Section II. 4.1).  
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“the only substantive test of ﬁt for SEM.” Nevertheless, we explain and evaluate other fit 
indices suggested in the literature to support the salience of our decision.  
The chi-square statistic compares the empirical model against the alternative that 
the covariance matrix of the observable variables is unconstrained. The null hypothesis is 
that the model reproduces the covariance matrix of causes and indicators. Smaller test 
statistic values indicate that the model is a better fit, which implies that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. Looking at the main results in Table II. 1 the null hypothesis of 
a perfect fit cannot be rejected for specifications (1), (3), (7), (9) and (10). In these 
estimated specifications the p-values range between 0.13 (specification 9) and 0.32 
(specification 7).  
The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) evaluates the model fit on 
the basis of the difference between the two co-variances. Better fit is implied with an 
RMSEA value equal to or below 0.05 and a high p-value, indicating high probability to 
obtain a low RMSEA (Browne and Cudeck, 1993). This is the case in three of the five 
specifications not rejected by the chi-square statistic before: (3), (7) and (10).  
Bentler (1990) suggests to judge model fit based on the comparative fit index (CFI) 
and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). A good model fit is indicated by values close to one 
(Hu and Bentler, 1999). This criterion is met by all five specifications with values around 
0.93-0.99. Next, the coefficient of determination (CD) is comparable to the R-squared 
statistic of conventional regression analysis signaling the explained variation. Higher 
values indicate better fit. The variation explained is around 0.63 in the five models 
considered here.73 We use all five models with acceptable model fit to generate our HT 
intensity measure based on factor scores.74  
                                                 
73 A more detailed description of all goodness of fit indices in structural equation modelling is given by 
Iacobucci (2010). A critical assessment of the use of goodness of fit indicators is provided by Barrett (2007) 
who argues that the decision rules based on these indicators are arbitrary. He argues that the chi-square 
statistic is the “only substantive test of fit for SEM” (p. 815).  
74 The factor score is the preferred method to build the ranking of countries, because it includes more 
structural information in the final index than simple linear prediction. It is suggested by Jöreskog (2000) and 
employed by most of the studies mentioned above. Another approach is the linear prediction multiplying 
the standardized coefficients with the standardized data in order to derive a measure of the latent variable. It 
is employed by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), and recently by Buehn and Farnazegan (2013). In order 
to test whether the country ranking depends on the method of index construction both approaches are 
implemented. The rank correlation is larger than 0.9 showing that the method is not decisive for ranking. 
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II. 4.1 MIMIC estimation results 
The results of the MIMIC estimations are displayed in Table II. 1, showing the point 
estimates. 75 The top panels show the structural model and the relationship of causes. The 
middle panels show the measurement model with the indicators and the lower panels 
display the fit indices. Column one presents the base line specification of principal 
causes and indicators and all additional hypothetical causes of human trafficking are 
included in the subsequent specifications 2 to 11. The focus is on the causes and 
indicators of HT in countries where exploitation takes place, i.e., destination countries. 
All causes in column 1 are statistically significant with an acceptable overall model fit. 
Looking at the extent of human trafficking in these countries, (log) income per capita, the 
share of employment in agriculture and (log) foreign direct investment are the simplest 
and most basic combination of determinants. The observed correlation of GDP per capita 
is positive and significant at the 1 percent level across specifications indicating that 
wealthier countries are more often the destination of HT. Investment flows into 
destination countries are also positively associated with human trafficking. More 
international business and investments are correlated with more illicit human movement 
in the form of HT. The effect is significant over all specifications. The observed robust 
positive relation of the share of employment in agriculture endorses the positive relation 
between HT and cheap working opportunities with more potential placements for 
traffickers to exploit people. Our results endorse that labor exploitation is a major 
precondition for trafficking occurrences.  
Linguistic fractionalization within countries has a negative and significant relation 
to trafficking (column 3). This suggests that less diverse countries observe more human 
trafficking within their borders. While column 2 has no acceptable model fit with a low 
p-value and a large chi-square statistic, column 3 shows acceptable values in all fit 
indicators according to the cut off thresholds of the indices discusses before.  
The size of the market for victim exploitation is measured by (log) population. We 
find the expected sign and the coefficient to be statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. However, the model fit is unsatisfactory with a low p-value and incongruous fit 
                                                 
75 All estimations have been performed using STATA 12.1.  
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indicators. Columns 5 the international migrants share and in column 6 the share of 
international tourists arrivals are both negatively related and are significant at the 1 and 
5 percent level, respectively. These results are contrary to general expectations and 
difficult to explain. We refrain from a detailed explanation because the fit indices show 
poor model fit, which indicates that the results are not reliable. The test of the correlation 
between refugees and share of HT victims in the country reveals an insignificant 
correlation.76 The results do not support the hypothesized relationship between refugees 
and the extent of HT. The model fit, however, suggests that the estimated covariance 
resembles the actual covariance of the data quite well. Therefore, specification 7 is also 
tested in predicting the final measure. 
 
                                                 
76 The test of identified victims as a causal variable for trafficking intensity is based on the argument of 
Dreher et al. (2007) and Buehn and Schneider (2012) who write that it is difficult to clearly differentiate 
between causes and indicators in the MIMIC approach. This is applicable here as well: identified victims 
could theoretically also induce trafficking inflows. Established placements of victims and former victims 
turning into traffickers would suggest a determining nature. However, this is not supported by the data. 
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Finally, criminal activities in column 9 and 10 show the hypothesized relationships. The 
coefficient for drug trafficking (column 9) is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. An increase in the share of drug trafficking offences detected in a country is 
positively associated with HT. The fit indicators show a good model fit. In contrast, 
heroine seizures (column 10) seem not to have a significant relationship with the extent 
of HT. The model fits the data acceptably well. Finally, in column 11, all significant 
causes are tested at once. The model fit is lower, but the variables qualitatively show the 
same results.  
Turning to the measurement model, we find all indicators to match our 
expectations. One of the indicators of the latent variable has to be normalized and used 
as an anchor variable for the scale and identification.77 We follow the literature using the 
indicator with the largest standardized coefficient as the anchor variable (e.g., Schneider 
et al., 2010; Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Dreher et al., 2007). The anchor used here, and 
over all models in the analysis, is the crime rate. The coefficient is normalized to one, 
resulting in a standardized coefficient of around 0.88 on average across all specifications 
(not shown). All three indicators are positively related to the extent of human trafficking, 
which is in line with theoretical considerations and economic intuition. The number of 
identified victims as a share of the population turns significant in only some of the 
yearly applications (see Table II. 2). Arguably this indicator is very important but 
identification capacity depends on many aspects of countries’ legislative infrastructures 
(Laczko and Gozdziak, 2005). We argue that important aspects of the trafficking process 
are identifiable by employing identified victim numbers even though the results are not 
significant. Identified victims are part of the prevalence of HT in destination countries 
and yield important information as shown by Hernandez and Rudolph (2015 [Chapter 
I]). Furthermore, model fit is good including those variables. 
The 3P-index of anti-trafficking policies turns positive and significant at the one 
percent level in all specifications. This shows the importance of anti-trafficking policies 
that protect victims, prosecute traffickers and prevent HT in reflecting the intensity of 
human trafficking in the country. These results support the hypothesized relationship 
                                                 
77 The choice of the anchor does not change estimation results qualitatively (Bollen 1989). 
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between the extent of human trafficking and efforts to curb it: countries with more 
trafficking in persons and more exploitation of their people are more proactive in their 
fight against HT and reach a higher score in the 3P-index.  
The response of human trafficking into the country is expressed in units of 
standard deviation for a one standard deviation change in an explanatory causal variable 
holding all other variables constant (Bollen, 1989). 78 We give a preview of the size of the 
effects here, but they are not shown in the table and are available upon request. We 
explain the effects of the main causal variables of the full model (column 3, Table II. 1). A 
one standard deviation increase in GDP per capita is correlated with an increase in the 
magnitude of human trafficking by 1.08 standard deviations. A one standard deviation 
increase of the FDI share and the share of employment in agriculture relate to an 
increase in the extent of human trafficking by 0.2 and 0.48 standard deviations 
respectively. A decrease in the standard deviation of language diversity increases human 
trafficking by more than 0.15 standard deviations. Turning to the other effects that 
support our hypotheses we see that human trafficking reacts to an increase of one 
standard deviation of the exploitation market (measured by population) by 0.28 
standard deviations (specification Table II. 1 column 4). The magnitude of the effect for 
drug trafficking detected shows an increase in HT of 0.31 standard deviations if the 
share in detected offences increases by one standard deviation. Turning to the indicator 
variables, the standardized coefficient of the crime rate indicates that an increase in 
human trafficking by one standard deviation increases the crime rate by around 0.88 
standard deviations on average over all specifications. The 3P-anti-trafficking policy 
measure increases by 0.62 standard deviations and the number of victims by 0.04 
standard deviations given an increase in the extent of human trafficking by one standard 
deviation on average. The results are fairly robust over all specifications. 
Robustness tests 
Before we move to the yearly application we undertake several sensitivity tests to 
confirm our results are robust to a variety of circumstances. First, the described results 
                                                 
78 The standardized coefficients are calculated by using ?̃?𝑖𝑗 = ?̂?𝑖𝑗√?̂?𝑖𝑖 ?̂?𝑗𝑗⁄   where i represents the causal 
variables and j the unobservable variable. The predicted variances under the squared root are the variances 
of the ith and jth variables, respectively. The results are available upon request. 
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do not depend on the method used nor are they driven by specific countries. Testing the 
robustness of different models to the application of maximum likelihood and case-wise 
deletion we find that the number of observations is lower and varies across 
specifications (Table A II. 2). The reason is that now some of the data for causes and 
indicators are not available for all countries. We can show that the results do not change 
qualitatively and stay largely the same quantitatively. The significance of the factors 
decreases, which does not affect the model fit. The goodness of fit indicators still show 
good results for the five specifications highlighted above. As has been shown by several 
studies (see, e.g., Little and Rubin, 1987, and their references) the deletion of 
observational units due to missing values is rather ad hoc and comes with several well-
documented problems. Case-wise deletion, common in social science, might remove a 
high proportion of observations and make the estimates inefficient because only few 
observational units have complete data. This comes together with a possible selection 
bias if the complete cases are not representative of the entire sample (Schafer and Olsen, 
1998). We avoid these problems by using the full information maximum likelihood 
estimates and multiple imputations.  
A second test suggested is to exclude the three highest and lowest ranking 
countries of the resulting measure (e.g., Buehn and Farzanegan, 2012). This exclusion 
tests whether outliers at the top and bottom of the ranking drive the results. Generally 
the fit of the specifications decreases, but qualitatively the results are not affected. All fit 
measures are in line with previous findings. To rule out endogeneity concerns we also 
estimate the results following Dreher et al. (2007) and lagging all quantitative causal 
variables by one period before estimating the model again. The analysis is robust to this 
sensitivity test and the results are not changed.79  
An important issue in using the MIMIC approach is whether the assumption that 
the variables identify one latent factor holds. The results seem to support the theoretical 
argumentation and our hypotheses in what drives and what reflects the extent of human 
trafficking in countries of exploitation. We use a principal component analysis (PCA) to 
further show that the variables chosen identify one latent factor. Figure II. 2 shows a 
                                                 
79 Both findings are available from the authors upon request.  
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screen plot of this exercise. The plot indicates that the first component has an eigenvalue 
above three and the second component has an eigenvalue just above one. According to 
the Kaiser rule one should keep all components with an eigenvalue above one. However, 
the screen plot indicates that most of the variation in variables is sufficiently explained 
by one component. This supports our hypothesis that the observed variables identify the 
one latent factor, the extent of human trafficking.  
Figure II. 2: Screen plot of eigenvalues after principal component analysis 
 
 Notes: Own calculation. 
Based on these results, the final specification for the yearly index is chosen. Model 3 
(Table II. 1 column 3 and see also Figure II. 1) includes the main causes of the extent of 
HT together with the main indicators making HT visible in countries. Table II. 2 shows 
the estimates for the yearly applications. The estimates are robust over time and agree 
with the baseline specification described above (Table II. 1, column 3). The chi-square 
test and the respective p-values of the models show a good fit in almost all years. 
Interestingly, in this application we find the number of identified victims turn 
statistically significant in some of the years (2001, 2002, 2004). This further supports the 
validity of our approach. The human trafficking intensity index is constructed based on 
these estimates. The next step is to generate the country ranks according to their 
expected rate of human trafficking prevalence. 
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II. 4.2 Human trafficking index 
After disentangling the relationships between human trafficking and the observed 
causes and indicators, we now turn to the construction of our HT intensity index and a 
ranking of the 142 countries under study. An important question is what our measure 
captures and how it can be interpreted. Given that trafficking in persons is a multi-
dimensional process involving many actors (i.e. traffickers, victims, the public, nation 
states) a clear assignment is difficult to make. The definition of human trafficking 
provided by the Palermo Protocol broadly describes the aspects and components 
included. As described in Section II. 2, human trafficking includes all forms of 
exploitation and aims at all groups of actors involved, traffickers as well as victims. We 
focus on the destination countries where exploitation takes place. Thus, we capture the 
extent of HT in these countries as a bundle of actions and decisions. This includes the 
decision of traffickers to send individuals to these countries and exploit them. 
Additionally, it includes the extent of market failure ensuring the exploitation of victims 
and the demand for cheap labor as well as a share of the population (vulnerable and 
marginalized) that is easily exploited. The HT intensity index provides an assessment of 
human trafficking relative to other countries in all dimensions of the process. This shows 
that creating a clear picture of the extent and dimensions of human trafficking in 
countries is still very difficult. Nevertheless, we are confident that we capture the main 
aspects causing and indicating HT in destination countries and provide the first objective 
human trafficking intensity index (or at least the beginnings of one). 
The derived index is superior to existing measures of aspects of human trafficking. 
For example, the tier score of the U.S. Department of State (United States, 2001-2012), 
which addresses compliance with U.S. policies only, has been criticized as a one-sided 
approach that reflects political interest rather than being a transparent independent score 
of the variety of international policy approaches (Simmons and Lloyd, 2010). The 
underlying measures implemented in the construction of our intensity index, in contrast, 
are based on publicly available data of causes and indicators that influence human 
trafficking through different channels. 
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Country rankings 
The results for the measurement and the ranking of all 142 countries for the 2000-2010 
period are presented in Table II. 3. The countries are ranked according to the 2005 index 
to provide an overall picture of the century. The rank indicates the relative position of 
each country according to the extent of human trafficking into its borders. The cardinal 
index is scaled between 1 and 100 with lower values for countries with a lesser 
prevalence of HT.80 Unsurprisingly industrialized countries are on top of the ranking. 
This is in line with the observations in the UNODC Trafficking in Persons: Global 
Pattern Report (2006: 17). Countries in North-America, Europe as well as Australia are 
reported to be the top destination countries of HT. The fact that Scandinavian countries 
rank so high indicates that there are hidden activities taking place in these countries 
enabling traffickers to exploit individuals to a large extent. Taking their geographic 
location into account this is less surprising than it seems, given that they are often used 
as role models of institutional quality. They are close to Russia and Eastern European 
countries, which have lower economic opportunities and, in Russia's case at times, a 
higher level of persecution of individuals (traffickers and victims alike). Thus, they are 
very attractive destinations for the vulnerable and desperate in these countries as well as 
Middle Eastern, African and Asian nations. It is also in line with the observation that the 
share of identified victims in these countries is quite high especially in the beginning of 
the century.81 Next, countries ranking among the top 20 countries, but lower than the 
Nordic countries are Spain, Italy and Portugal. These countries are well known to be 
destination countries for human trafficking, which we also find in our ranking.  
  
                                                 
80 Since the assumptions of the model explicitly indicate causal relationships the retrieved ranking is tied to 
the causal (cardinal) variables that are used to estimate the model which makes the index a cardinal measure 
of the difference between countries.  
81 Share of victims in Iceland and Norway in 2000 was 10.4 per 100,000 people, which is one of the highest 
shares of identified victims across all countries during the decade observed. 
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Table II. 3: Country ranking and index (2000 – 2010) 
  
Country Rank 2000 Rank 2001 Rank 2002 Rank 2003 Rank 2004 Rank 2005 Rank 2006 Rank 2007 Rank 2008 Rank 2009 Rank 2010
United Kingdom 6 (68) 8 (59) 7 (53) 1 (74) 2 (57) 1 (91) 1 (82) 1 (68) 1 (74) 2 (77) 2 (92)
Sweden 2 (76) 3 (65) 5 (55) 2 (61) 3 (49) 2 (71) 2 (67) 2 (67) 2 (74) 3 (70) 3 (86)
Belgium 9 (62) 6 (60) 12 (52) 5 (57) 8 (48) 3 (64) 5 (60) 5 (61) 4 (66) 7 (58) 7 (62)
Norway 8 (66) 2 (72) 2 (62) 3 (60) 1 (91) 4 (63) 3 (61) 6 (60) 6 (62) 1 (84) 1 (100)
Denmark 4 (70) 4 (61) 4 (56) 4 (60) 5 (49) 5 (62) 4 (60) 3 (62) 3 (69) 6 (61) 6 (65)
Netherlands 7 (67) 5 (60) 6 (54) 6 (57) 4 (49) 6 (60) 6 (58) 4 (61) 5 (65) 5 (65) 5 (71)
New Zealand 3 (71) 18 (49) 19 (48) 24 (41) 24 (40) 7 (58) 9 (55) 11 (54) 10 (56) 14 (51) 12 (52)
Germany 10 (62) 9 (57) 13 (51) 8 (54) 7 (48) 8 (56) 11 (54) 14 (52) 12 (56) 9 (54) 9 (57)
Australia 16 (52) 14 (51) 16 (49) 7 (56) 9 (48) 9 (55) 23 (45) 13 (53) 13 (54) 13 (51) 14 (50)
Austria 13 (55) 11 (55) 11 (52) 9 (54) 11 (47) 10 (55) 8 (55) 9 (56) 7 (59) 11 (53) 10 (56)
Iceland 1 (81) 1 (75) 1 (64) 11 (53) 16 (44) 11 (55) 7 (55) 7 (58) 8 (58) 4 (65) 4 (74)
Luxembourg 14 (54) 10 (57) 3 (59) 10 (54) 6 (48) 12 (54) 10 (54) 8 (57) 11 (56) 10 (53) 13 (51)
United States 17 (50) 17 (49) 14 (50) 13 (53) 10 (47) 13 (54) 13 (53) 15 (52) 14 (53) 16 (48) 15 (48)
Switzerland 18 (50) 13 (53) 8 (53) 12 (53) 15 (45) 14 (54) 14 (53) 12 (53) 15 (52) 19 (46) 18 (46)
Finland 5 (69) 7 (59) 10 (52) 17 (49) 18 (43) 15 (53) 12 (54) 10 (55) 9 (57) 8 (57) 8 (60)
France 15 (54) 16 (50) 15 (49) 14 (51) 13 (46) 16 (52) 16 (51) 16 (50) 17 (50) 15 (49) 17 (47)
Canada 11 (60) 12 (54) 18 (49) 15 (50) 17 (44) 17 (50) 15 (51) 17 (48) 16 (50) 12 (53) 11 (54)
Ireland 22 (45) 15 (50) 9 (53) 18 (49) 19 (42) 18 (48) 18 (46) 18 (48) 23 (45) 18 (46) 24 (42)
Israel 25 (44) 25 (42) 33 (40) 26 (40) 31 (36) 19 (48) 19 (46) 25 (44) 26 (43) 20 (44) 19 (45)
Italy 20 (47) 20 (48) 20 (48) 16 (50) 12 (46) 20 (48) 17 (49) 21 (46) 24 (44) 17 (47) 23 (43)
Spain 24 (44) 19 (48) 22 (47) 19 (46) 14 (45) 21 (46) 21 (46) 23 (45) 22 (45) 27 (41) 21 (44)
Bahamas, The 21 (46) 21 (44) 25 (45) 22 (44) 36 (34) 22 (46) 20 (46) 19 (48) 18 (49) 23 (43) 22 (43)
Portugal 23 (44) 22 (44) 24 (45) 20 (45) 20 (41) 23 (45) 24 (43) 24 (44) 21 (45) 28 (41) 33 (36)
Slovenia 31 (38) 23 (42) 28 (43) 23 (43) 22 (40) 24 (45) 22 (46) 20 (47) 20 (46) 22 (43) 25 (41)
Japan 39 (35) 27 (41) 23 (46) 21 (44) 23 (40) 25 (43) 28 (41) 29 (42) 29 (41) 35 (37) 46 (31)
Czech Republic 27 (42) 30 (40) 35 (38) 25 (41) 29 (36) 26 (43) 26 (42) 26 (43) 28 (42) 29 (41) 26 (40)
Malta 26 (42) 33 (39) 34 (39) 27 (40) 33 (35) 27 (43) 27 (41) 27 (43) 27 (42) 30 (40) 38 (35)
Trinidad and Tobago 37 (36) 39 (36) 41 (36) 38 (35) 56 (29) 28 (39) 25 (43) 28 (43) 25 (43) 21 (44) 16 (48)
Gabon 34 (38) 37 (37) 45 (34) 39 (35) 27 (37) 29 (39) 39 (36) 37 (37) 37 (37) 33 (38) 30 (38)
Croatia 42 (33) 43 (35) 40 (37) 40 (35) 30 (36) 30 (38) 35 (38) 31 (40) 32 (38) 32 (38) 40 (33)
Chile 12 (58) 40 (36) 47 (34) 46 (33) 45 (32) 31 (38) 34 (38) 36 (38) 31 (39) 25 (41) 27 (40)
Poland 32 (38) 32 (39) 36 (38) 33 (38) 28 (37) 32 (38) 36 (37) 22 (45) 19 (48) 26 (41) 28 (39)
Singapore 44 (33) 35 (38) 30 (42) 41 (35) 39 (34) 33 (38) 31 (39) 32 (40) 43 (35) 45 (33) 45 (31)
Estonia 33 (38) 42 (35) 51 (33) 47 (33) 49 (30) 34 (37) 40 (35) 39 (37) 38 (36) 38 (36) 34 (36)
Greece 47 (31) 29 (40) 26 (44) 31 (39) 32 (36) 35 (37) 29 (39) 30 (40) 30 (39) 24 (42) 37 (35)
Korea, Rep. 28 (42) 31 (40) 31 (41) 30 (39) 21 (40) 36 (37) 30 (39) 33 (39) 33 (38) 31 (40) 35 (36)
Hungary 29 (41) 34 (39) 43 (36) 36 (36) 46 (32) 37 (36) 33 (38) 35 (39) 36 (37) 34 (37) 29 (38)
Cyprus 30 (39) 24 (42) 27 (44) 32 (39) 26 (38) 38 (36) 32 (39) 34 (39) 35 (37) 36 (37) 39 (34)
Bahrain 41 (34) 41 (36) 39 (37) 54 (31) 67 (27) 39 (36) 45 (34) 45 (33) 41 (35) 47 (32) 47 (31)
Brazil 35 (37) 46 (32) 54 (32) 43 (34) 43 (33) 40 (36) 41 (35) 43 (35) 34 (38) 37 (37) 31 (38)
Lithuania 46 (31) 45 (33) 50 (33) 34 (37) 34 (35) 41 (34) 37 (36) 42 (35) 45 (33) 51 (31) 66 (27)
United Arab Emirates 36 (37) 28 (41) 21 (47) 28 (40) 37 (34) 42 (34) 42 (34) 38 (37) 46 (33) 43 (33) 64 (27)
Turkey 78 (24) 48 (32) 37 (37) 45 (34) 38 (34) 43 (33) 44 (34) 46 (33) 56 (30) 49 (31) 57 (28)
Swaziland 38 (35) 51 (32) 57 (30) 44 (34) 63 (27) 44 (33) 55 (30) 47 (33) 39 (36) 40 (34) 20 (45)
Slovak Republic 49 (30) 50 (32) 44 (34) 48 (32) 55 (29) 45 (32) 46 (34) 41 (36) 42 (35) 39 (35) 43 (32)
Latvia 57 (28) 56 (29) 59 (29) 55 (31) 48 (31) 46 (31) 43 (34) 48 (32) 49 (31) 58 (29) 53 (29)
Qatar 40 (34) 26 (42) 17 (49) 29 (40) 42 (33) 47 (31) 38 (36) 40 (37) 47 (32) 41 (34) 51 (29)
Belarus 68 (25) 71 (26) 63 (28) 56 (31) 40 (33) 48 (30) 56 (30) 53 (30) 53 (30) 48 (32) 48 (30)
Brunei Darussalam 43 (33) 38 (37) 29 (42) 42 (34) 53 (30) 49 (30) 47 (33) 44 (35) 54 (30) 55 (30) 61 (27)
Mauritius 48 (31) 60 (28) 72 (26) 72 (27) 64 (27) 50 (30) 64 (28) 62 (29) 50 (31) 53 (30) 44 (31)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 72 (24) 64 (27) 55 (31) 58 (30) 47 (31) 51 (30) 52 (30) 50 (31) 51 (31) 44 (33) 55 (28)
Romania 45 (32) 36 (37) 42 (36) 37 (36) 25 (39) 52 (29) 50 (30) 49 (32) 57 (30) 54 (30) 58 (27)
Argentina 51 (30) 70 (26) 91 (22) 85 (23) 97 (24) 53 (29) 54 (30) 73 (27) 55 (30) 60 (29) 42 (33)
Belize 50 (30) 61 (28) 74 (26) 67 (27) 57 (29) 54 (29) 49 (31) 61 (29) 61 (29) 77 (26) 52 (29)
Russian Federation 65 (25) 77 (25) 77 (25) 69 (27) 77 (26) 55 (29) 48 (32) 57 (30) 64 (28) 70 (27) 71 (26)
Albania 62 (27) 49 (32) 46 (34) 51 (31) 35 (34) 56 (29) 60 (29) 70 (28) 72 (26) 50 (31) 50 (30)
Namibia 55 (28) 75 (26) 64 (28) 68 (27) 73 (26) 57 (29) 66 (28) 67 (28) 76 (25) 78 (26) 59 (27)
Mexico 52 (30) 47 (32) 48 (34) 59 (29) 62 (28) 58 (28) 51 (30) 56 (30) 71 (27) 59 (29) 78 (25)
Bulgaria 71 (25) 80 (24) 89 (23) 66 (27) 50 (30) 59 (28) 61 (29) 60 (29) 66 (28) 62 (28) 49 (30)
Kuwait 58 (27) 44 (33) 32 (40) 35 (36) 44 (32) 60 (28) 59 (29) 58 (30) 52 (30) 66 (28) 86 (22)
Thailand 66 (25) 54 (29) 53 (32) 49 (32) 41 (33) 61 (28) 58 (29) 52 (30) 60 (29) 73 (27) 75 (25)
Cuba 53 (29) 72 (26) 80 (24) 60 (28) 85 (25) 62 (28) 63 (28) 64 (28) 40 (35) 42 (33) 36 (35)
Ecuador 63 (26) 63 (27) 97 (20) 86 (23) 106 (22) 63 (27) 67 (28) 72 (28) 69 (27) 67 (28) 76 (25)
Panama 70 (25) 65 (27) 62 (28) 73 (27) 72 (27) 64 (27) 57 (29) 63 (29) 67 (27) 64 (28) 74 (25)
Colombia 74 (24) 66 (27) 67 (27) 61 (28) 59 (28) 65 (27) 65 (28) 71 (28) 77 (25) 74 (27) 84 (22)
Lebanon 59 (27) 52 (31) 38 (37) 50 (32) 51 (30) 66 (27) 71 (26) 55 (30) 70 (27) 63 (28) 77 (25)
Costa Rica 60 (27) 59 (28) 65 (27) 63 (28) 69 (27) 67 (27) 62 (28) 68 (28) 62 (28) 57 (29) 69 (26)
Morocco 102 (19) 128 (14) 71 (27) 71 (27) 58 (28) 68 (27) 74 (26) 84 (24) 89 (22) 90 (22) 101 (20)
Kazakhstan 87 (21) 67 (27) 58 (30) 64 (28) 52 (30) 69 (26) 68 (27) 69 (28) 68 (27) 61 (29) 68 (26)
Dominican Republic 54 (29) 76 (26) 73 (26) 77 (26) 90 (24) 70 (26) 70 (26) 66 (28) 59 (29) 71 (27) 54 (28)
Tunisia 79 (23) 68 (26) 60 (29) 78 (26) 70 (27) 71 (26) 84 (24) 78 (26) 80 (25) 81 (25) 83 (23)
CHAPTER II 
 
96 
Table II. 3: (continued) 
  
Country Rank 2000 Rank 2001 Rank 2002 Rank 2003 Rank 2004 Rank 2005 Rank 2006 Rank 2007 Rank 2008 Rank 2009 Rank 2010
Saudi Arabia 64 (25) 58 (28) 49 (34) 53 (31) 61 (28) 72 (25) 69 (26) 74 (27) 78 (25) 75 (27) 89 (22)
Venezuela, RB 75 (24) 69 (26) 68 (27) 89 (22) 113 (21) 73 (25) 80 (24) 75 (27) 73 (26) 69 (28) 79 (24)
El Salvador 92 (20) 83 (23) 88 (23) 80 (25) 96 (24) 74 (24) 73 (26) 82 (25) 81 (24) 84 (23) 95 (20)
Zambia 94 (20) 78 (24) 75 (26) 76 (26) 60 (28) 75 (24) 79 (24) 90 (22) 83 (24) 79 (25) 87 (22)
Georgia 110 (17) 91 (21) 83 (24) 83 (24) 71 (27) 76 (24) 53 (30) 65 (28) 63 (28) 68 (28) 60 (27)
Honduras 83 (21) 87 (22) 90 (23) 91 (21) 108 (22) 77 (24) 77 (25) 86 (23) 87 (22) 87 (23) 82 (23)
China 82 (21) 74 (26) 69 (27) 75 (26) 65 (27) 78 (24) 83 (24) 81 (25) 75 (25) 72 (27) 62 (27)
Macedonia, FYR 86 (21) 81 (24) 78 (25) 65 (28) 84 (25) 79 (23) 76 (25) 83 (24) 84 (24) 85 (23) 98 (20)
Oman 73 (24) 55 (29) 52 (32) 62 (28) 81 (25) 80 (23) 75 (25) 76 (27) 65 (28) 65 (28) 85 (22)
Armenia 107 (17) 89 (21) 84 (23) 79 (26) 88 (25) 81 (23) 72 (26) 77 (26) 79 (25) 76 (27) 72 (25)
Zimbabwe 67 (25) 73 (26) 82 (24) 82 (24) 95 (24) 82 (23) 87 (23) 99 (20) 103 (18) 108 (18) 96 (20)
Ukraine 91 (20) 101 (20) 115 (17) 88 (23) 105 (22) 83 (23) 92 (21) 91 (22) 88 (22) 106 (19) 100 (20)
Maldives 61 (27) 85 (22) 85 (23) 84 (23) 118 (20) 84 (23) 81 (24) 59 (29) 44 (35) 83 (24) 65 (27)
Malaysia 77 (24) 62 (27) 66 (27) 74 (27) 75 (26) 85 (23) 86 (23) 79 (26) 82 (24) 86 (23) 80 (24)
Botswana 76 (24) 82 (24) 56 (30) 70 (27) 68 (27) 86 (23) 85 (24) 80 (26) 74 (26) 80 (25) 73 (25)
Uruguay 56 (28) 57 (29) 76 (25) 52 (31) 86 (25) 87 (22) 82 (24) 51 (31) 48 (32) 46 (32) 41 (33)
Guatemala 90 (20) 79 (24) 70 (27) 81 (25) 74 (26) 88 (22) 89 (22) 88 (22) 90 (21) 91 (22) 104 (19)
Azerbaijan 120 (15) 112 (18) 100 (20) 105 (19) 114 (20) 89 (22) 78 (25) 85 (24) 86 (23) 56 (30) 56 (28)
Indonesia 96 (20) 110 (18) 98 (20) 87 (23) 79 (26) 90 (22) 95 (21) 87 (23) 91 (21) 94 (21) 99 (20)
Sri Lanka 69 (25) 92 (21) 110 (18) 99 (20) 99 (24) 91 (21) 96 (21) 100 (20) 96 (20) 92 (21) 63 (27)
South Africa 19 (47) 53 (31) 61 (29) 57 (30) 76 (26) 92 (21) 98 (20) 54 (30) 58 (29) 52 (31) 32 (38)
Nicaragua 80 (23) 86 (22) 103 (19) 106 (19) 109 (21) 93 (20) 90 (22) 96 (20) 101 (19) 98 (20) 91 (22)
Cambodia 100 (19) 103 (19) 101 (20) 94 (21) 87 (25) 94 (20) 94 (21) 93 (21) 94 (20) 95 (20) 97 (20)
Congo, Rep. 97 (19) 90 (21) 87 (23) 92 (21) 107 (22) 95 (20) 88 (22) 92 (22) 92 (20) 97 (20) 88 (22)
Vietnam 88 (21) 88 (22) 93 (22) 103 (20) 82 (25) 96 (20) 99 (20) 95 (21) 95 (20) 82 (24) 93 (21)
Mongolia 93 (20) 99 (20) 102 (20) 96 (21) 121 (19) 97 (20) 97 (20) 97 (20) 98 (20) 89 (22) 81 (23)
Nigeria 115 (16) 124 (15) 121 (15) 117 (17) 93 (24) 98 (20) 102 (19) 118 (15) 105 (18) 107 (18) 119 (16)
Philippines 118 (16) 120 (16) 112 (18) 97 (21) 83 (25) 99 (19) 91 (21) 101 (19) 106 (17) 101 (20) 105 (19)
Paraguay 114 (17) 93 (20) 95 (21) 93 (21) 104 (22) 100 (19) 107 (18) 98 (20) 93 (20) 104 (19) 90 (22)
Burkina Faso 89 (20) 96 (20) 99 (20) 95 (21) 54 (30) 101 (19) 105 (18) 119 (15) 107 (17) 100 (20) 108 (18)
Guyana 106 (18) 105 (19) 120 (15) 131 (14) 130 (17) 102 (19) 93 (21) 103 (19) 102 (19) 116 (17) 113 (17)
Tanzania 119 (15) 104 (19) 92 (22) 100 (20) 98 (24) 103 (19) 104 (18) 104 (18) 108 (17) 115 (17) 114 (17)
Moldova 103 (19) 100 (20) 105 (19) 107 (19) 103 (22) 104 (18) 120 (15) 117 (16) 111 (17) 103 (19) 67 (26)
Pakistan 137 (10) 123 (15) 128 (13) 125 (16) 78 (26) 105 (18) 117 (16) 116 (16) 122 (14) 127 (14) 128 (14)
Mozambique 132 (13) 119 (16) 104 (19) 110 (18) 111 (21) 106 (18) 112 (17) 108 (17) 112 (16) 118 (16) 130 (14)
Iran, Islamic Rep. 104 (18) 108 (18) 96 (21) 102 (20) 94 (24) 107 (18) 109 (17) 111 (16) 120 (15) 112 (17) 106 (18)
Lesotho 95 (20) 95 (20) 108 (19) 104 (19) 117 (20) 108 (18) 101 (19) 102 (19) 97 (20) 99 (20) 70 (26)
Papua New Guinea 124 (15) 97 (20) 79 (25) 101 (20) 100 (23) 109 (18) 106 (18) 113 (16) 118 (15) 119 (15) 131 (14)
Cameroon 85 (21) 84 (23) 81 (24) 90 (22) 101 (23) 110 (17) 116 (17) 121 (14) 123 (14) 117 (16) 115 (17)
Peru 98 (19) 117 (16) 122 (15) 120 (16) 137 (16) 111 (17) 100 (19) 105 (18) 99 (19) 96 (20) 92 (22)
Jordan 84 (21) 109 (18) 119 (16) 111 (18) 127 (18) 112 (17) 103 (19) 89 (22) 85 (23) 88 (22) 94 (21)
Cote d'Ivoire 111 (17) 107 (19) 111 (18) 123 (16) 110 (21) 113 (17) 108 (18) 126 (13) 126 (12) 132 (12) 134 (11)
Uzbekistan 125 (15) 129 (14) 130 (12) 112 (18) 112 (21) 114 (17) 124 (15) 115 (16) 109 (17) 102 (20) 109 (17)
Yemen, Rep. 131 (13) 111 (18) 109 (18) 115 (17) 124 (19) 115 (17) 119 (16) 112 (16) 117 (15) 121 (15) 129 (14)
Algeria 101 (19) 98 (20) 94 (21) 109 (18) 125 (19) 116 (17) 111 (17) 106 (18) 114 (16) 111 (17) 110 (17)
Malawi 135 (12) 136 (10) 139 (7) 139 (10) 129 (17) 117 (16) 125 (15) 131 (11) 131 (12) 136 (10) 133 (11)
Madagascar 129 (14) 122 (15) 116 (16) 113 (18) 89 (25) 118 (16) 118 (16) 110 (17) 115 (16) 130 (13) 136 (10)
Egypt, Arab Rep. 105 (18) 118 (16) 114 (17) 122 (16) 136 (16) 119 (16) 126 (14) 107 (17) 119 (15) 110 (18) 102 (20)
Turkmenistan 112 (17) 94 (20) 86 (23) 108 (19) 128 (18) 120 (16) 115 (17) 94 (21) 100 (19) 93 (21) 103 (20)
India 99 (19) 102 (19) 107 (19) 98 (20) 66 (27) 121 (16) 110 (17) 109 (17) 110 (17) 105 (19) 117 (16)
Uganda 123 (15) 131 (13) 127 (13) 129 (15) 119 (20) 122 (16) 122 (15) 128 (12) 125 (12) 114 (17) 116 (17)
Ghana 127 (14) 125 (15) 123 (14) 114 (17) 123 (19) 123 (15) 113 (17) 123 (13) 121 (14) 128 (14) 127 (14)
Senegal 121 (15) 121 (16) 133 (12) 132 (13) 102 (23) 124 (15) 128 (14) 122 (13) 116 (15) 129 (13) 120 (16)
Bangladesh 108 (17) 116 (16) 126 (14) 116 (17) 91 (24) 125 (15) 121 (15) 120 (15) 113 (16) 109 (18) 112 (17)
Chad 142 (7) 140 (7) 138 (8) 141 (10) 132 (17) 126 (14) 139 (11) 139 (8) 139 (10) 140 (7) 139 (8)
Bolivia 116 (16) 113 (17) 113 (17) 127 (16) 139 (16) 127 (14) 114 (17) 114 (16) 104 (18) 113 (17) 118 (16)
Benin 113 (17) 126 (15) 131 (12) 128 (15) 115 (20) 128 (14) 135 (13) 133 (11) 124 (13) 131 (13) 122 (15)
Kyrgyz Republic 126 (14) 127 (14) 129 (13) 126 (16) 122 (19) 129 (14) 132 (13) 132 (11) 128 (12) 122 (15) 124 (15)
Gambia, The 136 (11) 135 (11) 135 (11) 135 (12) 140 (16) 130 (14) 138 (12) 137 (10) 134 (11) 138 (9) 138 (8)
Tajikistan 133 (12) 138 (8) 137 (10) 130 (14) 120 (19) 131 (14) 130 (14) 127 (12) 133 (11) 124 (14) 107 (18)
Kenya 117 (16) 114 (17) 117 (16) 119 (16) 92 (24) 132 (13) 131 (13) 124 (13) 129 (12) 120 (15) 111 (17)
Mali 134 (12) 133 (13) 134 (12) 124 (16) 133 (16) 133 (13) 127 (14) 136 (10) 135 (11) 137 (10) 137 (9)
Nepal 128 (14) 130 (14) 132 (12) 118 (16) 80 (25) 134 (13) 137 (12) 138 (9) 138 (10) 134 (12) 135 (10)
Syrian Arab Republic 109 (17) 115 (16) 106 (19) 121 (16) 131 (17) 135 (13) 134 (13) 125 (13) 127 (12) 125 (14) 125 (15)
Iraq 81 (22) 106 (19) 118 (16) 136 (12) 141 (14) 136 (13) 123 (15) 130 (12) 132 (12) 126 (14) 123 (15)
Sudan 130 (14) 134 (12) 124 (14) 133 (13) 138 (16) 137 (13) 129 (14) 134 (11) 136 (10) 133 (12) 126 (14)
Sierra Leone 122 (15) 132 (13) 125 (14) 134 (13) 126 (19) 138 (13) 133 (13) 129 (12) 130 (12) 123 (14) 121 (16)
Ethiopia 140 (8) 137 (10) 136 (10) 137 (11) 116 (20) 139 (13) 136 (13) 135 (10) 137 (10) 135 (11) 132 (12)
Niger 138 (9) 139 (7) 140 (6) 140 (10) 134 (16) 140 (8) 141 (9) 141 (5) 141 (8) 142 (5) 141 (7)
Burundi 141 (8) 141 (7) 142 (5) 138 (10) 135 (16) 141 (8) 142 (4) 142 (1) 142 (4) 139 (8) 142 (5)
Liberia 139 (8) 142 (6) 141 (5) 142 (6) 142 (4) 142 (6) 140 (10) 140 (8) 140 (9) 141 (6) 140 (7)
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In 2000, overall only 4 non-OECD countries are located in the top 30. These are the 
Bahamas, Malta, Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon. Again looking at the information 
available from the U.S. TIP reports (e.g., United States, 2001), this is not extraordinary. 
Malta is reported as being a destination for women and girls exploitation in prostitution. 
Furthermore, its restaurant sector is known for exploiting men. Malta still ranks in the 
top 30 in 2005, but in 2010 its rank lowered to 39 indicating a decrease in the extent of 
human trafficking until 2010. Malta is also a destination country for many African 
migrants aiming to enter Europe who are vulnerable to human trafficking in the 
informal sectors of the Maltese economy (United States, 2010). The Bahamas rank very 
high in the trafficking index throughout the ten years (among the top 30 countries in all 
years apart from 2004 when it ranks 37). A likely reason is The Bahamas' status as a 
destination country for many migrants of other Caribbean countries who seek better 
economic conditions and who are consequently vulnerable to exploitation. With the 
lowest unemployment statistics in the region these are promising conditions for many 
migrants (IOM, 2010). The country is also known to be a destination and transit country 
for victims trafficked to Europe and Northern America (United States, 2010). 
Additionally, the government of the Bahamas only ratified the Palermo Protocol in 2008 
(United Nations, 2013), which indicates potentially lower efforts to fight human 
trafficking in the beginning of the research period. All of these aspects together explain 
the high ranking of the country, and thus the high magnitude of HT into the country. 
Trinidad and Tobago has been evaluated by the U.S. Department of State in its TIP 
report since 2009. According to the investigation the country is known to be a 
destination and transit country where female victims are exploited in the commercial sex 
and forced labor industries and men are exploited on construction sights and other low 
skilled activities such as fishing (United States, 2012). Trafficking is a lucrative business 
in the country, which makes it an attractive destination country for traffickers. 
According to the intensity measure, the level of HT increased and in 2010 Trinidad and 
Tobago ranks among the top 20 destination countries.  
In the case of Gabon, the only African country ranking among the top 30 countries 
in 2005, the trafficking problem is large in magnitude because of many children being 
trafficked into the country. Traffickers buy children from their parents with the promise 
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of better living conditions. However, they are trafficked and exploited in their 
destination country (United States, 2009). Gabon is seen as one of the most prosperous in 
the region, with more opportunities for work (United Nations, 2012). This might explain 
the high position of the country in the index.  
Looking at some major OECD countries, the United States – as the state pushing 
initiatives against human trafficking such as the implementation of anti-trafficking 
instruments – ranks between 10 (2004) and 17 (2000). In the last two years they rank 16 
and 15, which suggests that they are a destination country for victims of exploitation. 
This relatively constant position suggests that despite the United States' intense anti-
trafficking efforts and awareness campaigns run locally and internationally, the 
magnitude of the problem within its borders seems to be quite stable.  
According to our ranking, human trafficking is most prevalent in the United 
Kingdom (UK). It is the top ranked country for five of the ten years and except for 2000 
to 2002 it holds the second position. Taking into account that the UK is traditionally an 
immigration country, where many international migrants seek better living conditions, 
all forms of exploitation are identified in the country. Illegal drug cultivation and 
smuggling as well as exploitation in low skilled jobs together with lax law enforcement 
in parts of the country support our findings (United States, 2010). Finally, Germany and 
the Netherlands rank among the top ten countries throughout the years supporting 
reports of a high magnitude of HT in these countries. On the lower end of the list are 
mainly Sub-Saharan African countries. These are mainly low-income countries that act 
as a source rather than a destination for victims of human trafficking.  
Relevance of the index 
Testing the properties and the relevance of our intensity measure we apply several 
verifications. Looking at Table II. 4 we find the index to be satisfactorily correlated with 
other relevant measures. The intensity index (HT intensity) is positively correlated with 
the tier rank of the U.S. State Department with a Spearman rank correlation of 0.69. This 
is in line with expectations, given that high values of the tier rank indicate compliance 
with the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA). Presumably the 
problem in the country is more intense with stricter legal measures. 
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Table II. 4: Pair -wise correlations between indices 
  HT inflow Tier rank CI: destination CI: origin 
HT intensity 1 
   Tier rank 0.500 1 
  CI: destination 0.504 0.294 1 
 CI: origin -0.369 -0.166 -0.124 1 
Notes: The tier rank is reversed and shows higher values the better countries fulfill the TVPA standards. CI: 
destination/origin stands for the citation index compiled by the UNODC. The countries are ranked in a five-
category scale with the highest value indicating that the probability of being a destination/origin country is 
very high. 
The citation index (CI) is developed in the 2006 Global Report on Trafficking. These are 
three measures of human trafficking in destination, transit and countries of origin 
(UNODC, 2006). The country classification is based on open source information and is 
only available in 2006 based on information for the years 1995-2003. Looking at the 
UNODC citation indices, again a positive correlation exists with the constructed HT 
index. Countries with a high citation index value (destination countries) also have a 
larger value in our ranking. Likewise, the negative and significant correlation with 
citation as origin countries displays the expected correlation. One could argue that the 
correlation between the indices is only modest (0.50 to 0.37, respectively). However, this 
can be attributed to the different aspects of human trafficking that they measure. The tier 
rank addresses compliance with the TVPA and thus political decisions on fighting 
human trafficking. This is only one aspect of the process of trafficking in human beings, 
which is a partial aspect of our intensity index. The latter also captures country 
characteristics as well as the criminal dimension and vulnerability of victims. The same 
holds true for the citation indices. Both measures are based on and capture human 
trafficking visible to society that receives public awareness. By including identified 
victims as well as the other indicators in our measurement this aspect of the trafficking 
process is included in the intensity index together with the causes. Although these 
correlations only provide descriptive evidence, it is a reassuring signal for the adequacy 
of the measurement developed in this paper.  
Finally, we show that the HT intensity index really captures human trafficking. 
Given that with the ratification of the Palermo Protocol governments set themselves the 
goal of rigorously fighting human trafficking and implementing instruments against the 
CHAPTER II 
 
100 
international criminal activity, we would expect that human trafficking decreases 
following its ratification. In Table II. 5 we provide first evidence that this is indeed the 
case for our measure of HT intensity. The table shows the results for the test of 
ratification in a specific year, measured by a dummy variable (year of ratification) on the 
extent of HT measure. We control for rule of law taken from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010), ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. We also include measures of (log) income per capita 
and (log) population from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2012) and a 
dummy indicating democratic governments (Cheibub et al., 2010).82 All controls are 
lagged by one year. 
Table II. 5: HT intensity and Palermo Protocol ratification 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. FE = fixed-effects regression with clustered standard errors on the country 
level. RE = random-effects regression with cluster robust standard errors, DC = fixed-efefcts with Driscoll-
Kraay (1998) cross-sectional dependence adjusted standard errors; Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
We use three panel model estimators: fixed-effects with clustered standard errors, 
random effects, and fixed-effects with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) cross-sectional dependence 
adjusted standard errors. The Hausman-test clearly indicates that the fixed-effects 
                                                 
82 We take the controls suggested by Cho et al. (2013). We do not control for migration, because the 
number of observations decreases to one fourth. 
                    FE RE DC
Year of ratification       -0.490         -0.499         -0.490   
                         (1.174)        (1.233)        (1.264)   
Rule of Law             -0.513          2.528***       -0.513*  
                         (0.600)        (4.265)        (1.812)   
Population              -8.955***        0.214         -8.955***
                         (4.881)        (0.793)       (11.562)   
(log) GDP pc             4.456***        5.955***        4.456***
                         (4.319)       (13.708)        (8.274)   
Democracy               -0.853          0.305         -0.853   
                         (0.981)        (0.386)        (1.647)   
# of Observations         1136           1136           1136   
# of Countries          142            142            142   
R-squared  (within)        0.042          0.011          0.042   
Hausman test (p-value)        0.000  
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estimator is preferred. The controls are according to expectations: larger countries 
experience relatively less human trafficking, and richer countries are more prone to 
trafficking, ceteris paribus. Both variables are significant at the 1 percent level. 
Democracies seem to have a lower intensity of human trafficking and better rule of law 
reduces HT as well. Our variable of interest is the year of ratification. The dummy is 
negative indicating that after the ratification of the Palermo Protocol the extent of human 
trafficking reduces. Although the latter is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, it points in the right direction, regardless of the method used. We are aware of the 
fact that they should be interpreted with care. However, a more in depth analysis of 
these aspects in future research will provide further evidence. We are confident that we 
are able to show the relevance and strength of the HT intensity index and the value of 
the approach taken. 
II. 5 CONCLUSION 
In summary, this paper is the first study that uses a structural equation model in a 
holistic approach to measure human trafficking. Both causes and indicators of human 
trafficking intensity in destination countries are included and thus the clandestine nature 
of the phenomenon is addressed. MIMIC models are special cases of structural equation 
models combining a structural model and a measurement model. This empirical 
instrument provides both estimates of the correlation between determinants of HT as 
well as estimates on the relationship between human trafficking and its consequences in 
destination countries. From these results, a yearly index on the intensity of human 
trafficking in destination countries is constructed for the 2000-2010 period considering 
142 countries around the world.  
Our approach goes beyond existing studies including causal factors and indicators 
together acknowledging the illicit nature of the phenomenon. The causes mirror the 
incentive structure for traffickers by taking into account their chances of making high 
profits while having a low probability of detection. Furthermore, the causes also capture 
the vulnerability of trafficking victims by addressing their incentives to move in the first 
place from which point they are vulnerable to false promises of better opportunities. By 
travelling from a poorer country to a wealthier one individuals are inherently vulnerable 
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– this is the case especially as they seem not to move to linguistically fractionalized 
countries. The indicators, on the other hand, show the outcomes for countries of illegal 
trafficking of human beings into their borders. Human trafficking induces a higher crime 
level in destination countries with, e.g., a larger underground economy. The number of 
identified victims is a partial indicator of the phenomenon and specifies the visible 
extent of the problem. The dimensions of the fight against HT are captured by the 3P-
index. The measure quantifies the application of anti-trafficking policies within 
countries, which arguably is a consequence of the intensity of the phenomenon. 
The developed measure of HT intensity in destination countries identifies the 
development of HT over time and across a large set of countries. It is the first measure to 
quantify illegal trafficking of humans in these countries. The pattern of the development 
of human trafficking over the observed period is in line with expectations. Developed 
countries are highly ranked and observe a large amount of trafficking within their 
borders. These countries are the primary targets of traffickers, supposedly because the 
potential for large profits is greatest in wealthier countries. The lowest ranking countries 
are the countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, whose status as a source for victims of trafficking 
explains this position. Asian countries are in the middle range although evidence of 
trafficking within this region (e.g., due to the missing women phenomenon) is varied. 
Researchers and policy makers alike may use this numerical evaluation of human 
trafficking to respond more adequately to the issue of trafficking in persons. To date, this 
information was lacking. The information provided by our new human trafficking 
intensity measure fills this knowledge gap. We provide researchers with a measure of 
the intensity of HT over time that allows for an in depth analysis of related aspects. This 
will support further research on the consequences of trafficking in persons and increase 
the toolbox of policy makers to understand and combat human trafficking. In particular, 
the relationship between human trafficking inflows and its auxiliary aspects can be 
analyzed in more detail, giving a better understanding of the intensity of victim 
exploitation and inflows. Studies that leveraged situations in countries with the existence 
of human trafficking such as ethnic fractionalization, conflict or displaced populations 
could further profit from an analysis of the intensity of human trafficking rather than 
only looking at its existence measured by binary variables. Using the MIMIC approach 
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also provides the possibility to assess human trafficking in a social context and 
investigate its relationship with labor market reforms in destination countries. Similarly, 
the effect of migration legislation on human trafficking inflows is an important factor for 
policy analysts to consider in the fight against HT. Investigating these interrelations will 
enhance understanding of the crime and help in designing counter-measures to control 
human trafficking in developed and developing countries alike. 
Some final qualifications are in order. First, the MIMIC method is a repeated cross 
section method that does not allow us to use country-specific intercepts in the regression 
analysis. However, by scaling the index between 1 and 100 (1 shows low intensity and 
100 a high intensity) over the whole period we are able to compare the development of 
the extent of human trafficking over time and between countries. Second, potential 
endogeneity between the variables is not rigorously addressed. Taking lags of the causal 
variables mitigates the problem, but does not eliminate it. Finally, it remains unclear 
what the extent of human trafficking ultimately includes. Therefore, a decrease in the 
intensity of HT made visible by our index shows the reduction of criminal activity in 
total, but not which aspect specifically (trafficker, victims, legal system) or in what kind 
of exploitation (i.e., sexual or labor exploitation).  
In terms of policy implications, policy makers as well as practitioners alike may 
use this numerical assessment of human trafficking to see positions of countries relative 
to other countries and further understand the problem within their respective national 
borders. We estimate a country specific measure, one should keep in mind that human 
trafficking is a transnational problem and that the fight against this crime is best fought 
at both ends of the trafficking route – in destination and source countries. Additionally, 
the allocation of resources on the supranational level, i.e., to Interpol or other 
international organizations might be best suited to address and fight international 
human trafficking. 
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APPENDIX II.A 
Table A II. 1: Overview of hypotheses 
 
Notes: Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A II. 1 shows the theoretically expected signs of our eight hypotheses and all independent variables. 
For example, a high crime rate in a country is the result of high human trafficking in these countries, ceteris 
paribus. Or, traditional crime activities have a positive effect on HT, ceteris paribus, with the expected 
positive sign and the independent variable “drug trafficking offences share” being highly statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
         Hypotheses Independent Variables
Theoretical 
expected sign
Hypotheses 
confirmed
Statistical 
significance
H1
A large extent of human trafficking in a country 
leads to a high number of identified victims, 
ceteris paribus.
Number of victims (per 100,000 people) +
H2
The larger the scale of HT in a country the more 
intense the fight against this crime, ceteris 
paribus.
3P-anti trafficking index + √ ***
H3
The more HT takes place in a country the higher 
the crime rate, ceteris paribus. 
Crime rate (per 100,000 people) + √ ***
H4
The richer the country, the larger is the extent of 
HT, ceteris paribus.
GDP per capita + √ ***
H5
The larger the demand for low-skilled services 
where exploitation takes place the higher the 
prevalence of HT in the country, ceteris paribus.
Employment in agriculture as share of 
total employment
+ √ **
H6
International investment connectedness increases 
HT presence in the country, ceteris paribus.
FDI stock as share of GDP + √ ***
Information flow +
Tourism arrivals (per 100,000 people) +
Linguistic fractionalization (DELF) - √ *
Migrants (share in population) +
Size of population + √ ***
Refugees (per 100,000 people) +
Heroin seized (kg per 100,000 people) +
Drug trafficking offences (per 100,000 
people)
+ √ ***
HT is increased by factors that force migration 
and attract people to a specific (rich) country, 
ceteris paribus.
H7
H8
Crime activities also have causal effects on HT, 
ceteris paribus.
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Table A II. 3: Data and sources 
Variables Description Sources 
(log) GDP per capita GDP per capita in constant US$ (2005) World Bank (2012) 
(log) FDI stock share Inward and outward FDI stock as percentage of GDP  UNCTAD (2012) 
(log) Population Total population per country per year World Bank (2012) 
Employment in 
agriculture (percent of 
total) 
Share of employment in agriculture as percentage of total 
employment 
World Bank (2012) 
International migrants 
(share) 
Number of (officially registered) international migrants in the 
country as share of total population 
World Bank (2012) 
Refugees by country of 
origin  
Number of (officially registered) refugees in the country per 
100,000 of local population 
World Bank (2012) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific (region 
dummy) 
Dummy indicating countries lying in East Asia and the Pacific 
region according to the World Bank 
World Bank (2012) 
International tourism 
arrivals (share) 
International tourists arriving in countries per year in 100,000 
per local population 
World Bank (2012) 
Information flow  
(KOF Social 
Globalization) 
Sub-components of the KOF globalization index including 
telecommunication as well as access to internet and newspaper 
proliferation. 0-100, larger values indicating more information 
availability 
Dreher et al. (2008) 
Version: 2013 
Linguistic 
fractionalization 
Linguistic fractionalization in countries as part of the distance 
adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (DELF); 0-1, 
lager values indicating larger linguistic dissimilarities 
Kolo (2012),  
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Heroin seizure  Amount of heroin seized per year in kg 
United Nations (2008) 
CTS Database 
Police personnel  
Number of police personnel active in the country per 100,000 
people 
United Nations (2008) 
CTS Database 
Crime rate  Crime rate in the country per 100,000 people 
United Nations (2008) 
CTS Database 
Drug trafficking Drug trafficking offences per 100,000 people 
United Nations (2008) 
CTS Database 
OECD membership Dummy for OECD countries OECD (2012) 
Victims Number of identified human trafficking victims in destination 
countries coded by the UNODC in their Global Report on 
Trafficking in Persons 
UNODC (2009, 2012) 
CI: destination Citation index of destination countries coded by the UNODC 
using open source information. Lower values indicating a 
larger probability to be a destination country 
UNODC (2006) 
CI: origin Citation index of countries of origin coded by the UNODC 
using open source information. Lower values indicating a 
larger probability to be a country of origin 
UNODC (2006) 
3P-anti-trafficking 
index (prosecution, 
protection, prevention) 
Anti-trafficking policy index which shows the application of 
anti-trafficking instruments in countries; 3-15, larger values 
indicating more compliance; Sub-components are the policy 
instruments applicable ranging from 1-5 
Cho et al. (2014) 
Democracy Indicates whether multiple parties are legally allowed and 
exist outside the regime front, and whether the selection of the 
executive and the legislature involve either a direct or indirect 
mandate from an electorate. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Rule of Law Index in the range of -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
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APPENDIX II. B:  
FORMAL MODEL (DETAILED) 
 
Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) developed the formal specification of the approach for 
one latent variable. It encompasses a system of two equations: First, showing how the 
unobservable variable in the measurement equation model determines the examined 
endogenous variables; and second how the latent variable and its causes interact. Thus, 
the model is formally characterized in the following way. The independent indicators 
are 𝑦𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚) and 𝜂 is the latent variable (i.e., human trafficking) such that: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝜂 + 𝜀𝑖 (II. A1) 
The 1 × 𝑚 parameter vector 𝛽𝑖 = {𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝑚}′ embodies the coefficients which indicate 
the estimated alteration in the respective indicators after a one unit change in the latent 
variable. The error terms 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 have mean zero and covariance matrix Ѳ𝜀. The 
correlation across indicators is exclusively determined by the common factor 𝜂. Equation 
(1) is a confirmatory factor analysis model for the observable indicators 
𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚)
′ including the common factor 𝜂 and the unique factor 𝜀𝑖. In the 
covariance matrix Ѳ𝜀, the diagonal elements are represented in the 1 × 𝑚 vector 𝜏.  
Moreover, the latent unobservable variable 𝜂 can be linearly decomposed in the 
following way: 
𝜂 = 𝜶′𝒙 + 𝜔,  (II. A2) 
where 𝛼 = (𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑠)′ are parameters, 𝒙 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑠)′ is the vector of observable 
exogenous causal variables and a stochastic error term 𝜔. The model described in 
equation (1) is also called a measurement model of the observed endogenous indicators 
determined by the latent variable. Any correlation between the elements of y results 
from the association with 𝜂. The indicators are assumed to be partially independent 
between all indicator pairs i and j setting all diagonal elements of Ѳ𝜀 equal to zero. The 
second component of the model is a structural equation (2) that characterizes the 
relationship between the latent variable and its causes.  
The structural parameters 𝛼 are not directly estimable due to the latent nature of 
the objective variable. Therefore equation (1) is inserted in equation (2) in order to derive 
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the reduced form which connects the observable variables from (1) and (2) via the 
equation 
𝒚 = 𝜫′𝐱 + 𝜸.  (II. A3) 
This is a multivariate regression model, which includes the endogenous indicators 
𝒚 = (𝑦1 … 𝑦𝑛)′ and the exogenous causes 𝒙 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑠)′ of the latent factors 𝜂. The 
reduced form coefficient matrix has the rank (𝑚 × 𝑠) = 1 and is given by 𝜫 = 𝛼𝛽′. The 
(1 × 𝑚) reduced form disturbance vector reads as 𝜸 = 𝜷𝝎 + 𝜺 and has the error 
covariance matrix  
Ѳ𝜔 = 𝐸[(𝛽𝜔 + 𝜀)(𝛽𝜔 + 𝜀)
′] = 𝜎𝜔
2 𝛽𝛽′ + Ѳ𝜀. (II. A4) 
The variance (𝜎𝜔
2 ) of the stochastic error term 𝜔 has the characteristic structure of the 
covariance matrix of a factor analysis model. This error covariance matrix is constrained 
similarly to 𝜫, because it is the sum of a one-rank matrix and a diagonal matrix. 
Therefore one of the elements of the factor loading vector 𝜷 has to be constrained in 
order to identify the model (Bollen 1989).83 The choice of which indicator is normalized 
determines the scale of the latent variable, but it does not affect the results of the 
measurement. We follow the literature and use the indicator with the largest factor 
loading (Bollen, 1989). 
Accordingly, the estimation procedure and the identification of the model are 
derived by relations of the observable data, 𝑧 = (𝑦′𝑥′)′. The (𝑚 + 𝑠) × (𝑚 + 𝑠) covariance 
of the underlying model defined by equations (1) and (2) shows the relationship in terms 
of their respective covariance  
∑(𝜑) = [
𝛽(𝑎′ɸ𝑥𝛼 + 𝜎𝜔
2 )𝛽′ + Ѳ𝜀    𝛽𝛼
′ɸ𝑥
ɸ𝑥  𝑎
′𝛽                     ɸ𝑥
].  (II. A5) 
Where 𝜑 is the vector of independent but correlated parameters 𝛽, 𝑎, Ѳ𝜀 and 𝜎𝜔
2 . The 
elements on the main-diagonal are 𝐸[𝑦𝑦′] =  𝛽(𝑎′ɸ𝑥𝛼 + 𝜎𝜔
2 )𝛽′ + Ѳ𝜀 and 𝐸[𝑥𝑥
′] = ɸ𝑥 and 
the off-diagonal components are 𝐸[𝑥𝑦′] = 𝛽 𝑎′𝐸[𝑥𝑥′]. Applying this information for the 
population, parameters are derived resulting in an estimate of the best approximation of 
                                                 
83 Following the literature (e.g., Dreher et al., 2007 and Buehn and Farzanegan, 2012) this approach is used 
here where one of the coefficients of the coefficient vector β is fixed to an a priori value, such that the unit of 
measurement for the unobserved term is normalized relative to one of the indicator variables. Another 
possibility is applied mainly in factor analysis where the latent variable is standardized to have unit variance 
(e.g., Di Tommaso et al., 2009).  
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the sample covariance matrix of the observed causes and indicators, ∑  ̂ = ∑(?̂?). This 
pattern is driven by the unobservable variable.  
Given (5), identification depends on the information in the matrix and whether it is 
sufficient to provide a unique set of values in 𝜑. The set of mean parameters will then be 
identified if 𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0, with 𝑞 = 𝑚𝑠 observable moments in terms of structural 
parameters and 𝑝 = 𝑚 + 𝑠, which is shaped by the off-diagonal elements. If this 
condition holds, the remaining parameters on the diagonal will be identified. In 
combination this implies that the necessary condition for identification of all parameters 
is given by 
𝑝 ≤
1
2
(𝑚 + 𝑠)(𝑚 + 𝑠 + 1).  (II. A6) 
Estimation of ∑(𝜑), ∑  ̂ = ∑(?̂?) is obtained if the parameter and covariance values are 
chosen in such a way that the difference between the estimate and the true sample 
covariance 𝐒 of the causes and indicators is minimized using the following objective 
function: 
𝐹 = ln|𝛴(𝜑)| + 𝑡𝑟[𝑆𝛴−1(?̂?)] − ln|𝑆| − (𝑚 + 𝑠),  (II. A7) 
which is a likelihood function assuming a multivariate normal distribution.84 The 
sufficient rule for the MIMIC model to be identified is 𝑚 ≥ 2 and 𝑠 ≥ 1 (Bollen, 1989: 
331). Perfect fit would be achieved if the true sample covariance is equal to the estimated 
covariance, 𝑺 = ∑(?̂?). This is evaluated using several indices specified below. 
After identification of the relationship between the variables and the estimation of 
the parameters, the latent scores of 𝜂 for each country can be specified assigning factor 
scores using the mean vector and variance matrix of the fitted model. This method was 
suggested by Jöreskog (2000) and uses more structural information than a simple linear 
application.85 For this reason the factor score is used for the generation of the final 
country ranking. The factor score is generated in the following way: 
?̃? = ?̂?𝑧𝜂
′ ?̂?𝑧𝑧?̂?𝑧 + ?̂?𝜂 (II. A8) 
                                                 
84 The maximum likelihood estimator with missing values (mlmv) is implemented into STATA’s sem 
command in order to account for the missing values in the observable data (Jöreskog, 1973). Since the 
maximization of the log likelihood does not depend on the complete information of individuals the 
estimator also considers all partially complete data in the estimation process. This procedure is similar to 
multiple imputations and provides unbiased estimates (Baraldis and Enders, 2010). 
85 The linear prediction is specified as well and gives similar results with a rank correlation of larger than 
85 percent. 
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with 𝑧 = (𝑦′𝑥′)′ being the vector of all observable causes and indicators from equation 
(3), 𝑍 = (𝑧′𝜂′)′ the vector of all variables of the model, ?̂?𝑍 = ?̂?𝑧?̂?𝜂 the fitted mean of Z, 
and ?̂?𝑍 = (
?̂?𝑧𝑧 ?̂?𝑧𝜂 
?̂?𝑧𝜂
′   ?̂?𝜂𝜂
) the fitted variance. Thus, the factor score is the fitted mean 
prediction of the latent variable, similar to prediction of the dependent variable in 
regression models, weighted by minimizing the objective function (7). The score of the 
latent variable is subsequently obtained by implementing these weights, the estimated 
coefficients of the measurement, and the structural model in equation (8). This said, the 
model is applied to measure the extent of human trafficking in destination countries. 
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III. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Population growth, decreasing fertility rates and improvements in life expectancy in 
many countries around the world have contributed to a substantial rise in the world’s 
share of elderly population. In line with this general trend, the total size of the global 
population above 60 years is expected to increase further and reach 2 billion by 2050 in 
absolute terms (United Nations, 2014). Given the past and expected future increase in the 
elderly population, many countries in the world have introduced reforms to their 
pension systems with the double goal of mitigating old-age poverty and ensuring the 
financial viability of the system. Despite reforms, until today the majority of elderly 
people in the world, especially in developing countries, are either not at all or only 
insufficiently covered by a pension scheme (ILO 2014).86 Figure III. 1 displays these 
trends and shows that with the exception of North America (NA) and Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA) individual coverage rates are below 80 percent of the working 
population or even below 20 percent in South Asia. 
Figure III. 1: Coverage of pension programs 
 
Notes: ILO (2014). East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), North America (NA), South Asia (SA), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
                                                 
86 For an overview and discussion on causes and measurement of old-age poverty especially in developing 
countries see Barrientos et al. (2003). 
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These low coverage rates and frequently insufficient pension benefits in developing 
countries have been attributed by many scholars and pension experts to the specific 
nature of contributory retirement schemes (Willmore, 2007; Holzmann, 2012). 
Contribution-based pension systems, which link pension eligibility and benefits to 
previous contributions or work history, fail to achieve the desired outcomes in several 
cases. This is particularly relevant in developing countries in which workers who 
participate in contribution-based pension schemes are usually from the upper half of the 
wealth distribution. They are predominantly from urban areas with a secure career 
within the public sector while large parts of the population are left without effective 
pension coverage (Palacios & Sluchynsky, 2006; Willmore, 2007). The reliance on 
contributory pension systems alone has therefore been seriously questioned. As a 
consequence, several countries have introduced so called ‘social pensions’ (non-
contributory funds), which provide cash transfers for the elderly with little or no link to 
previous contribution or work history.87 In the context of the larger debate over pension 
reform, some argue that these social pensions are an effective way to deal with the 
limited coverage of contributory schemes and help alleviate poverty among the elderly 
(Willmore, 2007; World Bank, 2009; ILO, 2014; UNDP, 2014).  
Surprisingly, despite the growing interest in and importance of non-contributory 
pensions around the world, little is known about the number of countries that have 
adopted such a pension scheme, the related geographical distribution across countries, 
and trends over time. In fact, the academic and policy literature in these fields have been 
entirely based on OECD countries (Gruber and Wise, 1997, 2002, 2005; Gruber et al., 
2009; OECD, 2013; Wolf et al., 2014) or focused on individual country case studies only 
(Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; Willmore, 2007; Whitehouse et al., 2009; World Bank, 2009; 
Chomik and Whitehouse, 2010; Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012; Kaushal, 2014). While these 
are important contributions, the existing studies fail to provide a comprehensive 
overview of non-contributory pensions’ distribution across a larger number or more 
heterogeneous countries and in the developing world. Moreover, no single analysis 
                                                 
87 The terms social pension and non-contributory pension are used interchangeably throughout the 
chapter.  
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investigates to what extent the provision of this pension form is driven by different 
economic, demographic, political and international factors.  
This article’s principle objective is twofold: first, the trends of the development of 
non-contributory pension systems over time are illustrated, and second, a systematic 
analysis of the cross-country determinants of the introduction of social pensions shows 
the most relevant factors shaping the provision of old-age funds. By generating a new 
data set on social pension adoption using information from the database of national 
labour, social security and related human rights legislations (NATLEX) provided in the World 
Social Protection Report of the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2014), I compare 
alternative data sources and social pension classifications. This allows me to cover up to 
185 countries over the 1960-2012 period. Thus, developed and developing countries are 
included comprehensively. Based on the political economy of social security spending 
and public good provision, the role of economic and demographic country character-
ristics is analyzed. Subsequently, I specifically focus on the influence of political 
institutions and international forces in the adoption of non-contributory pensions.  
The results suggest that demographic factors are decisive for the adoption of social 
pension proxying for the demand of increased old-age public support. Whereas 
democratic countries are more likely to adopt social pension, more fractionalized 
governments have a lower probability of introduction. This correlation reflects that 
weaker governments are less likely to implement non-contributory old-age anti-poverty 
transfers. The influence of miscellaneous international leverage factors highlights that 
trade openness affects the launch of a social pension negatively while aid dependency of 
a country is not systematically related.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section III. 2 the data on 
social pensions are introduced, a consistent classification is provided and international 
facts and figures on the distribution and trends over the last five decades are described. 
In Section III. 3 I review the political economy literature on public good and pension 
provision and discuss theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding the 
provision of social security and transfer programs. Testable hypotheses are developed 
thereafter. The empirical strategy is outlined and results are discussed in Section III. 4, 
while Section III. 5 concludes. 
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III. 2. SOCIAL PENSION AROUND THE WORLD 
The diversity in design and shaping of pension programs in general and social non-
contributory pensions in particular make a comparison across countries rather complex. 
I use a comprehensive classification and extract information from two sources. First, the 
‘Social Security Programs Throughout the World’ (SSPTW) data, which provides 
information on mandatory pension programs around the world for the last decade. 
Second, the World Social Protection Report (ILO, 2014) provides details on contributory 
and non-contributory pensions across countries. I construct a data set which allows the 
description of worldwide trends over time in the provision of social pension. 
III. 2.1. Classification of social pension 
Since a diverse range of national systems exists in the provision of old-age cash transfers 
worldwide, only a clear classification of non-contributory social pensions allows a 
systematic analysis. The study focuses on social pensions or non-contributory pension 
systems that are used by governments to ensure against old-age poverty. The most 
comprehensive classification is provided by the World Bank’s multi-pillar approach 
implemented in early 2000 (Holzman and Hinz, 2005).88 Therein a new pillar, Pillar 0, 
was introduced and defined as "a non-contributory pillar (in the form of a demogrant89 
or social pension) that provides a minimal level of protection" (ibid.: 1). Social pensions 
are commonly financed from general government revenue and are distributed to the 
elderly on a targeted (means-tested, ear-marked) or universal basis.90   
                                                 
88 Diversity in pension system specifically and social security programs in general, with the goal to fight 
old-age poverty, made a pointed approach towards pensions necessary. The World Bank therefore expanded 
the three-pillar system to a five-pillar one (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). The three pillar classification was 
introduced in 1994 (World Bank, 1994). Pillar 1 referred to a basic pension which representd an anti-poverty 
pillar that guarantees a minimum income at old-age irrespective of a person's earning history. Pillar 2 
included a system of mandatory contributions to an earnings-related scheme, while Pillar 3 refered to a 
voluntary savings system available to anyone who wishes to supplement his/her retirement income by the 
first two pillars. 
89 Demogrant funds are universal flat rate funds based on other characteristics than contributions, i.e., age.  
90 The original Pillar 2 was split into a new Pillar 1 (public earnings-related pension) and a new Pillar 2 
(private earnings-related pension), with Pillar 3 refering to voluntary contributions to occupational or 
private pension plans and Pillar 4 including a variety of non-pension retirement savings. See Willmore 
(2007) for a more detailed discussion on the respective pension pillars. 
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Figure III. 2: Social pension classification 
 
Notes: SSPTW, various issues; ILO (2014).  
a)-d) social pension components by Willmore (2012),  
a) and d) Universal and targeted (means-tested) pension identified by ILO (2014). 
The SSPTW reports do not clearly categorize a zero pillar or 'social pension'; therefore 
the classification of Willmore (2012) of components of social pensions provides useful 
information. It allows the identification of whether or not a country has some kind of 
social pension scheme anchored in national legislation. Figure III. 2 shows different 
aspects of social pension components (a)-(d). Willmore (2012) classifies four different 
systems to be part of social pension programs which are grouped in universal and 
targeted social pension. First, universal non-contributory pensions include (a) universal 
pensions, (b) universal minimum pensions, and (c) recoverable social pensions. And 
second, targeted social pensions include (d) means-tested social assistance pensions 
where means-tested includes income-, asset- or pension tests in order to be eligible to 
receive a pension.91  
The advantage of this classification is that it includes all kinds of basic transfers to 
the elderly including flat-rate components and minimum provision of old-age income. 
                                                 
91 In detail, universal (minimum) pensions are provided to all residents or citizens independent of 
earnings, assets, family transfers or other forms of pension income. The funds are provided by the 
government and are transferred to all elderly residents independent of income. E.g., in Bolivia Renta Dignita 
is financed by the government through taxes on hydro-carbons and dividends from public enterprises. 
Recoverable social pensions are universally distributed dependent on years of service or residency, financed 
through the tax system (payroll taxes) and thus recoverable by tax authorities. Lastly, targeted (means-
tested) social pensions are social assistance pensions that require applicants to pass a means-test 
guaranteeing a non-contributory pension for poor people with no personal wealth or family support. 
Social non-contributory pension
Universal pension
a) Universal pension 
(independent of earnings)
b) Universal minimum 
pension 
(minimum income in old 
age)
c) Recoverable universal 
pension 
(financed through the tax 
system)
Targeted pension
d) Social assistance 
means-tested pension 
(targeted transfer for 
people with no personal 
wealth or family support 
that is distributed through 
income-, asset- or pension-
tests)
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These may also be part of mandatory individual accounts or other pay-as-you-go 
pension systems and may not necessarily be part of a non-contributory social pension.92 
This allows taking the diversity of programs into account, but it also bears the risk that 
the definition includes very broad categories and may not be regarded as `social´ 
pension consistently. A narrow definition of social pension solely includes universal and 
means-tested pensions which refers to (a) and (d) in Figure III. 2. The advantage of this 
classification is that it specifically includes non-contributory components of pension 
programs which are largely targeted to reduce old-age poverty and is consistent with the 
classification of the World Banks’ `zero pillar’.  
III. 2.2. Non-contributory pension data 
The detailed classification allows me to construct indicators of whether countries have 
an earnings-related and/or social pension and which component of a social pension 
(universal or targeted) is implemented in the country. To the best of my knowledge, the 
only database that continuously reports data since 2001 is the SSPTW.93 These reports 
combine information on national mandatory pensions provided by national 
agencies/officials in answer to a survey send out by the International Social Security 
Association (ISSA) and supplemented by data collected from the ISSA’s Developments 
and Trends Annual Survey.94 In total, the data set provides data on social security 
programs for up to 179 countries and has been issued in four regional reports over two-
year periods since 2002.95 Each report details country narratives covering all kinds of 
statutory social security programs (old-age, disability, heath, etc.).96 Information is 
clustered into three aspects: employment-related, universal and means-tested systems. 
                                                 
92 Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems are publicly managed pension systems promising the 
contributors future goods and services form the government by compulsory (earmarked) income taxes and 
are usually part of Pillar 1 in the revised system (Willmore, 2007).  
93 Initiatives by HelpAge International, the World Bank and other institutions such as the UN population 
division and the European Commission assess the extent, coverage and distribution of retirement programs 
globally. Although important in itself to collect as much data as possible to be able to establish best practice 
models, most of the information available from these sources is rather fragmented in its scope of countries or 
availability of information over time. For an overview see HelpAge International (2014). 
94 The SSPTW data has also been used in pension-related academic publications (e.g., Bloom et al., 2007). 
95 Online: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ (accessed: 02.09.2014). Regional reports are 
available for Europe, Asia and Pacific, Africa and The Americas. Before 2000 these reports are compiled in 
single versions following a different structuring and are not publicly available. 
96 These are intended to "insure individuals against interruption or loss of earnings power and certain 
special expenditures arising from marriage, birth, or death" (see SSPTW: Africa, 2013: 1). 
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The first two provide the individual by right with benefits in case of shock (i.e., injury, 
death) and the third system bases the benefits formula on personal income or resources. I 
first code an indicator of social pension that includes components (a)-(d) and a 
contributory indicator including earnings-related pensions and provident funds,97 and 
second indicators for each of the categories are coded singularly.  
 Two major shortcomings are, however, first, the reporting bias and subjectivity 
that may be prevalent in the data. Second, the short time-frame (2002-2012) leaves out 
important developments of non-contributory pension provision of earlier decades. 
Therefore, I extend the time frame and expand the data set with additional information 
on contributory and non-contributory pensions worldwide over the 1960-2013 period. 
This information is extracted from the database of national labour, social security and 
related human rights legislations (NATLEX) of the World Social Protection Report issued 
by the International Labor Organization on main social security programs and non-
contributory pension schemes (ILO, 2014).98 The ILO provides an overview of pension 
programs including the type of program, the date of the first law, the name of the non-
contributory scheme, the year it was introduced, and legal requirement characteristic. 
This information is used to classify the different systems in the same way as the SSPTW 
data. It differs from the SSPTW information in that I do not have detailed information on 
components of contributory pension systems and therefore will only use information 
compatible to the narrow definition of social pension (Figure III. 2: (a)+(d)). The 
extended data set now provides information on 185 countries including information that 
dates back until 1891 where a non-contributory pension scheme was implemented in 
New Zealand.99 The observation period starts in 1960, because most information on 
relevant variables is not available before and even then information is fragmented.  
In the following, I compare both data sources and thereby describe the main facts 
and trends in social pension provision. One cautious note is still in order: since the 
                                                 
97 Earnings-related pensions are old-age retirement systems based on the work history of the individual. 
Provident-funded pensions are publicly managed funds where compulsory savings of employees, retained 
from wages, are matched by employer's contributions, invested and paid at pension age. The latter are 
mainly used in developing countries.  
98 See Annex IV: Statistical tables, Tables B6 and B7 (ILO, 2014). 
99 Other countries are reported before 1960, for instance, Denmark (1891) implementing a national 
universal pension, Australia (1900) providing a targeted `age pension' or United Kingdom (1909) adopting 
pension credits that are targeted non-contributory pensions.  
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distribution and trends show the existence of pension programs, first, they hide the fact 
that availability of pension per se says nothing about the coverage of the population. 
Second, it cannot be addressed whether or not the level of the pension secures an 
adequate living standard for those covered. 
III. 2.3. Facts and figures 
Social pension data 
Comparing the provision of pension systems worldwide between the two data sources, 
the SSPTW data (Table III. 1) has a lower coverage of countries in general compared to 
the data from NATLEX (Table III. 2). By 2012 153 countries are reported to have a 
contributory pension in the SSPTW data, but 176 countries are reported in the ILO 
data.100 Looking only at social (non-contributory) pensions, 85 and 96 countries are 
reported in 2012, respectively. This difference may be due to the fact that some countries 
do not respond to the SSPTW survey which leads to a lower coverage in general. 
The difference in the definition becomes obvious in the second panel of both tables 
where we show the detailed components of each social non-contributory pension. 
According to Willmore (2012) universal minimum and recoverable minimum pension 
are also part of social pension systems. Including these in the count of social pensions the 
overall number of universal pensions substantially increases. In the extended data set 
(Table III. 2) I only have information on universal pensions. The numbers are roughly 
comparable to reported universal pension from the SSPTW data where 15 countries 
report to have a universal pension. In the ILO data set it is 17 countries in 2012. The data 
also differs substantially in the information on targeted (means-tested) pension where 58 
countries are observed in 2011/2012 (SSPTW). This number is already reached in 2000 
and increases to 79 countries according to the ILO data. 
Only speculations are possible about the reasons for this deviation. It seems to be 
the case that reporting or coding bias may be an issue in the SSPTW data set. This is 
simply exemplified looking at differences in reporting over the years. Six countries 
                                                 
100 The complete list of countries is provided in appendix Table A III. 3.  
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report abolishing social pension in the last decade.101 While inconsistency are not 
identified for Senegal and Turkey who report no social pension since 2004 and 2003, 
respectively, reporting in Turkmenistan might be prone to reporting bias. Given that 
abolishment is reported in the last period in 2011 and further information is not yet 
available, this will become clear with the next report. Note that Ecuador reports a social 
targeted pension in 2004 and no social pension since 2011.102 In Latvia no means-tested 
pension is reported in 2003 whereas in all other years the report indicates existence of 
such a pension.  
 Taken together the SSPTW data has major disadvantages, which led me to 
construct a different data set. I use the narrow definition of social pension in this 
analysis, which guarantees first, the comparability across countries and second, the sole 
focus on specific social pension programs targeted at old-age poverty reduction.103 
Another advantage is the extension of the time frame looking at characteristics of 
implementation in the last five decades. This is possible because the World Social 
Protection Report provide information on the year of the law implementing non-
contributory (and contributory) pensions for each country. 
  
                                                 
101 While abolishment or reforms of pension systems are ongoing processes, jumps from one year to 
another seem rather unlikely. 
102 In the report of Ecuador (SSPTW, 2008) it is noted that the Social Security law of 2001 is not fully 
implemented, which either could mean that the reported pension is not yet implemented or that it will never 
be implemented. The report is not clear in that instance. 
103 Critiques may argue that other components of pension systems are also used to prevent old-age 
poverty; however, the aim of the analysis is to focus on the zero pillar (non-contributory) pensions, which 
are targeted individuals that have never contributed to any pension system. 
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Table III. 1: SSPTW pension data by region (2001-2012) 
 
 
Notes: The top panel shows the existence of contributory and non-contributory (social) pensions and the 
respective share of countries in the regions in periods 2001/2002, 2005/2006 and 2011/2012. The lower panel 
shows reported components of social pensions and regional shares in 2001/2002 and 2011/2012. 
Table III. 2: ILO pension by region (1960-2012) 
 
 
Notes: The top panel reports the number of countries with contributory and non-contributory pensions and 
respective regional shares in 1960, 1980, 2000, 2012 and the lower panel reports the components of non-
contributory pensions (universal and targeted pensions) and their shares in the same years. 
Distribution and trends 
Looking at the development of pension programs worldwide in Figure III. 3, provision 
of earnings-related pensions has almost doubled since 1960. The major increase in the 
provision of contributory pension, covering the working population and being financed 
through contributions from employees and/or employers, is observed in the first two 
decades between 1960 and 1980. The only regions that still lack behind in earnings-
Region N
East Asia & Pacific 17 47% 17 47% 19 53% 8 22% 8 22% 10 28% 36
Europe & Central Asia 42 74% 44 77% 43 75% 35 61% 37 65% 38 67% 57
Latin America & Caribbean 32 78% 32 78% 32 78% 18 44% 22 54% 21 51% 41
Middle East & North Africa 16 76% 15 71% 17 81% 2 10% 2 10% 2 10% 21
North America 2 67% 2 67% 2 67% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3
South Asia 5 63% 4 50% 4 50% 1 13% 3 38% 3 38% 8
Sub-Saharan Africa 36 75% 35 73% 36 75% 6 13% 5 10% 8 17% 48
World 150 70% 149 70% 153 71% 73 34% 80 37% 85 40% 214
2011/2012
Contributory pension Social pension
2001/2002 2005/2006 2011/2012 2001/2002 2005/2006
Region N
East Asia & Pacific 4 11% 4 11% 0 0% 0 0% 3 8% 4 11% 3 8% 5 14% 36
Europe & Central Asia 1 2% 3 5% 0 0% 1 2% 15 26% 21 37% 25 44% 25 44% 57
Latin America & Caribbean 0 0% 1 2% 4 10% 6 15% 2 5% 3 7% 12 29% 18 44% 41
Middle East & North Africa 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 10% 2 10% 1 5% 2 10% 21
North America 1 33% 1 33% 0 0% 0 0% 1 33% 1 33% 2 67% 3 100% 3
South Asia 0 0% 1 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 13% 0 0% 0 0% 2 25% 8
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 4% 5 10% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 3 6% 3 6% 48
World 8 4% 15 7% 4 2% 7 3% 25 12% 31 14% 46 21% 58 27% 214
2011/2012
Universal pension Universal minimum pension Recoverable universal pension Means-tested
2001/2002 2011/20122001/2002 2011/2012 2001/2002 2011/2012 2001/2002
Region N
East Asia & Pacific 8 22% 19 53% 24 67% 25 69% 4 11% 10 28% 10 28% 14 39% 36
Europe & Central Asia 46 81% 47 82% 49 86% 49 86% 20 35% 34 60% 34 60% 38 67% 57
Latin America & Caribbean 19 46% 33 80% 34 83% 34 83% 7 17% 15 37% 15 37% 26 63% 41
Middle East & North Africa 9 43% 16 76% 17 81% 18 86% 2 10% 2 10% 2 10% 2 10% 21
North America 1 33% 2 67% 3 100% 3 100% 2 67% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3
South Asia 2 25% 4 50% 5 63% 5 63% 0 0% 3 38% 3 38% 3 38% 8
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 23% 35 73% 39 81% 42 88% 2 4% 6 13% 6 13% 10 21% 48
World 96 45% 156 73% 171 80% 176 82% 37 17% 47 22% 73 34% 96 45% 214
Social pensionContributory pension
1980 2000 20121960 1980 2000 2012 1960
Region N
East Asia & Pacific 3 8% 4 11% 6 17% 7 19% 1 3% 1 3% 5 14% 8 22% 36
Europe & Central Asia 2 4% 2 4% 2 4% 2 4% 18 32% 21 37% 32 56% 35 61% 57
Latin America & Caribbean 2 5% 2 5% 3 7% 4 10% 5 12% 9 22% 12 29% 22 54% 41
Middle East & North Africa 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 10% 2 10% 2 10% 2 10% 21
North America 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 67% 3 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3
South Asia 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 38% 3 38% 8
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 2% 1 2% 4 8% 4 8% 1 2% 2 4% 2 4% 6 13% 48
World 8 4% 9 4% 15 7% 17 8% 29 14% 38 18% 59 28% 79 37% 214
Universal pensions Targeted pensions
1960 1980 2000 2012 1960 1980 2000 2012
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related pension provision with only 69 and 63 percent of countries covered are East and 
South Asia (Table III. 2). All other regions show coverage of over 80 percent of countries 
with 100 percent coverage in OECD countries (ILO, 2014). 
Figure III. 3: Development of pension provision (1960-2012) 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on ILO (2014). 
Social pensions are prevalent in 20 percent of countries already in the 1960s with only a 
minor increase until 1990 (from 17 percent to 24 percent of countries). In total, 37 
countries (worldwide) have a non-contributory pension already in 1960. Most of these 
are from Europe and North America.104 Since then major changes in the provision of non-
contributory pensions worldwide took place and coverage of countries reaches almost 50 
percent in 2012. Principle reforms and implementation of social pension components 
within national pension systems are mainly observed since the 1990. In 2000 the share of 
countries has doubled compared to the level in 1960 and reached 34 percent of countries 
providing old-age cash transfers with major increases in Latin America and South Asia. 
In 2012 45 percent of countries have such pension systems where the major changes 
                                                 
104 These countries are: Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Barbados, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Japan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and 
Uzbekistan. 
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again are observed in Latin America with an increase of an additional 27 percent (11 
countries). As shown in Figure III. 2, countries foremost provide targeted pensions that 
provide a conditional cash transfer to elderly with no other means of pension income. 
Countries in North America, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
are the main providers of this form of social pension with more than 50 percent of 
countries of each region. Eight countries in East Asia and six in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
a targeted social pension in 2012.105  
 In contrast, non-contributory universal pensions are only provided in eight 
percent of countries worldwide which represents 17 countries in total. The largest share 
in this category is provided in East Asia with seven countries in total.106 No changes and 
no uptake at all are observed in the provision of universal pension in North America, the 
MENA region and South Asia (see Table III. 2). In Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa 
four countries each, and two countries in Europe, have a universal pension.107 
 
 
  
                                                 
105 Countries providing targeted pension in 2012: In East Asia and the Pacific are Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Samoa, Thailand, and Vietnam. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are Botswana, Cabo Verde, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland. 
106 These countries are Brunei Darussalam, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Kiribati, New Zealand and Samoa.  
107 These countries are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles in Africa, Aruba, Bolivia, Guyana 
and Paraguay in Latin America, and Denmark and The Netherlands in Europe. 
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Figure III. 4: Distribution of social pension (world) 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on ILO (2014). 
The regional trends are visualized in Figure III. 4. They show clear patterns: over the 
years Latin American countries are the first countries implementing social targeted 
pension’s, followed by Central and Eastern Asia. The African continent is colored more 
light throughout the whole period with almost no changes.  
Overall, it is observed that targeted social pensions are more popular worldwide 
than universal pensions, given the latter are provided to the whole population solely 
based on age and citizenship, because they are costly. No reform efforts are undertaken 
in contributory pensions in the last two decades whereas non-contributory pensions 
gained importance especially in that time period.  
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III. 3. DRIVERS OF SOCIAL PENSION: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND HYPOTHESES 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights108 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights109 establish social security as a basic human right. 
This rights-based approach requires states and the international governance structure to 
provide a cash income in the form of a pension on a regular and predictable basis to the 
elderly (Bloom and McKinnon, 2013; Barrientos and Hulme, 2009). The redistributive 
nature of social non-contributory pensions is different from contributory pension 
schemes in that they are funded through general governmental revenues. Besides the 
cost-intensity of social pensions (especially of universal pensions) critics often regard the 
redistribution of resources between young and old (and rich and poor) as burdensome 
for productivity. Additionally, traditional support systems such as intra-family transfers 
or work-ethics may be crowded out further (Willmore, 2007). The literature provides 
three lines of argument to explain the emergence and provision of social pensions 
through targeted government spending: economics and demographics, the political 
system and its structure, and international transmission channels.  
After the initial investment of financial resources that are needed for the 
implementation of a pension system, annual governmental budgets need to be available 
to ensure long-term financial sustainability. Changing socio-economic conditions affect 
the financial stability of government resources and, as a consequence, determine the 
continuation of (tax-funded) non-contributory pension systems. 
 
                                                 
108 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948; Articles 22 and 25.  
Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality.  
Article 25: (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old-age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special 
care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
109 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; Article 9.  
Article 9: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance. 
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Economics and demographics 
The political economy literature focuses on the efficiency and cost effectiveness of such 
programs as main explaining factors. Positive theories suggest that efficiency concerns 
are the sole driver of social security provision (Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Tabellini, 2000), and 
consequently of social pension adoption and continuation. Accordingly, the key 
explanatory variables are economic and demographic factors, since those are central 
variables in determining sustainability in the expansion of government spending 
(Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1999) as well as the tax base.  
In political economy models of voting, pension reforms are adopted if the old and 
the middle aged form a majority voting coalition which cannot be defeated by younger 
generations (e.g., Cooley and Soares, 1999; Shoven and Slavov, 2006; Tabellini, 2000). 
Mulligan et al. (2010) show empirically that the share of the elderly population (older 
than 65 in total population) is a robust positive determinant of social security spending. 
Additionally, Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) demonstrate theoretically and empirically in a 
fixed cost theory of regulation that social security expenditures in general are driven by 
the size of the affected population and administrative costs. They argue that regulatory 
costs may be reduced if a similar jurisdiction is already in place. Countries in which 
contribution-based pensions exist may be more inclined to also adopt a social non-
contributory pension, since the institutional environment (i.e., agency responsible for the 
management of the program, lists of beneficiaries, legal environment, etc.) is already in 
place (Hugo and Cook, 2012). However, one could also expect those countries see no 
need in the adoption of social pension.  
Overall, the literature suggests that both economics and demographics are the 
principal variables in determining the adoption and persistence of a social pension. The 
following economic and demographic variables are used: (ln) GDP per capita in 
international Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) from the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.1; 
Feenstra et al., 2015) and its square to account for the general economic situation of each 
country, state capacity and the general living standard. Given the large coverage in 
OECD countries, the relationship between the income level and social pension is likely to 
be non-linear. I expect it to positively affect social pension adoption at lower levels of 
income with decreasing probability at higher levels of income (Jung and Tran, 2012). 
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Additionally, state capacity is determined by the savings rate, the ability of public and 
private actors to restore assets. Savings are either expected to positively affect the ability 
of the state to provide public pension or lower private savings (high current 
consumption) increasing the need for public support in old-age suggesting a negative 
relation. There are no clear predictions which effect dominates. Gross savings in terms of 
GDP from the WDI data set is used (World Bank, 2014). 
Demographic characteristics are proxied by population growth, fertility and life 
expectancy rate at birth from the World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank, 
2014). A growing population is associated with an increase in the tax base and thus a 
positive correlation with the probability of social pension adoption. Decreasing fertility 
and increasing life expectancy are indicators of aging of societies. In general, the 
provision of old-age retirement income is positively related to the demographic 
composition of countries, because it determines the potential number of contributors and 
pensioners (Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012). In countries with high fertility rates the need 
for social pension provision might be less pressing since within-family support systems 
are still intact (Entwisle and Winegarden, 1984).110 Considering the costs of 
implementation I control for the existence of contributory pension and isolate the effect 
on social pensions.  
Political institutions 
A second strand of political economy arguments emphasizes the role of political 
institutions in social security provision (Galasso and Profeta, 2002). Testing their 
predictions, Mulligan et al. (2004) find no difference between autocracies and 
democracies in the provision of different public policies. Similarly, Mulligan et al. (2010) 
find no differential effects in the size of retirement programs between democracies and 
autocracies once they control for economic and demographic variables. Giulliano and 
Mishra (2014) show that a democratic political system favors reforms in different 
economic sectors such as the financial sector, the capital and current account, the 
                                                 
110 Another potential demographic factor influencing the population composition of countries is migration. 
This is, however, still only a minor factor, according to Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012), depending heavily on 
the age structure of the migrants. Given the persistent low quality of migration data especially in a multi-
country context we do not include it in our analysis. 
CHAPTER III 
 
131 
product and the agriculture market, and on the amount of trade. This could suggest that 
generally reforms are more likely in democracies. Case studies support this assumption 
regarding social pensions. Hugo and Cook (2012) present case studies from Asia and 
argue that a democratic political system facilitates the provision of social pension, 
because civil society alliances support the emergence of social welfare programs. General 
societal support is needed to motivate the implementation of such a program and to 
ensure that it is maintained. I test whether there is a differential impact in democratic 
compared to non-democratic regimes in the case of social pension provision. As a larger 
share of the voting population grows old, countries might be under pressure to reduce 
old-age income insecurity to please their electorate. Democracies might also be more 
likely to introduce social pension as a vote-maximizing strategy if the share of the 
elderly among voters increase. However, the same argument may be true for autocratic 
regimes since also autocratic leaders need to please their elderly supporters. 
Hypothesis 1: The provision of social pension is more likely in democratic countries, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, the democracy indicator of Cheibub et al. (2010) is employed, 
which is available for the 1960-2008 period. The dummy distinguishes between 
democratic regimes with electoral voting schemes to establish executive and legislative 
offices and autocratic regimes where this is not the case. The indicator has been widely 
used and is well accepted in the economic literature.111 
A second source of differences in political institutions influencing targeted 
government spending are the ideological orientation of governments and the extent to 
which governments are fractionalized (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989a, b). First, the 
ideological orientation of governments shape targeted spending, because it is presumed 
that socialist parties if in power expand the welfare state. New evidence from a set of 55 
different countries shows that socialist governments are in favor of state interventions 
and redistribution in order to reduce income inequality (Keefer and Milanovic, 2014).112 
                                                 
111 We also use the Polity IV data set to test the predictions and the results are qualitatively the same. 
112 Several studies empirically show that party ideology matters in OECD countries in the allocation of 
grant aid to least developed and middle-income countries (Brech and Potrafke, 2014), and in German aid 
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In line with these observations, left-oriented governments are expected to be in favor of 
social pensions and have a higher probability of adoption. I use the measure of the party 
orientation of the chief executive provided by the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; 
Beck et al., 2001, updated 2013), which distinguishes between right, left and centric 
orientation on a three-scale indicator. A dummy variable is generated that turns one for 
left-oriented governments and zero for right- or center-oriented governments. Thus, the 
effect of the variable compares the difference between left-oriented governments and 
other orientations. The effect is expected to be positive. 
 Second, empirical results testing the impact of fractionalization show that it 
increases governments’ deficits (Volkerink and de Haan, 2001) and the size of 
government spending, subsidies and transfers (Scartascini and Crain, 2002). Budgetary 
competition increases in more fractionalized governments where each party seeks to 
please their own constituency (common pool problem) without internalizing the costs 
(Weingast et al., 1981). Topic-specific coalitions are formed ad-hoc by mutually agreeing 
to grant favors increasing log-rolling (Scartascini and Crain, 2002). In the context of 
social pensions, I would expect the probability of social pension adoption rising if 
governments are more fractionalized due to larger government spending. Thus, the 
composition of political institutions in the form of government fractionalization has been 
shown to influence government spending which would affect welfare expenditures in 
particular.  
Hypothesis 2: The strength of governments and its socialist orientation increase the 
probability of social pension provision, ceteris paribus. 
 
The government fractionalization index that mirrors the probability that two deputies 
picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties is used 
(Beck et al., 2001) to test this relationship for social pension provision. I would expect a 
negative coefficient, since higher levels in the government fractionalization measure 
means more fractionalization. 
                                                                                                                                                  
allocation (Dreher et al., 2015b). Fuchs et al. (2012), however, do not find a significant relationship in a 
worldwide sample of countries. 
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International influence 
Finally, sociology and political science literature on the expansion of social assistance 
suggests that national political processes are subject to international influence. Leisinger 
and Barrientos (2013) accord the main reason for the rise in the number of social 
pensions in the last decade to the international proliferation of social-policy innovations. 
Political constructivism and coercion theory predict diffusion of global norms through 
the international community (e.g., Dobbing et al., 2007). For instance, global norms 
might be diffused by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF that 
often require policy reforms as condition for lending (e.g., Williamson, 1993; Gore, 2000). 
Dobbing et al. (2007: 451) emphasize that countries, which are subject to international 
leverage, such as trade, aid or security concerns, are more likely to adopt reforms 
promoted by powerful actors. Trade openness has been shown to increase social security 
spending in Latin American countries (Avelion et al., 2005) supporting the compensation 
perspective of increased international competition via higher social security support. In 
terms of pensions, Palacios and Sluchynsky (2006) show that, particularly in the area of 
pension, peer effects through policy transfer seem to lead to the introduction of 
mandatory contributory schemes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 
This might also hold for non-contributory schemes. 
Aid allocation could be another trigger. Aid does not include financial grants and 
loans only, but also technical assistance in form of expertise and knowledge on 
implementation, program design and sustainability. The allocation of development 
assistance has been shown to be influenced systematically by strategic considerations 
(Dreher et al., 2009a, b). On the one hand, aid that is rather politically motivated and/or 
tied to conditions including social security reforms may force countries to implement a 
social pension even if national conditions do not constitute a demand for increased social 
spending.113 On the other hand, international support increases a government's budget 
and may lead to the expansion of national government spending. Studies show that 
development aid supports government’s budget financed programs, such as social 
                                                 
113 Politically motivated aid has been shown to be attached to fewer conditions in IMF programs than in 
other forms of aid (Dreher et al., 2009a) and that it is less effective to increase economic growth (Dreher et al., 
2013).  
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pensions (Bloom and Mc Kinnon, 2013) and that donors support social policies in 
recipient countries (Dreher et al., 2015a).  
Following these arguments, open countries and countries that are dependent on 
aid should be more prone to international leverage increasing the probability of social 
pension adoption. The influence of international leverage in the adoption of social 
pension is tested using trade openness – the ratio of exports and imports to GDP (World 
Bank, 2014). The WDI's aid as a share of government expenditure (Aid/Gov.exp.) 
variable to proxy for aid dependency is employed (World Bank, 2014). The hypothesis is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 3: International leverage through trade and aid provision increases the 
probability of social pension implementation, ceteris paribus.  
 
III. 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the deliberations in the last section, the empirical analysis focuses on three 
different types of variables: economic and demographic, political system, and 
international influence variables. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of 
whether or not a country has a social pension between 1960 and 2012. The unit of 
analysis is a country over a five year period leading to a maximum of 1,205 observations, 
depending on the availability of control variables. I investigate what drives the 
implementation of social pension programs in the last five decades. In addition, I focus 
on whether drivers differ in developing compared to developed countries. Since delayed 
demographic trends in developing countries are obvious, the decision to provide social 
pension may be different in this set of countries. In Figure III. 5 these different patterns 
are visualized. In the left figure the evolution of the variables in developed and in the 
right panels in developing countries is displayed. The fertility rate is much lower and life 
expectancy much higher in developed compared to developing ones. Additionally, the 
share of elderly population steadily increases in both reaching 10 percent in developed, 
but only 4 percent in developing countries. This makes a separate assessment plausible. 
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Figure III. 5: Fertility, old-age population and life expectancy over time 
  
Notes: Own calculation. The left figure shows the development of fertility, life expectancy and share of the 
elderly population in industrialized countries, the right panel the same in developing countries. Developing 
countries are classified according to the World Bank with a yearly GNI per capita of up to US$4,125 (low 
income and low middle income countries according to the World Bank, 2014). 
III. 4.1. Method  
I estimate the conditional probability of a country having a social pension by the 
duration adjusted probit model in the following general form: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑟 + ʎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) (III. 1) 
where i = 1, …,N, t = 1,…, T and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates whether or not a country i has a non-
contributory pension in period t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of covariates, 𝛼 is a common constant, 
𝛽 are parameters to be estimated and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic multivariate normal error 
term. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level are used to allow for 
within country dependence over time. Additionally, 𝛿𝑟 controls for common income-
related regional trends disaggregated into income levels. Since different trends in high, 
middle and low income countries are observed, the regions are disaggregated along 
these lines to capture heterogeneity within major world regions.114 Beck, Katz and Tucker 
(1998) also show that "annual binary time series-cross sectional data are equivalent to 
grouped duration data with an observational interval of one year" (p. 1265) which can be 
estimated by an ordinary probit or logit link controlling for duration dependence by 
                                                 
114 The results are robust to the conditional logit estimator with regional income group identifier and linear 
probability estimates. 
CHAPTER III 
 
136 
including temporal dummies or splines.115 I use a probit link (𝑓(. ) = 𝜙(. )) in order to 
appropriately model the binary dependent variable and use time dummies, ʎ𝑡, to control 
for duration dependence in the application of social pensions. In the tables average 
marginal effects (AME) are reported to interpret the sign, size and significance of the 
effects (Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010). All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period (five years).116 Since social pension implementation is generally a long-term 
process, pension experts suggest careful analysis and adequate planning and evaluation 
to put a social pension program into practice. Implementation of a new pension scheme 
is frequently accompanied by a preceding political decision-making process and the 
subsequent establishment of new institutions which might take several years especially 
in less developed countries (e.g., Pigott et al., 2009).117 By taking these structural 
adjustments in the implementation of social pension into account it is possible to control 
for the sequence of events, but all forms of endogeneity are not completely ruled out, 
which makes a causal interpretation of the findings difficult. I test additional channels 
later, first, to ensure that I identified the most important drivers of social pension 
adoption, and second, to reduce potential omitted variable bias. The results are stable to 
these stress tests suggesting that endogeneity is no major concern in this setting. 
III. 4.2 Results and discussion 
Table III. 3 reports the main findings using the duration adjusted probit models and 
displays average marginal effects (AME). The number of observations varies between 
1205 and 821, depending on the availability of data. All regressions have a pseudo R 
                                                 
115 The authors show that by adjusting for duration dependence in ordinary logit or probit models the 
results mirror Cox proportional hazard models and are appropriate in the application of binary time series-
cross section data (Beck et al., 1998). 
116 Summary statistics for all variables used are provided in Table A III. 1 and a detailed description of 
variables and sources is provided in Table A III. 2. 
117 The choice of the lag structure is somewhat arbitrary. All estimations have therefore been conducted 
using different lags. The results do not change qualitatively and are available from the authors. After 
discussions with Sandra Kissling, expert from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) responsible for the implementation of a social security system in India, on social pension 
implementation, we assume the one period lag to be the most plausible. Since the social pension variable 
takes a value of one if “laws and regulations are in force” it is plausible to assume that it takes around five 
years to implement such legislations. However, this includes no information on coverage or reach of the 
programs. 
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squared of over 0.36 and the Wald test p-values of joint significance highlight good 
model fit. 
In terms of the demographic and economic variables I find savings, fertility rate 
and the existence of a contribution-based pension system to be statistically related to 
social pension adoption. In the overall sample the AME of GDP per capita never turns 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The marginal effect of savings is significant 
at the 5 percent level. A decrease in the savings rate, thus, is systematically related to an 
increase in the probability to have a social pension by 0.39 percent in column 1. This 
finding suggests that on average decreasing savings increases the probability of social 
pension provision slightly (substitution effect). Presumably, countries that have low 
level of savings are more like to provide old-age security. 
A decrease in the fertility rate is related to an increase in the probability to adopt a 
social pension program and provide against old-age poverty by public funds. The effect 
is negative and significant across all specifications. The average marginal effect of life 
expectancy on the probability of implementation is also negative, but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. High fertility levels and similarly high life expectancy 
lower the probability of social pension adoption, ceteris paribus. This is in line with 
Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) who show that public pension and fertility rates and 
life expectancy are inversely correlated. Given the projections of an ongoing decrease of 
fertility and increase of life expectancy (Pallares et al., 2012) this relationship shows that 
the increase in demand for social pension is an important driver of the introduction of 
social pension. Increasing life expectancy goes hand in hand with an increase of costs for 
a rising share of the elderly, which is one possible explanation for negative correlation.  
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Table III. 3: Determinants of social pension implementation 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating if the country has a social pension. Average 
marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. Significance levels: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All models include time-period and region-income dummies (World Bank region 
classification 2015). Explanatory variables lagged by one period. 
The existence of a contributory pension system is positively related to the probability of 
social pension adoption. Presumably, the existence of pension infrastructure reduces 
costs and increases the probability to also provide social non-contributory pension.  
Turning to the hypotheses, in column 2 the indicator of whether or not the country 
is a democracy is included testing for Hypothesis 1. Being a democracy increases the 
probability of social pension provision significantly at the 5 percent level. This is in 
contrast to Mulligan and Shleifer (2010) who find no difference between the two political 
systems. However, the result suggests that participation in the political system supports 
the provision of social pension. The size of the effect indicates that providing for old-age 
                             (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)   
(ln) GDP pc               0.4897         0.4840         0.1570         0.1467        -0.2616   
                         (0.377)        (0.383)        (0.419)        (0.348)        (0.393)   
(ln) GDP pc squared      -0.0201        -0.0200        -0.0022        -0.0000         0.0225   
                         (0.022)        (0.022)        (0.025)        (0.020)        (0.023)   
Population growth         0.0002         0.0040        -0.0152         0.0325         0.0262   
                         (0.019)        (0.018)        (0.019)        (0.024)        (0.026)   
Savings                  -0.0039**      -0.0030*       -0.0042**      -0.0042**      -0.0038** 
                         (0.002)        (0.002)        (0.002)        (0.002)        (0.002)   
Fertility rate           -0.1006***      -0.0963***      -0.1344***      -0.1358***      -0.1724***
                         (0.026)        (0.026)        (0.031)        (0.028)        (0.035)   
Life expectancy rate      -0.0027        -0.0049        -0.0048        -0.0052        -0.0092   
                         (0.005)        (0.005)        (0.006)        (0.005)        (0.006)   
Contributory pension       0.2854***       0.2572***       0.3011***       0.2614***       0.2502***
                         (0.062)        (0.061)        (0.093)        (0.059)        (0.091)   
Democracy                                0.1200**                                     0.0888** 
                                        (0.047)                                      (0.043)   
Gov. fractionalization                                    -0.0956                       -0.1623** 
                                                       (0.087)                       (0.078)   
Party orientation (left)                                     0.1086***                      0.1019***
                                                       (0.035)                       (0.032)   
Trade share                                                           -0.0013**      -0.0013** 
                                                                      (0.000)        (0.001)   
Aid/Gov.exp.                                                          -0.0001        -0.0003   
                                                                      (0.000)        (0.000)   
# of Observations                       1116           1116            788           1065            757   
# of Countries                   147            147            138            147            136   
pseudo R-squared            0.38           0.39           0.39           0.40           0.43   
Wald test (p-value)         0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00   
Log Likelihood ratio      -465.87        -457.30        -329.46        -425.90        -295.11   
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income is 8 to 10 percent more likely in democracies compared to autocratic regimes in 
the overall sample. 
In column 3, I find evidence in line with hypothesis 2. While more fractionalized 
governments are less likely to provide social pension, socialist governments are 
associated with a positive probability to provide social pension. For government 
fractionalization the effect is only significant in column 5 at the 5 percent level. Higher 
government fractionalization is associated with weaker governments and a lower ability 
of fiscal deficit reduction (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989a,b).118 Since social pensions are 
financed by general budgetary spending, the government may need to increase taxes. 
Evidence suggests that the higher government fractionalization, the lower the ability to 
raise taxes and increase revenues, because of lower political support (Perotti and 
Kontopoulos, 2002). This may translate into a lower probability of adoption of social 
pension. The marginal effect of the socialist dummy is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note that in socialist governments compared to center and right-oriented governments 
the probability is 10 percent higher to provide social pension. This finding is in line with 
Keefer and Milanovic (2014) who find that left-oriented governments favor government 
provision of redistributive programs which seems to hold for social pension as well.  
Finally, the importance of international factors for social pension adoption is 
analyzed. The results indicate that I can reject the hypothesis of leverage through 
international forces. A higher probability of social pension introduction is associated 
with less open countries. The magnitude of the effect shows that a 1 standard deviation 
increase in trade openness is associated with a 5 percent decrease in the probability of 
social pension provision. This is in contrast to expectations and suggests that there are 
indeed no policy transfer effects regarding non-contributory pension via commercial 
ties. Though, it could still be the case that it holds for contributory pension schemes. 
Presumably, countries may be forced to reduce their budget due to the diffusion of 
international crisis, which is easier in more open economies and demand austerity 
policies reducing public good provision and social pension. This effect can be observed 
                                                 
118 More fractionalized governments have also been found to have higher public spending and transfers 
(Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Scartiscini and Crain, 2002; Bräuninger, 2005), this does not seem to translate 
in social pension provision. 
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in the current economic crisis. The AME of aid dependency is negative, but not 
significant at conventional levels, indicating that leverage through international financial 
support is not visible in the data. In sum, I find evidence for two hypotheses on 
democratic systems and the structure of government; however, I do not find evidence for 
international leverage through trade and aid. 
Including alternative variables, that could be related to the probability of social 
pension adoption, tests for additional channels of influence. Since the increasing share of 
the elderly population should theoretically increase the probability of social pension 
provision, I use this variable instead of life expectancy in column 1 in Table III. 4. The 
AME has the right sign, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
column 2, the alternative measure of democracy provided by the Polity IV database is 
used (Marshall et al., 2014). This variable is a measure of democratic systems along three 
dimensions: regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment; 
executive constraints; and regulation and competitiveness of political competition. 
Table III. 4: Alternative variables 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating if the country has a social pension. Average 
marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level.  
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All models include time-period and region-income dummies 
as well as the full vector of controls of specification 5 in Table III. 3. Explanatory variables lagged by one 
period. 
                             (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)            (7)   
Elderly Population       0.0083                                                                                           
                         (0.012)                                                                                             
Democracy (Polity IV)                      0.1349***                                                                            
                                        (0.050)                                                                              
Party fractionalization                                    -0.0606                                                              
                                                       (0.090)                                                               
FDI/GDP                                                    0.0036                                              
                                                                      (0.008)                                                
Globalization                                                                         0.0013                               
                                                                                     (0.003)                                 
ODA/GNI                                                                                             -0.0004                  
                                                                                                    (0.003)                  
(ln) Gov. exp. pc                                                                                                 0.1246***
                                                                                                                   (0.034)   
Controls       Yes   Yes        Yes        Yes        Yes        Yes   Yes
#Obs                         757            757            755            740            783            732            624   
#Countries                   136            136            136            136            138            130            132
pseudo R-squared            0.43           0.45           0.43           0.43           0.40           0.43           0.46   
Wald test (p-value)         0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00   
Log Likelihood ratio      -297.13      -288.25        -297.12       -289.17        -322.98        -284.96        -232.11   
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It is widely available and highly correlated with the indicator used in the main 
specification. It is scaled between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating the prevalence 
of sound democratic institutions to a larger extent. The dummy variable is 1 for values 
six or larger and 0 otherwise.119 The finding suggests that the result for democracy does 
not depend on the definition of the variable.  
Looking at columns 3 to 6, other alternative variables are tested: party fractionali-
zation, foreign direct investment (FDI) share, multidimensional globalization (Dreher, 
2006; Dreher et al., 2008), and official development assistance (ODA) as a share of GNI120. 
I find that a different specification of fractionalization focused on the legislature does not 
turn out to be relevant. However, since the initiation power to implement a social 
pension is largely located at the government level, the influence of government strength 
is more closely captured by employing government fractionalization. Using different 
measures for trade openness or aid dependency again does not support Hypothesis 3. 
Finally, in column 8 we test the influence of the size of government. We find a positive 
and significant relation, at the 5 percent level. Thus, higher government expenditure 
relate to a higher probability of social pension provision. This is not surprising since 
social pensions are part of government expenditures. Interestingly, the democracy effect 
and the savings effect vanish in this specification (not shown). This suggests that the size 
of the government is one channel through which democracies provide for social 
pension.121  
As described before, different demographic trends are observed in developed and 
developing countries. In order to analyze whether these have an influence on the 
findings I introduce a dummy variable that is one if the country is a developing country 
following the income classification of the World Bank (2015) and interact it with the 
explanatory variables. Specifically, the dummy is 1 if the country has a yearly gross 
national income (GNI) per capita equal to or less than US$4,125. In Table III. 5 the results 
for both countries groups are separately shown.  
                                                 
119 The cutting value is suggested by the authors of the indicator and has been used in the literature before 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002; Rudra and Haggard, 2005). 
120 ODA/GNI differs from the aid to government expenditure measure in that it does not include financial 
flows to more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe (World Bank, 2014). 
121 There is little evidence on whether democracies have larger government budgets than non-democracies. 
Theoretical predictions suggest the opposite (e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004 and references cited therein).  
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Not surprisingly I observe different important factors in the two groups. The 
average marginal effects for income and savings do not turn statistically significant for 
developed countries, whereas the AMEs of fertility and life expectancy are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level throughout all specifications for this country 
group. In accordance with the generally very low level of fertility and its decreasing 
trend in this country group this shows demand-driven implementation of social pension. 
In developing countries (lower panel), this does not seem to be the case. In this country 
group the income level is significantly related to social pension adoption where the effect 
is first increasing and then decreasing with rising income level and significant in three 
out of six specifications. Moreover, the savings rate is significantly and negatively 
related to the probability of social pension adoption. Contrary to developed countries, I 
find no systematic relation between fertility and the probability of social pension 
implementation. Presumably, a large part of the elderly population is still cared for 
through within-family transfers and the need for social pension is still lower. Given 
demographic trends (Figure III. 5), a rising demand is expected in the future.  
Turning to the variables of interest, being a democracy seems to matter in the set of 
developing countries, whereas it is not systematically related to social pension adoption 
in the developed country sample. This also explains the difference to the result of 
Mulligan and Shleifer (2010), because they only look at developed countries and for this 
sample I also observe no difference between democracies and non-democracies. 
However, in democratic developing countries the probability of social pension adoption 
itself seems to be higher compared to non-democratic countries. The same holds for 
government fractionalization. The effect is not different from zero in developed but in 
developing countries. In the latter group the effect is not robust to the inclusion of 
additional variables in column 6. Finally, socialist governments are associated with a 
higher probability of social pension adoption in developed countries, but not in 
developing countries. I do not find any effect in the two groups regarding the size of 
governments (column 4). Contrary to expectations, more open countries and countries 
receiving more aid (developing countries) do have a lower probability of social pension 
provision. Presumably, these countries do not have enough capacity to provide social 
pension.   
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Overall, different factors seem to matter differently in these two sub-samples. Demand is 
more important in developed countries while we find state capacity and strength of 
government to play a major role in developing countries. 
Finally, the relationship between democratic regimes and social pension provision 
is scrutinized in more detail. First, it may be the case that there are not only differences 
in country groups, but that it also plays a role whether the democratic system is strongly 
established. I expect more established democracies to have a higher probability of social 
pension provision. In order to address this I use a measure of system tenure taken from 
the DPI data set (Beck et al. 2001) and interact it with the democracy dummy. Further-
more, I also investigate whether the effect of government fractionalization differs 
between democratic and non-democratic systems. Table III. 6 shows the AMEs for both 
interaction effects and Figure III. 6 displays the average marginal effects of democracy 
over system tenure and government fractionalization, respectively. Table III. 6 shows 
that the tenure of democracies is positively and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level related to social pension adoption. Figure III. 6 the marginal effect turns significant 
when the system is strongly established for more than 30 years, indicating that 
established democracies have a higher probability of adopting social pension. For 
government fractionalization there is no differential effect in democracies.  
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Table III. 6: Interaction effects 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator, whether the country has a social pension. Average 
marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. Significance levels: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All models include time-period and regional dummies. Both specifications 
include the vector of controls of specification 5 Table III. 3 all lagged by one period. 
Another aspect of non-linear models is that the marginal effects of interactions may be 
very heterogeneous at different observation levels and individually significant for a 
subset of observations. The average marginal effects hide this type of heterogeneity 
which may be of special interest if the effect switches sign. These non-linearities are 
 
Figure III. 6: Marginal effects 
 
Notes: The left figure shows the average marginal effect of democracy with increasing system tenure based 
on column 1 in Table III. 6 and the right panel shows the average marginal effect of democracy with 
increasing government fractionalization based on column 2. 
         (1)            (2)   
Democracy              -0.4409*        0.1083   
                         (0.249)        (0.253)   
Gov. fractionalization      -0.9108***      -1.5267***
                         (0.336)        (0.520)   
Gov.frac # Democracy                      1.0434   
                                        (0.671)   
System tenure      -0.0477***                
                         (0.015)                  
System tenure # Democracy       0.0649***                
                         (0.016)                  
Controls Yes Yes
#Obs                         821            821   
#Countries                   149            149   
pseudo R-squared            0.41           0.39   
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analyzed for three interaction effects and the results are presented in Figure III. 7.122 The 
figure graphs the distribution of AMEs for the interaction terms of GDP per capita, 
system tenure and fractionalization both with democracy over the predicted probability 
of non-contributory pension adoption, as well as the associated z-statistic with the 95 
percent confidence bands. The figure shows that all three interaction terms are clearly 
non-linear. Looking at the income level the effect includes positive and negative values 
in an S-shape: positive significant marginal effects in the form of an inverse U-shape 
relation at lower probabilities of social pension adoption and negative marginal effects at 
higher probabilities of social pension provision. The effect is positive and significant for 
around 29 percent of the observations. It is negative and significant for around 25 
percent of the observations and ranges overall from -55 percent to 53 percent. This large 
share of significant results suggests that the income level is likely to be of some 
importance for the probability of social pension adoption. I have shown before that this 
seems to be especially relevant in developing countries.  
Figure III. 7: Effect of interaction terms in probit models 
 
Notes: The upper panel shows the non-linear partial effects of GDP per capita and democracy depending on 
system tenure or government fractionalization on the probability of social pension adoption. In the lower 
panel the respective z-statistics with a 95 percent confidence band are displayed (cut-off values +/- 1.96). 
                                                 
122 The routine of Norton et al. (2004) is used to analyse the non-linear effect of GDP per capita.  
GDP per capita Democracy # System tenure Democracy # Gov. fractionalization 
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The interaction effect of democracy and system tenure is inverse U-shaped throughout 
the distribution. The marginal effect is positive and significant for 51 percent of the 
predicted observations observing an increase in the effect for lower probabilities of social 
pension adoption and decreasing marginal effects at higher levels of adoption 
probability. The AMEs range from 0 to 16 percent. Clearly the large share of significant 
values indicates that the age and establishment status of the democratic system matter 
for the provision of public old-age pension. This would explain the low coverage in 
many developing countries, where besides low state capacities the political system is not 
mature enough to provide public funds for the elderly. Turning to the interaction of 
democracy with government fractionalization, again the marginal effects are distributed 
in a U-shape. A fraction of 43 percent is individually significant at the 5 percent level. 
The effect ranges from -2 to 66 percent and thus is quite large which explains the null 
finding on average. However, the marginal effect also suggest that only for very high 
levels of fractionalization, which is rarely observed in the data the effect would turn 
positive and significant. 
The results show the relevance of economic and demographic variables. Efficiency 
concerns are more important for social pension adoption in developing countries, 
whereas demographics, and thus the demand to provide public funds, rather drive 
social pension introduction in developed countries. Furthermore, the adoption is shaped 
by the political system and its structure. This lends support to Hypotheses 1 and 2. I find 
support for the notion that democracies have a higher probability of social pension 
provision (H1). This is especially relevant in developing countries. The probability 
increases with the stability of the system. The results also suggest a supporting role of 
the political system and its structure (H2). On the one hand, the higher the government 
fractionalization the lower seems to be the probability of non-contributory pension 
provision, indicating that weaker governments especially in developing countries are 
less like to provide against old-age poverty. On the other hand, the results point to a 
higher probability in the provision of social pension in socialist governments especially 
in developed countries. Third, there is no evidence in the data that international leverage 
through trade or aid influences the provision of social pension at the national level. 
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Although the topic is very present on the global governance agenda, the relation to 
national legislation is weak. 
III. 5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I investigate, first, the distribution of pension programs around the world 
with a focus on social pensions. These anti-poverty cash transfer pensions are defined in 
accordance to the World Bank zero pillar pension as non-contribution-based pensions 
provided in the form of targeted (means-tested) or universal funds (Holzman and Hinz, 
2005). So far, this paper is the first to broaden the view beyond contribution-based 
pensions including information on the provision of social pension in developed and 
developing countries. 
Second, I focus on whether social pensions are determined by economic and 
demographic factors, the political system and its structure, and through international 
leverage. I use duration adjusted probit models to disentangle the role of the socio-
economic conditions, of political institutions and international relations to social pension 
provision. In contrast to the existing literature that mainly focusses on spending 
behaviour and to a large extent on OECD countries, explicit formal hypotheses are 
developed and tested in a large set of countries. 
The results show that economic and demographic factors matter for different 
country groups. In countries where traditional support structurs break down, the 
probability of implementation increases. This can be attributed to decreasing fertility 
rates and increases in life expectancy. In contrast, state capacity measured by the income 
level and savings are systematically related to the adoption of social pension in low 
income countries. Compared to autocratic regimes, democracies have a higher 
probability of social pension introduction foremost in developing countries, but they 
need to be stable and established for at least three decades for the effect to be 
systematically visible. While in more fragmented governments the chance of social 
pension adoption decreases, this seems to be foremost the case in developing countries, 
but driven by a small part of the sample. Socialist governments are more inclined in state 
interventions which supports the probability of social pension provision in developed 
countries. 
CHAPTER III 
 
149 
In terms of policy implications I provide evidence that demand for tools against 
old-age poverty will increase. Since only around 50 percent of countries worldwide 
provide their elderly with a public non-contribution based pension there is still leeway 
for countries to increase their social protection. However, especially for developing 
countries this might only be affordable if the income level increases and participatory 
government systems are strongly established. International actors are not found to 
influence national decision making processes through commercial ties or aid provision. 
However, there might be other channels through which such support is possible which 
we did not identify in this study. 
A next step in this line of research will be the analyis of the effectiveness of social 
pensions in terms of coverage rates and success in decreasing old-age poverty. Both 
aspects are not covered here due to scarce data availability. Furthermore, the availability 
of more data will allow for the application of additional techniques and a more in depth 
analysis of endogeneity concerns. Nevertheless, our findings show systematic evidence 
of important factors shaping the provision of public redistributive policies.  
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APPENDIX III 
Table A III. 1: Summary statistics 
 Notes: Summary statistics include number of observations (Obs.), mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), 
minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.) of the respective variable. 
  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Social pension 1205 0.371 0.483 0 1 
(ln) GDP pc 1205 8.516 1.207 5.49 11.73 
Population growth 1205 1.740 1.364 -4.64 15.51 
Savings 1189 17.925 15.389 -80.93 83.23 
Fertility rate 1203 3.796 2.002 0.87 8.42 
Life expectancy  1203 64.752 11.371 21.78 83.29 
Contributory pension 1205 0.880 0.325 0 1 
Democracy 1205 0.422 0.494 0 1 
Gov. fractionalization 959 0.200 0.253 0 1 
Trade share 1193 80.484 50.561 8.42 442.64 
Elderly population 1195 6.276 4.324 1.24 21.04 
AID/Gov.exp. 1136 35.365 59.504 -0.96 623.73 
Party orientation (left) 1205 0.234 0.424 0 1 
System tenure 1028 20.447 19.043 1 82 
Democracy (Polity2)  1205 0.426 0.495 0 1 
Fractionalization 956 0.510 0.271 0 1 
FDI/GDP 1089 3.488 5.601 -17.51 66.15 
Globalization 1132 49.342 17.993 13.09 92.30 
ODA/GNI 1124 4.875 7.774 -0.12 93.17 
(ln) Government expenditure 936 6.117 1.809 1.25 9.55 
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Table A III. 2: Variables and sources 
 
  
Variable Description Source 
Social (non-
contributory) pension  
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
has a social (non-contributory) pension, 0 otherwise. 
ILO (2014) 
Contributory pension Dummy variables that is 1 if the country has a 
retirement scheme based on earnings and contribution 
or a provident fund; 0 otherwise. 
ILO (2014) 
(ln) GDP pc Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita at chained 
Purchasing Power Parities (constant 2011 US$).  
Penn World tables 8.1 (2014) 
Fertility rate    Fertility rate is the rate of all births per woman WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a 
newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life. 
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Savings rate Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final 
consumption expenditure (total consumption), plus 
net transfers. 
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Elderly population Total population 65 and older as share of total 
population. 
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Democracy Dummy variable that is one if electoral determination 
of executive and legislative offices are existent; 0 
otherwise.   
Cheibub et al. 2010 
Party orientation 
(left) 
Dummy that is one for a left oriented government and 
zero if right or center oriented. Based on Chief 
Executive Party Orientation; Right (1); Left (3); Center 
(2); No information (0). 
Beck et al. (2001)  
updated Jan. 2013 
Government 
fractionalization 
The probability that two deputies picked at random 
from among the government parties will be of 
different parties. Equals NA if there is no parliament. 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 updated Jan. 2013 
Party 
fractionalization 
The probability that two deputies picked at random 
from the legislature will be of different parties. Equals 
NA if there is no parliament. 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 updated Jan. 2013 
Trade share      Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as share of GDP. 
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Globalization Multidimensional index: economic, political and social 
globalization: 1 (not globalized) – 100 (fully 
globalized). 
Dreher 2006, Dreher et al. 
(2008); Version 2013. 
AID/Gov. 
expenditure 
Net official development assistance and official aid 
received as share of total government’s expenses.  
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
ODA/GNI Net official development assistance (ODA) received (% 
of GNI). 
WDI (World Bank, 2014) 
Democracy (Polity 2) Institutionalized democracy along three dimensions: 
regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive 
recruitment; executive constraints; and regulation and 
competitiveness of political competition. 
Marshall et al. (2014) 
System tenure Reports the number of years the country has been 
autocratic or democratic. 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 updated Jan. 2013 
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 Table A III. 3: List of countries per region (N = 214) 
 
Notes: Classification according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2014). 
 
Region Country Region Country Region Country Region Country
Albania American Samoa Antigua and Barbuda Angola
Andorra Australia Argentina Benin
Armenia Brunei Darussalam Aruba Botswana
Austria Cambodia Bahamas, The Burkina Faso
Azerbaijan China Barbados Burundi
Belarus Fiji Belize Cabo Verde
Belgium French Polynesia Bolivia Cameroon
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guam Brazil Central African Republic
Bulgaria Hong Kong SAR, China Cayman Islands Chad
Channel Islands Indonesia Chile Comoros
Croatia Japan Colombia Congo, Dem. Rep.
Cyprus Kiribati Costa Rica Congo, Rep.
Czech Republic Korea, Dem. Rep. Cuba Cote d'Ivoire
Denmark Korea, Rep. Curacao Equatorial Guinea
Estonia Lao PDR Dominica Eritrea
Faeroe Islands Macao SAR, China Dominican Republic Ethiopia
Finland Malaysia Ecuador Gabon
France Marshall Islands El Salvador Gambia, The
Georgia Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Grenada Ghana
Germany Mongolia Guatemala Guinea
Greece Myanmar Guyana Guinea-Bissau
Greenland New Caledonia Haiti Kenya
Hungary New Zealand Honduras Lesotho
Iceland Northern Mariana Islands Jamaica Liberia
Ireland Palau Mexico Madagascar
Isle of Man Papua New Guinea Nicaragua Malawi
Italy Philippines Panama Mali
Kazakhstan Samoa Paraguay Mauritania
Kosovo Singapore Peru Mauritius
Kyrgyz Republic Solomon Islands Puerto Rico Mozambique
Latvia Thailand Sint Maarten (Dutch part) Namibia
Liechtenstein Timor-Leste St. Kitts and Nevis Niger
Lithuania Tonga St. Lucia Nigeria
Luxembourg Tuvalu St. Martin (French part) Rwanda
Macedonia, FYR Vanuatu St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sao Tome and Principe
Moldova Vietnam Suriname Senegal
Monaco Algeria Trinidad and Tobago Seychelles
Montenegro Bahrain Turks and Caicos Islands Sierra Leone
Netherlands Djibouti Uruguay Somalia
Norway Egypt, Arab Rep. Venezuela, RB South Africa
Poland Iran, Islamic Rep. Virgin Islands (U.S.) South Sudan
Portugal Iraq Bermuda Sudan
Romania Israel Canada Swaziland
Russian Federation Jordan United States Tanzania
San Marino Kuwait Afghanistan Togo
Serbia Lebanon Bangladesh Uganda
Slovak Republic Libya Bhutan Zambia
Slovenia Malta India Zimbabwe
Spain Morocco Maldives
Sweden Oman Nepal
Switzerland Qatar Pakistan
Tajikistan Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka
Turkey Syrian Arab Republic
Turkmenistan Tunisia
Ukraine United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom West Bank and Gaza
Uzbekistan Yemen, Rep.
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CHAPTER IV 
HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT ECOLOGICAL PRESSURES? 
A ROBUST EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS USING THE ECOLOGICAL 
FOOTPRINT 
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IV. 1 INTRODUCTION 
“A long term correlation between the recent processes of globalization of international 
markets and environmental degradation is quite evident [... and ...] so uncontroversial 
that, for the sake of brevity, we do not need to document it here.”  
(Borghesi and Vercelli, 2003)  
According to Borghesi and Vercelli there seems to be no doubt about the degrading impact 
of economic globalization on the global environment. However, there are also competing 
claims that “globalization is in fact good for the environment” (Stern, 2004: 1428). Scholars from 
various disciplines acknowledge that there is a connection between globalization and the 
(global) environment, yet, empirical evidence is largely missing. However, this hides the 
fact that the true relationship may be more complex. The objective of the paper is to close 
this gap and provide a comprehensive analysis of what drives human environmental 
demands taking the multidimensionality of globalization into account.  
Broadly defined, globalization is “the growing interconnectedness and inter-relatedness of 
all aspects of society” (Jones, 2010). Previous work on the relationship between environmental 
pressures and globalization in many cases assesses one single dimension of globalization 
such as the level of trade openness and focuses on singular aspects of human demands and 
environmental pollutants (Antweiler et al., 2001; Cole, 2004; York et al., 2003; Dreher et al., 
2008; Lamla, 2009). In both cases the complexity of the concepts is neglected. However, for 
some time now, multi-dimensional and more holistic indicators of both phenomena provide 
the possibility to systematically assess the complex relationship and to investigate whether 
globalization has an unambiguously increasing effect on human demands on the 
environment. 123 
Currently the most widely used measure for human ecological demands is the 
Ecological Footprint (EF) (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). Three basic characteristics make it 
widely applicable: first, it takes a universal perspective on environmental externalities and 
                                                 
123 Throughout the paper we use ecological pressures and human demands interchangeably capturing 
environmental degradation through human impact. 
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pressures. Second, it compares human demands placed on the environment by countries 
and highlights the differences in levels of resource consumption between them (Jorgenson 
and Clark, 2011); and third, it quantifies the amount of biologically productive land that is 
required for consumption, production, imports and export of natural resources and 
absorption of carbon dioxide emission of a given population (Global Footprint Network, 
2012a). Together with a measure of globalization that captures the globalization level of 
countries along three dimensions – economic, political, and social globalization (Dreher, 
2006; Dreher et al., 2008), we advance beyond one-dimensional considerations. To the best 
of our knowledge no study has yet analyzed the relationship between globalization as a 
multidimensional process and ecological pressures allowing for the complexity of global 
environmental change.124 A better (empirical) understanding of the determinants of human 
demands on ecosystems, with a special focus on the role of globalization is the pre-requisite 
for effective mitigation. 
While we draw on previous research on the drivers of ecological pressures and human 
demands, we contribute new insights by first, considering a variety of determinants and 
identifying whether they are robust to including other conditioning variables. For that we 
apply a variant of the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997), 
Sturm and De Haan (2005) and Gassebner et al. (2010b) and test various demographic, 
economic, and political economy variables that have been suggested to affect environmental 
stressors. Second, since we broaden the concept of globalization we add to the quantitative 
literature on consequences of globalization (Dreher et al., 2008; Potrafke, 2014). In the 
empirical analysis, we construct a panel data set of 146 countries that allows us to exploit 
the time dimension of the variables and investigate the relationship over the 1981-2009 
period in a fixed-effects setting considering cross-section interdependence. 
To foreshadow our results: income, technology and population are the main drivers as 
suggested by theory. The EBA reveals that besides the latter three a larger vector of controls 
                                                 
124 In their book on the consequences of globalization Dreher et al. (2008) analyse the influence of the 
globalization index on air and water pollution and also distinguish between the three dimensions of 
globalization. However, they focus on contemporaneous effects and do not consider human ecological pressures. 
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is robustly related to ecological pressures. The relationship to globalization, however, is less 
clear than previously assumed; it is rather distinct depending on the aspect of globalization 
and perspective of human demands. Globalization is positively associated with the human 
demands of trade increasing the EF of exports and imports, while having no unambiguous 
correlation to the other two components of Ecological Footprint (consumption and 
production). We do not find any systematic evidence for the impact of political 
globalization, whereas on social globalization we find indication for both negative 
(awareness increasing) and positive (obliviousness) coefficients depending on the pressure. 
For economic globalization the findings suggest a positive enhancing correlation especially 
in production – and trade – induced pressures. 
The remainder of this last chapter is structured as follows. In Section IV. 2 we explain 
the concept of human ecological pressures and use the existing literature on drivers of 
ecological pressures to identify relevant variables tested on the EBA. Then we present our 
measure of globalization and develop testable hypotheses. In Section IV. 3 we describe the 
estimation strategy including the EBA and our hypotheses tests. The results are presented in 
Section IV. 4 before we discuss sensitivity tests and address potential endogeneity concerns 
that might bias our results. In Section IV. 5 we conclude. 
IV. 2 HUMAN DEMANDS ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND GLOBALIZATION 
In the recent era of “Great Acceleration” which took off in the second half of the 20th 
century humans have become the single dominating driving force for global environmental 
changes, transgressing planetary boundaries and thereby coining a new geological epoch, 
the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2006; Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2005; Steffen et al., 
2015a; Steffen et al., 2015b). Human demands alter ecosystems by creating ecological 
pressures such as land-use changes, resource extraction and depletion (e.g., deforestation 
and overfishing), emissions of waste and pollution and the modification and movement of 
organisms (Steffen et al., 2005; UNEP, 2012a). The resulting environmental impacts include, 
but are not limited to climate change, ozone depletion, land degradation, loss of 
biodiversity, pollution, and acid rains. Consequences affect primarily the very poor and 
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vulnerable populations in developing countries through famine, water shortages, and 
competition over resources, among others (IPCC, 2014). Measurements of such 
environmental footprints allow the quantification of human environmental demands. 
Both human environmental demand and globalization are phenomena that include 
various dimensions making a one-sided assessment through single stressors (e.g., CO2 
pollution) or considerations (e.g., trade) prone to omitted variables bias. The availability of 
holistic indicators in both cases thus has the advantage of addressing various dimensions 
simultaneously without risking problems of multicollinearity in the empirical analysis. In 
this respect we use Ecological Footprint data provided by the Global Footprint Network 
(2012a) and a multidimensional measure of globalization including political, economic and 
social globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). 
IV. 2.1 The Ecological Footprint of nations 
The Ecological Footprint that addresses a whole set of human demands on the 
environments “measures how much area of biologically productive land and water125 an 
individual, population or activity requires to produce all the resources it consumes and to 
absorb the waste (carbon dioxide) it generates, using prevailing technology and resource 
management practices” (Global Footprint Network, 2012b).126 Different Environmental 
Footprint types are available.127 Best known is the Ecological Footprint (EF). It is currently 
the most complete indicator to assess aggregated human demands on ecosystems for several 
reasons: first, the aggregation is based on six bio-productive land-use types: i) cropland, ii) 
grassland and pasture (food and fiber), iii) fishing grounds (seafood), iv) forest land (timber 
and paper products) as well as v) areas required to build infrastructure (e.g., roads and 
buildings), and vi) land for carbon sequestration. Figure IV. 1 shows the global evolution of 
                                                 
125 Definition of biologically productive land and water: the land and water (both marine and inland waters) 
area that supports significant photosynthetic activity and the accumulation of biomass used by humans. Non-
productive areas as well as marginal areas with patchy vegetation are not included. Biomass that is not of use to 
humans is also not included, from the online GFN Glossary. 
126 We use the 2011 edition of the National Footprint Accounts from the Global Footprint Network (2012a) in 
the empirical analysis. 
127 E.g., ecological water or carbon footprints are another form of quantification of ecological pressures (Galli et 
al., 2012; Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014). 
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each land-use type over time. Note that since the 1970s land area equivalent to carbon 
sequestration shows a different development compared to the other components with more 
variation and an upward sloping trend. This suggests that carbon up-take might relate 
differently to impact factors than the other five land-use types. We will also test this in the 
empirical analysis by splitting the EF in carbon and non-carbon measures in Section IV. 4.3. 
Figure IV. 1: Development of EF components 
 
Notes: EF total refers to Ecological Footprint of consumption.128  
Second, the indicator is globally comparable. The EF is measured in global hectares (gha) 
which do not only refer to a physical area, but also take its ecological productivity into 
account.129 Third, the Ecological Footprint is scientifically rigorous (based on input-output 
tables) and widely accepted across the social sciences, including ecological economics 
(Jorgenson and Clark, 2011). Further, it is commonly used and employed in policy reports, 
such as the Global Environment Outlook (UNEP, 2012a) and the yearly Living Planet Report 
(WWF, 2014). Data are available for 240 countries and territories for the years 1961-2009 
                                                 
128 All components are measured in global hectares (gha) taking physical land and its productivity into account 
(Global Footprint Network, 2012b). 
129 For more detailed information on the exact calculation methodology we refer to Borucke et al. (2013). 
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covering most of the “Great Acceleration” period. Finally, the National Footprint Accounts 
(NFA) takes the effects of trade flows into account, by reporting Ecological Footprints from 
different perspectives, composed of production, imports and exports in the following form: 
𝐸𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 − 𝐸𝐹𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 
We use each of these footprints separately in the empirical analysis. This disaggregation 
allows us to disentangle the influence of globalization on several aspects of ecological 
demands. Since we find a simple positive correlation between the EF of consumption and 
overall globalization, it is not only important to analyze whether this holds controlling for 
confounding factors, but also how different perspectives of the Ecological Footprint are 
affected separately. 
Besides its general relevance, the EF also has some limitations. According to Galli et al. 
(2012) the major limitation of the EF is that it is not geographically explicit, meaning that it 
does not assign exact localities of environmental pressures, but aggregates only at the 
country level disregarding sub-national levels. This is of minor relevance to our study, since 
we are interested in the global perspective across countries. A second aspect regularly 
mentioned is that pollutants and wastes such as phosphorus and nitrogen, nuclear waste 
and greenhouse gases (GHGs) other than carbon dioxide, which also have environmental 
impacts, are not included in the calculation. While aggregating various demands, the EF still 
only gives a partial picture of the problem and thus is not a catch-all sustainability indicator. 
This needs to be taken into account in the interpretation of our results. Footprints in general 
do not say anything about actual state changes in ecosystems or impacts on humans. They 
indicate the extent of human demands on ecosystems, but do not measure actual 
environmental quality, change, impact, or resource depletion. Any analysis thus needs to 
consider country specific environmental characteristics separately. In our empirical 
assessment we address this by using country fixed-effects and control for underlying 
country characteristics that do not vary over time. Last, as pointed out by Borucke et al. 
(2013), National Footprint Accounts (NFAs) are a conservative measure of environmental 
pressures and are specifically constructed to underestimate EFs and overestimate 
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biocapacity.130 This is rather an advantage in a quantitative approach as ours, because it 
makes sure that if we find effects they are truly influential in explaining the variation. 
Various papers have used the EF to investigate the drivers of ecological demand. We review 
the most important ones and identify a vector of control variables. 
IV. 2.2 Drivers of ecological pressures 
Two major relevant strands of the literature provide insights into the drivers of ecological 
pressures: environmental sociology and environmental and ecological economics. 
Environmental sociologists quantitatively analyze the determinants of the Ecological 
Footprint by referring to the “IPAT notion.” This states that environmental impacts in a 
nation (I) are determined by the size and composition of the population (P), the level of 
affluence (A) and the state of technology (T) (York et al., 2003; Rose et al., 2004; Dietz et al., 
2007). These factors are identified by theories of societal modernization drawing on the 
current debate about the Anthropocene. They find an intensification of human demands as 
the income level increases in a U-shaped relationship (see, e.g., Dietz et al., 2012; Jorgenson 
and Clark, 2011). Dietz et al. (2007), Rosa et al. (2004), and York et al. (2003) consistently 
show a population elasticity being close to one and positive.131 
Environmental and ecological economists center on the discussion of an inversed u-
shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) for various aspects of environmental quality 
and respective pollutants (Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Dinda, 2004; Gallagher, 2009b). This 
strand of literature focuses strictly on the relationship between income and single 
environmental indicators (mostly air and water pollution). Following the EKC argument the 
standard of living – measured by GDP per capita – is the main determinant of 
                                                 
130 The reason stated for this approach is to “yield conservative estimates of global overshoot” (p. 532). In case 
of the EF this becomes clear in its composition, because for instance only C02 emission is included in the 
calculation as explained above.  
131 If more variables are tested the results are generally ambiguous (e.g., Jorgenson et al., 2010; Jorgenson and 
Rice, 2005; Jorgenson et al., 2005). A variety of approaches without addressing robustness concerns is used: Dietz 
et al. (2007), Rosa et al. (2004), York et al. (2003), Jorgenson, (2003, 2004, 2005) employ cross-sectional analysis, 
whereas Jorgenson and Clark (2011), Jorgenson et al. (2010), Jorgenson and Rice (2005) and Jorgenson et al. (2005) 
us panel data, but rely on averaged observations or a very short period of time. Moreover, these studies 
disregard multi-dimensional aspects of globalization and mainly consider partial aspects of it such as trade 
(Jorgenson and Clark, 2009). 
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environmental quality, but after reaching a certain threshold or turning point, further 
increases in income decrease pollution. However, the empirical evidence for the EKC is 
mixed (Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Dinda, 2004).132 Phrased differently, mixed findings 
suggest opposing trends: as countries with higher income on average reduce the emissions 
they produce locally, but because they do not consume fewer goods which are produced 
with high carbon intensity, the production of these goods is simply outsourced to other 
countries with lower income (grey imports). The products then find their way back to the 
outsourcing country as import goods. We thus consider the income-consumption 
relationship more meaningful than the income-production relationship with the Ecological 
Footprint as adequate measure. Looking at ecological demands of countries thus 
corresponds to the actual impact of a country’s consumption and to its contribution to 
pressures on the global environment.  
Both strands of the literature guide us in the choice of control variables for the 
empirical analysis that are important for ecological pressures. Interestingly, they differ in 
one major aspect: while the IPAT identity strongly suggests explicit treatment of the 
technological dimension, many empirical studies and theoretical findings regarding the 
EKC so far primarily focus on income per capita, without explicitly including a proxy for 
technology use. The assumption is that the technological dimension operates through 
income and therefore no explicit treatment is necessary (Copeland and Taylor, 2004; 
Gallagher, 2009b; Gassebner et al., 2010b). Nevertheless, disentangling impacts on the 
environment makes a formal treatment of technology necessary considering scale effects, 
composition effects and technique effects. The assumption behind this separation is that 
technological development results in more efficient production processes (scale effect) 
which require fewer inputs (natural resources) and produce less emission for the same 
amount of output (composition effect), thereby decreasing the demands on the environment 
through the technique effect (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). We expect globalization to 
affect ecological pressures in addition to these impacts, since globalization is a broad, 
                                                 
132 A more detailed overview of studies investigating the EKC relationship is provided by Gallagher (2009). 
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multidimensional concept capturing global developments and interactions that go beyond 
economic growth, technology use, and population or simple acknowledgement of 
international trade. 
IV. 2.3 Measuring globalization 
The KOF index of globalization, our “globalization” measure of choice, includes economic, 
political and social globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008); to measure globalization 
in a consistent way across countries and over time.133 Other indices trying to capture 
globalization have the disadvantage of being only available for a small group of countries, 
i.e., OECD countries (Andersen and Herbertsson, 2005; Lockwood and Redoano, 2005) or 
are just available for a few points in time like the Maastricht Globalization Index (MGI), 
recently updated by Figge and Martens (2014). 
The index covers 187 countries for the years 1970-2009, and allows us to disentangle 
the effect of different dimensions of globalization. The overall index is composed of 23 
variables grouped in the three dimensions. Economic globalization includes variables on 
actual flows such as trade, FDI and capital flows. Restrictions include hidden import 
barriers, tariffs, taxes on international trade and capital controls. Social globalization 
cumulates variables on personal contacts such as telephone traffic and international tourism, 
information flows including internet, newspapers and newspaper availability, and cultural 
proximity.134 The third dimension of political globalization includes the number of 
embassies in the country, membership in international organizations and ratification of 
international treaties as well as participation in U.N. Security Council missions.135 The 
overall as well as the disaggregated sub-dimensions are scaled between 1 and 100, where 1 
indicates a low level of globalization and 100 is the highest level of globalization. All four 
indicators are widely used in the literature (see, Potrafke, 2014, and citations therein). We 
                                                 
133 The 2013 version of the KOF index is applied, available at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
134 The latter includes variables such as the number of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores in the country 
and thus rather captures westernization and no other kinds of social globalization, like Islamic globalization. 
This has to be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
135 All variables included and their weights are detailed in Table A IV. 1 in Appendix IV. 
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use the overall index as well as the three sub dimensions to test our hypotheses, which are 
developed in the next section. 
IV. 2.4 Effects of globalization 
First evidence about the relationship between globalization and the natural environment is 
provided by Dreher et al. (2008). The authors show that globalization is positively correlated 
with a decrease in air and water pollution which holds for the economic, social and political 
dimension. We broaden this analysis by employing the different variants of the Ecological 
Footprint.136 The two studies that are closest to ours are the ones by Lamla (2009) and 
Gassebner et al. (2010b). Lamla (2009) investigates robust determinants of pollution (carbon 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide and biochemical oxygen demand) and considers, among other 
factors, overall globalization as explanatory variable. However, he does not disentangle the 
different dimensions of globalization and focuses on long-term effects by considering cross-
country differences.137 In contrast we analyze explicitly the different dimensions of 
globalization and focus on the immediate impacts on ecological pressures for a country. 
Gassebner et al. (2010b) focus on the EKC relationship of the same pollutants. They find that 
variables capturing the economic structure of a country robustly and positively relate to air 
and water pollution. We now disentangle the relation between ecological demand and the 
three dimensions of globalization – economic, political and social globalization – and thus 
advance beyond simple economic arguments.  
Economic Globalization 
We would expect economic globalization through trade relations and the lowering of trade 
barriers to be important in the relationship to environmental stressors through its 
externalities of production. However, a priori the effect is not clear. It may have alleviating 
effects on ecological demands. For instance, foreign direct investments (FDI) may lead to 
technology transfer and thereby diffuse clean production technologies allowing developing 
                                                 
136 In addition, the authors include each aspect of globalization in separate regressions which impedes the 
comparability between these dimensions. 
137 He finds differing correlations for different pollutants in the long-run: for carbon dioxide positive, sulphur 
dioxide negative and biochemical oxygen demand negative (Lamla, 2009).  
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countries to leapfrog less efficient production processes (Gallagher, 2009b; Tamazian et al., 
2009; Tamazian and Rao, 2010). Global market integration, the argument goes, may then 
improve the allocative efficiency of domestic markets and promote private property and 
thereby contribute to internalization of ecological externalities (Dinda, 2004). Therefore, our 
`markets for the global environment’ hypothesis suggests that economic globalization 
decreases ecological demands. 
On the contrary, considering the `displacement and pollution haven hypothesis’, 
economic globalization leads to growth of more pollution-intensive industries in countries 
with lower environmental regulations, which is the case in many developing countries 
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Generalized to all countries this translates into an 
`intensification’ hypothesis that expects economic globalization to intensify ecological 
demands in all countries and is based on four observations: first, there is currently no 
effective (global) framework for governing land-use and carbon emissions, which would 
allow for globally binding regulations. Second, more developed countries rather intensify 
agricultural production and their energy use which increases ecological stressors (UNEP, 
2012a). Third, economic globalization may contribute to a ‘race to the bottom’ (Dinda, 2004), 
where countries that are more globalized economically through trade and investment are 
also more likely to avoid footprint mitigation in order to safeguard economic objectives. We 
expect the second line of argumentation more relevant given previous studies and 
ambiguous observations regarding the diffusion of cleaner technology. 
Political globalization 
Political integration ties states to each other through bilateral diplomatic contacts and within 
international organizations and agreements. A country is considered more politically 
globalized if it participates more in UN activities, is a member in international organizations 
(Dreher 2006) such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)138 and signatory to 
international treaties such as the Kyoto protocol. These international initiatives aim at 
                                                 
138 This is just one example in the context of global environmental governance, other international 
organizations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that are 
not focused on environmental issues are also considered in the measure.  
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establishing a global framework to manage human demands on the environment.139 The 
evidence on whether closer political integration may reduce human demands on the 
environment is rather mixed (Lemos and Argaval, 2006). Up until now no strictly 
enforceable global framework for greenhouse gas emissions is in place. Studies show that 
the Kyoto protocol was not able to effectively tackle climate change (e.g., den Elzen and de 
Moor, 2002) and it is still not clear whether the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is capable of producing an effective successor. When it comes to 
global environmental issues other than climate change, measurable progress has only been 
made with respect to stratospheric ozone and lead in gasoline. Progress on other 
environmental issues such as deforestation, desertification or overfishing is mostly lagging 
behind (UNEP, 2012b). It, thus, seems that global governance still lags behind in managing 
adverse environmental effects of economic development.140 Considering the structure of 
global politics and governance it exposes nations and people to institutions and structures 
suffering from lack of democracy, accountability and transparency. This, as argued by 
critics, may contribute to power abuses (Grant and Keohane, 2005)141 and potential adverse 
ecological effects, because for instance more attention is put on investment goals than on 
environmentally sustainable production and trade. This suggests a `global environmental 
governance failure' hypothesis predicting a positive correlation between political 
globalization and the EF. 
On the other hand, Lemos and Argval (2006) conclude that political integration has 
beneficial effects on the capacity and effectiveness of governance institutions to mitigate 
human demands on the environment. Countries that are more politically integrated, the 
argument goes, benefit from their access to global institutions, know-how and monitoring 
                                                 
139 International environmental regimes included more than 1700 multilateral and bilateral environmental 
agreements as of 2006 (Lemos and Argaval, 2006), the Kyoto protocol being just one example (United Nations, 
1998). 
140 Newell (2001) provides an overview of different regulation approaches of multinational companies focusing 
on environmental initiatives and shows that surveillance of such private global actors is difficult because heavy 
polluters seem difficult to capture.  
141 Evidence is provided by Dreher (2009) on vote trading in the United Nations Security Council for IMF 
loans. 
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systems. Also, political cooperation often aims at building institutional capacity which 
advances social institutions for environmental regulation and facilitates negotiations. Rather 
than a race to the bottom, there may also be a rising of the bottom by disseminating 
environmental governance to developing countries (Dinda, 2004). In balance a `global 
environmental governance’ hypothesis suggests that political globalization decreases 
ecological pressures and human demands though theoretical arguments could explain a 
null effect if the opposing effects compensate for different institutions. 
Social globalization 
Social globalization exposes people and nations to global streams of information and 
knowledge (Rennen and Martens, 2003). Thinking of the global availability of information 
based on the international distribution of newspapers and increased access to the internet, 
social media and telephone connections as well as more travel opportunities, countries are 
more socially globalized if the population is able to use these media sources and have more 
personal contacts.  
In principle, we would expect more global societies to know more about (global) 
environmental problems. As people have increasing access to education and information 
about negative side effects of consumption and production become well known, 
environmental awareness increases together with demand for ‘cleaner’ products (Motoshita 
et al., 2015). At the same time producers promote their ‘clean’ products, increasing public 
understanding even more (Najam et al., 2007). Thus, social integration can give rise to more 
informal regulation, by empowering civil society, consumers, but also businesses and 
governments to cooperate in new governance structures and create general pressure for pro-
environmental behavior, adaption and regulation (Dinda, 2004). We assume a `global 
environmental awareness’ hypothesis suggesting that social globalization decreases 
ecological pressures. 
In contrast, global mobility of people, including migration, may physically and 
mentally distance individuals from the negative environmental (and social) impacts of the 
global economy (Dinda, 2004). Physical distancing refers to simply moving away from 
environmental problems. Mental or cognitive distancing are the result of socio-economic 
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and cultural tele-connections, which inhibits the understanding of how social and ecological 
problems elsewhere are connected to one's own individual behavior (Steffen et al., 2005). As 
a result, more information about environmental problems does not by itself lead to greater 
environmental awareness and concern. Additionally, consuming ever more global media 
exposes people to advertisements and other media contents that disseminate materialistic 
and consumerist values (Najam et al., 2007; Rennen and Martens, 2003). Increased meat and 
dairy consumption, increased mobility and international tourism are all drivers of ecological 
pressures. Thus, one could also expect, a ‘socio-cultural distancing’ hypothesis where social 
globalization increases ecological pressures. A priori we have no expectations which effect 
dominates. 
IV. 3 ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
In the empirical strategy we first identify a robust set of controls before we disentangle the 
nexus between globalization and ecological pressures. The results are presented in the next 
section where we also address potential measurement issues and biases. Our analysis covers 
146 countries worldwide for the 1980-2009 period in an unbalanced panel depending on the 
availability of data for the explanatory variables. 
IV. 3.1 Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Since the evidence on determinants of the Ecological Footprint so far is mixed, we follow the 
literature (e.g., Dreher et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2015) and use a variant of the Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) based on Leamer (1983), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and 
Sturm and De Haan (2005) to identify a robust vector of controls. The EBA is a statistical tool 
to test whether the variables suggested in previous work are indeed robustly related to 
Ecological Footprints independent of other explanatory variables included in the regression. 
We use the following general equation to conduct the EBA: 
 𝒀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑀𝑴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐹𝑭𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑧𝒁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (IV. 1) 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of commonly 
accepted explanatory variables; F is a vector including the variables of interest; and Z is a 
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vector of up to three additional variables (following Levine and Renelt, 1992); all variables 
are lagged by one year. 𝜗𝑡 is the time fixed-effect, 𝜏𝑖 are the country fixed-effects and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is 
the standard error term. 
The EBA is applied in two steps. First, the robustness of the base model (M) is tested 
by including the variable of the F vector while the remaining variables of the Z vector are 
used in all possible combinations of up to three at a time. In a second step we test whether 
additional variables are systematically related. In order to decide whether a variable in F is 
robust we consider the whole distribution of the estimates as suggested by Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) and use the threshold value of 0.95 of the unweighted cumulative density function 
CDF(0) suggested by Sturm and De Haan (2005).142 A CDF(0) of 0.95 indicates that at least 95 
percent of the distribution lies on one side of zero which is regarded as support for that 
coefficient to have a robust relationship.143  
Arguably, the choice of the variables of the baseline model in the M vector as well as 
selection into the Z vector is arbitrary. However, we base our selection for the M vector on 
the existing theory and empirical findings regarding the IPAT identity as described in 
Section IV. 2 and, accordingly use population, income and technology together as core 
determinants (base model). These are proxied, first, by the share of economically active 
population, which has been shown to consistently influence the EF of consumption (Dietz et 
al., 2007; York et al., 2003). Second, we use (ln) GDP per capita as a measure of the standard 
of living in a country and (ln) GDP per capita squared to account for a potential non-linear 
relationship as suggested by the Kuznets Curve relationship. Third, we include the ratio of 
energy use to GDP which is a measure of commercial energy intensity. All variables are 
from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2014). 
                                                 
142 The original very strict criterion proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) of a test of a 
variable in F to be robust considers the lower bound of 𝛽𝐹  (that is the lowest value minus two standard 
deviations) and the upper bound (highest value plus two standard deviations) of this coefficient to both be on 
one side of zero. However, Sala-i-Martin (1997) shows that this criterion is a very strong one and a researcher is 
bound to find a positive or negative coefficient if both directions are supported. He suggests considering a 
variable to be robust when the CDF is at least 0.9. 
143 For a detailed discussion on advantages and limitations of the EBA see Gassebner et al. (2010b).  
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For the F vector we consider 29 additional variables. First, our three globalization 
measures, and further variables suggested by the literature on Ecological Footprints and 
pollution.144 These variables can be categorized in several dimensions: demographic 
determinants other than economically active population are population growth and density, 
(Gassebner et al., 2010b; Lamla, 2009) and the share of the population living in urban areas 
(Dreher et al., 2008; Jorgenson and Clark, 2011). The results for these variables have not been 
conclusive. Additional economic factors that have been tested by Lamla (2009) and 
Gassebner et al. (2010b) are GDP growth and manufacturing share of GDP. Jorgenson and 
Burns (2007) include the agriculture share of GDP to test the effect of the agricultural sector. 
We further include ‘socio-economic conditions’ to control for general macro-economic 
conditions of the country. Data are provided by the International Country Risk Guide (PRS 
Group, 2012). As additional geographic variables, we include per capita land area and 
arable land as a share of total land since they have an influence on the capacity of the 
countries to compensate pollution and absorb waste (Dietz et al., 2007; Jorgenson and Clark, 
2011).  
Environmental awareness is a key determinant of human environmental demands on 
the planet, because it influences consumption patterns in mobility and energy consumption 
(UNEP, 2012a). We test other energy use variables including fossil fuels energy 
consumption, electricity production from oil sources and the share of alternative and 
nuclear energy provided by the World Bank (2014). To capture the effect of mobility, we 
employ road sector energy consumption in total and in per capita terms and CO2 as a global 
pollutant. 
(Environmental) governance structures and processes have an impact on ecological 
human pressures through regulation, standards, management and political and legal 
institutions (Dinda, 2004; Gallagher, 2009b). The capacity and effectiveness of governance 
institutions are proxied by corruption, law and order, bureaucratic quality, government 
stability, democratic accountability and regime type (PRS Group, 2012). Another political 
                                                 
144 All variables, their definition and sources are listed in appendix Table A IV. 3. 
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variable suggested by Lamla (2009) is the number of years the chief executive has been in 
office (Beck et al., 2001) following the notion that long-term rule reduces the willingness to 
control for environmental stressors.  
Finally, Dreher et al. (2012) suggest that issues regarding the internal and external 
security of a population may play a crucial mediating role. Countries that face high levels of 
external or internal conflict may have weak institutions, low productivity and destroyed 
infrastructure additional to the hardship the population faces. This might reduce the respect 
for “eco-rights” and thus increase ecological pressure.145 We therefore include variables for 
physical integrity rights, internal, and external conflicts. Similarly, Jorgenson et al. (2010) 
emphasize the role of military actions on ecological pressures which is captured by military 
expenditure as a share of GDP provided in the WDI data (World Bank, 2014). 
Taking all factors into account we might face multicollinearity problems with 
variables that potentially overlap. This is most likely when variables are related to each 
other as is the case for example by using land area and arable land as a share of total land 
area. Therefore, we carefully investigated the correlations between our explanatory 
variables and take it into account when analyzing the results of the EBA in Section IV. 4.1.146  
IV. 3.2  Empirical specification 
We conduct the EBA and test our hypotheses by estimating equations of the following form: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (IV.2) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the natural log of the annual Ecological Footprint per capita measure described 
above and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable which captures the persistence in the 
evolution of the EF. The 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of robust factors influencing human environmental 
demands identified by the EBA, and 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is overall globalization or all of the three sub-
dimensions. We expect the covariates to affect ecological pressures with only a short time 
                                                 
145 Dreher et al. (2012) look at the relationship between globalization and human rights; one could argue that 
high ecological footprints and increasing levels of pollution are a violation of eco-rights, which are comparable to 
human rights. 
146 The full pair-wise correlation table is provided in appendix IV, Table A IV. 4. 
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lag of one year, since the depletion of resources reduces the land-use type included in the 
calculation of the EF only with a short delay. The term 𝜆𝑡 describes the time fixed-effects 
and 𝜇𝑖 is the country fixed-effects.147 By employing the within fixed-effects estimator with 
time fixed-effects we control for unobserved time invariant and time variant common 
shocks which capture cross-sectional dependence that is homogenous across countries. The 
idiosyncratic error terms is 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Consequently, our estimates exploit variation within 
countries around a common trend. Then our parameter vector of interest (𝛽3) can be 
interpreted as the short-run effect of globalization on the Ecological Footprints.  
The specification raises some econometric issues. Since the lagged dependent variable 
is included, first, long term effects are affected by the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable as well. Second, this coefficient also comprises the unobserved country effects 
which could lead to downward bias the state dependence in the fixed-effects specification 
(Nickel, 1981). This Nickel bias is decreasing in T and since our panel has an average length 
of 25 time years, it should be reasonably small.148 Another potential bias may arise with 
auto- and spatial correlation in the error structure. Autocorrelation may inflate the z-statistic 
and cause invalid inference in a fixed-effects model (Bertrand et al., 2004). We apply 
Pesaran’s (2004) method testing the null hypotheses of cross-sectional independence in the 
error terms which can be rejected at conventional levels. Therefore, we deal with these 
issues by adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-
sectional correlation specific to each country, according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998).149 
                                                 
147 The Hausman-test rejects using the random effects estimator at the one percent level of significance.  
148 Dropping the lagged dependent variable from the models leads to generally similar results on our other 
explanatory variables, which also suggests that our main conclusions are not intensely affected by the Nickell 
bias. Additionally, Judson and Owen (1999) show that in panels with a T larger than 20 the bias is very small.  
149 We additionally estimate the regressions by using cluster robust standard errors in the fixed-effects setting, 
the feasible generalized least squares estimator with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated standard errors and 
linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). The results do not 
change qualitatively and are available on request. 
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IV. 4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
We report the findings in three steps: first, we analyze the relevance (direction and 
magnitude) of the baseline and additional variables by discussing the EBA results. Second, 
we turn to our hypotheses. All robust variables of the extreme bounds analysis are included 
and then we evaluate the relationship between globalization and the Ecological Footprint. 
Finally, we investigate whether the results are different for components of the EF and 
address concerns one might have with the empirical strategy.  
IV. 4.1 EBA results 
Table IV. 1 reports the results of the extreme bounds analysis for the per capita Ecological 
Footprint.150 As expected we find the lagged dependent variable to be a highly significant 
determinant of the Ecological Footprint in the following year. The same holds for the 
income level, energy intensity (technology) and the share of economically active population. 
All effects are positive and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level indicating 
that the per capita EF of consumption is positively related to the standard of living, 
technology and population.151 
The average effect of income on human pressures is positive, increasing, and almost 
always significant (100 percent for the level and 82 percent of the squared term). There is no 
indication in the data of an EKC relationship which suggests a decrease in ecological 
pressures as countries grow wealthier. Rather we even find that higher GDP per capita is 
non-linearly correlated and is related to a disproportional increase of human demands. 
Thus, the magnitude is economically relevant since an increase by 5 percent in GDP per 
                                                 
150 We also performed the EBA, first, using the within fixed-effects estimator with cluster robust standard 
errors. This does not change the findings qualitatively. We only show the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) adjusted 
standard errors results. Second, we used multivariate normal multiple imputation to impute the control 
variables and get a constant sample before applying the EBA. The results are not shown, but show the same 
results for the base vector. For the larger vector of controls the results are not exactly the same. However, the 
average coefficients are very small even suggesting no factors, besides the IPAT variables, are of sizable 
importance. Results are available on request. Since we find only minor differences in the average number of 
observations (Table IV. 1) we expect no sample selection bias. 
151 We also performed the analysis considering a higher level of significance, where the share of significant 
coefficients is based on the cut off at the one percent level. The results are the same, only the share of significant 
predictors reduces as expected. 
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capita is correlated with an increase in the Ecological Footprint of about 1.1 percent. Energy 
intensity also shows a positive and robust significant coefficient on average. An increase of 
energy consumption by 10 percent relates to rising ecological pressures on average by 
almost 1 percent. Finally, an increase in the economically active population increases the EF 
per capita consistently and is robustly statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. A 
5 percent increase in the Ecological Footprint per capita is equal to an increase in the share 
of the economically active population by 1 standard deviation (around 6 percent). On 
average the effects seem plausible and sizable. 
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Table IV. 1: EBA results Ecological Footprint per capita  
 
Notes: Dependent variable: EF of consumption per capita. The variables in the extended model are ordered 
according to the size of the CDF. Y(t-1) lagged dependent variable. Avg. β = average coefficient; Avg. ν = average 
Driscoll and Kraay adjusted standard error; %Sign. = percentage share coefficient is significant; CDF(0) = 
unweighted cumulative density function (threshold 0.95), lower (upper) Bound = lowest (highest) value of 
coefficient minus (plus) two standard deviation; Combi = # of variable combinations; Avg. Obs. = average # of 
observations. All variables are lagged by 1 year. Period: 1981-2009, 146 countries. 
  
Variables Avg. β  Avg. ν    %Sign.     CDF(0)
lower 
bound
upper 
bound
Combi Avg. Obs
Base model
 Y  (t-1) 0.579 0.061 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.754 4089 2569
(ln) GDP pc 0.212 0.034 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.341 4089 2569
(ln) GDP pc square 0.011 0.005 0.82 0.98 -0.012 0.035 4089 2569
(ln) Energy/GDP 0.102 0.017 1.00 1.00 -0.017 0.198 4089 2569
Population (15-65 yrs) 0.008 0.001 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.013 4089 2569
Extended model
Agriculture/GDP -0.002 0.001 1.00 0.99 -0.004 0.000 3682 2408
Urban population -0.002 0.001 0.87 0.97 -0.007 0.001 3682 2553
External conflict 0.003 0.001 0.85 0.97 -0.002 0.009 3682 2339
Bureaucratic quality 0.008 0.004 0.86 0.97 -0.006 0.020 3682 2339
Social globalization -0.001 0.000 0.70 0.96 -0.003 0.001 3682 2542
Population growth 0.007 0.005 0.30 0.91 -0.012 0.025 3682 2550
(ln) Area pc 0.057 0.032 0.35 0.90 -0.095 0.442 3682 2553
Government stability 0.002 0.002 0.23 0.89 -0.004 0.007 3682 2339
Years in office 0.001 0.000 0.33 0.89 -0.001 0.002 3682 2545
Physical integrity rights 0.002 0.002 0.07 0.88 -0.004 0.009 3682 2469
GDP growth 0.001 0.000 0.32 0.88 -0.001 0.003 3682 2543
Corruption 0.004 0.004 0.07 0.84 -0.009 0.016 3682 2339
Road energy per capita 0.000 0.000 0.73 0.84 0.000 0.000 3682 2530
Road energy consump. Share 0.001 0.001 0.59 0.79 -0.003 0.004 3682 2530
Internal conflict 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.78 -0.005 0.006 3682 2339
Oil energy 0.000 0.000 0.18 0.76 -0.001 0.001 3682 2530
Alternative and nuclear energy 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.68 -0.003 0.002 3682 2530
Fuel energy consumption 0.000 0.000 0.10 0.64 -0.003 0.002 3682 2553
Economic globalization 0.000 0.000 0.17 0.64 -0.001 0.003 3682 2504
(ln) Arable land share 0.006 0.014 0.00 0.63 -0.057 0.073 3682 2529
(ln) Military exp./GDP -0.003 0.009 0.00 0.63 -0.028 0.023 3682 2048
Socio economic conditions 0.000 0.002 0.00 0.62 -0.005 0.006 3682 2339
Regime type 0.002 0.004 0.05 0.60 -0.020 0.042 3682 2552
Manufacturing/GDP 0.000 0.001 0.06 0.60 -0.004 0.003 3682 2261
(ln) CO2 pc -0.003 0.011 0.05 0.59 -0.056 0.060 3682 2549
(ln) Population density 0.017 0.038 0.09 0.57 -0.319 0.472 3682 2530
Political globalization 0.000 0.000 0.31 0.56 -0.001 0.002 3682 2542
Law and order 0.000 0.003 0.00 0.55 -0.009 0.011 3682 2339
Democratic account. 0.000 0.002 0.01 0.54 -0.007 0.008 3682 2339
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Using this baseline specification we find that additional variables are robust correlates of the 
Ecological Footprints per capita. The variables that are robust according to the threshold of 
Sturm and de Haan (2005) are the share of agriculture, the share of the urban population, 
external conflict, bureaucratic quality of the government and social globalization. 
Interestingly, social globalization is negatively correlated which supports the ‘global 
environmental awareness’ hypothesis. An increase in social globalization by 10 points on 
average, which is equivalent to the difference of the index in Argentina between 1991 and 
1997 for example, is correlated with a decrease of 1 percent by the EF (driven by 
consumption and production as shown in the next section). This almost compensates for the 
pressure imposed by technology. Nevertheless, the finding suggests that internationally on 
average social connectedness increases the awareness of populations towards sustainable 
environmental use and may have the power to decrease human demands.  
The EF of consumption is also systematically and negatively related to the share of 
agriculture in total GDP. A decrease in the share of agriculture by one standard deviation is 
associated with an average increase of 2.6 percent of the per capita EF. The share of urban 
population turns statistically significant in 87 percent of the regressions. It turns out to be 
negatively related to the EF per capita where an increase in the share by 10 percent is related 
to a decrease of human pressures by 2 percent. This is rather counter intuitive since we 
would expect that an increase in urbanization increases ecological demands. Although the 
results suggest that on average this trend goes hand in hand with an improvement of 
ecological pressures, the average coefficient is very small. 
We also find that external conflict is negatively correlated to the EF. The coefficient is 
positive indicating that a decrease of two points (one standard deviation) on the twelve 
point scale, which is equivalent to an increase of external conflict risk, is correlated with a 
reduction of the per capita EF by 0.6 percent. This at first sight again seems to be counter 
intuitive. We would expect countries that are affected by external conflict and threats of 
foreign action care less about eco-rights. However, the opposite seems to be the case. The 
final robust indicator (according to our EBA results) is the bureaucratic quality index which 
on average is positively associated with the EF. In low risk countries, where the bureaucracy 
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is strong and revisions of policies are less likely, higher human demands on the 
environment are observed. This is in contrast to expectations where hypothetically a better 
bureaucratic quality should enhance the capacity and effectiveness of governance 
institutions to mitigate human demands. Presumably, investment choices are prioritized 
over ecological sustainability. One might also think that a strong bureaucracy slows down 
environmentally sustainable adjustments of the economy, since more feasibility concerns 
have to be overcome. Considering also that structural change is rather a long term process, 
we might not be able to capture positive effects here, since we look at short-term changes. 
After having identified a robust vector of controls, we use these findings to analyze the 
relationship between ecological pressures and multidimensional globalization in greater 
depth. 
IV. 4.2 Main results 
Turning to the hypothesis tests, the analysis of the relation between globalization and 
human environmental demands reveals some interesting findings. We report different 
specifications of Eq. (IV. 2). We always include the base vector of controls and the share of 
agriculture as control vector. In order to make sure that our results are not driven by sample 
selection we also use the imputed sample.152  
 Table IV. 2 reports the main results. We find that overall globalization is not 
significantly related to the EF of consumption. Turning to the different dimensions of 
globalization separately, the coefficient of political globalization is positive but not 
statistically significant. We find social globalization to be significantly and negatively 
related to the EF of consumption. An increase by 10 units (out of 100), which is the 
difference between Switzerland and the US, for example, is correlated with a decrease of the 
EF of 0.9 percent Economic globalization is positive and significant, with a 10 point increase 
corresponding to a 0.7 percent increase in the EF. These effects illustrate that the different 
                                                 
152 The multiple imputations on the control variables are performed using multivariate normal regressions 
with 20 imputations where the standard errors are adjusted according to Rubin’s (1987) combination rule. The 
variables with bounded values are adjusted using truncated regressions in order to keep the scale using 
additional 20 imputations. 
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dimensions of globalization can have diverging effects, leading to insignificant results of the 
overall index. The effects vanish in the constant imputed sample 
Table IV. 2: EF per capita and globalization 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Driscoll and Kraay adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, country and period fixed-effects and the 
control variables: (ln) GDP pc and its square, (ln) energy/GDP, population (15-65 years), agricultural share in 
GDP, urban population, external conflict and bureaucratic quality measures. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by 1 year. 
Since the EF is constructed from different perspectives we investigate whether globalization 
is differently related to the other variants of the Ecological Footprint. Thus we analyze the 
EF of production, imports and exports separately (Table IV. 2). We find that 
multidimensional globalization is not related to the EF of production, but that it is 
significantly and positively related to the EF of imports and exports which also holds for the 
imputed sample. This suggests that the multidimensional process of globalization is 
systematically associated with the ecological pressures of trade. Countries that are more 
globalized exhibit higher EF of exports and imports. The size of the effects for the EF of 
Variables
Globalization       0.0003                        0.0001                        0.0002                        0.0000                  
                 (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.000)                       (0.001)                  
Political                      0.0004                        0.0005                       -0.0000                       -0.0000   
                                (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)   
Social                     -0.0009**                     -0.0005                       -0.0006*                      -0.0001   
                                (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)   
Economic                      0.0007**                     -0.0000                        0.0008**                      0.0001   
                    (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.000)   
# of Observations         2963           2846           4118           4118           2963           2846           4118           4118   
# of Countries          141            124            146            146            141            124            146            146   
R-squared (within)        0.591          0.595          0.721          0.742   
Globalization       0.0061***                      0.0057***                     0.0052***                      0.0064***                
                 (0.002)                       (0.001)                       (0.002)                       (0.002)                  
Political                      0.0000                        0.0003                       -0.0008                       -0.0009   
                                (0.000)                       (0.000)                       (0.001)                       (0.001)   
Social                      0.0035***                      0.0038***                      0.0041**                      0.0061***
                                (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.002)                       (0.002)   
Economic                      0.0033***                      0.0013***                      0.0016*                       0.0012   
                    (0.001)                       (0.000)                       (0.001)                       (0.001)   
# of Observations         2963           2846           4118           4118           2963           2846           4118           4118   
# of Countries          141            124            146            146            141            124            146            146   
R-squared (within)        0.699          0.705          0.558          0.584   imputed imputed
EF consumption EF production
EF imports EF exports
imputed imputed
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imports and exports translates into an increase of around 6.1 and 5.2 percent when 
globalization increases by 10 units, respectively. The effects are slightly different in the 
imputed sample. Thus, ceteris paribus, countries which are more globalized have higher 
ecological footprints of imports and exports.  
Turning to the perspectives of the EF, we do not find any systematic relationship 
between political globalization and one of the subcomponents of the EF in any of the 
specifications. Interestingly we find that social globalization is divergent for different 
perspectives of the EF. For instance, for the EF of production the relation is negative. The 
effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level and indicates that increasing social 
globalization by 1 standard deviation (around 20 points) is related to a decrease in the EF of 
production by around 1.2 percent. This provides evidence for the ‘global environmental 
awareness’ hypothesis where increased international connectedness seems to lead to a 
higher vigilance in national production. Again the effect vanishes if we use the imputed 
sample, while the sign is still negative. In contrast, in the case of EF of imports, we find a 
positive and significant correlation to social globalization. The magnitude of the effect 
translates into an increase of imported pressures by 7 percent if social globalization 
increases by one standard deviation. One possible explanation is that societies that are more 
open to other cultures have a higher demand for international products which translate into 
ecological pressures. The effect is independent of the sample size. The relation to ecological 
pressures of exports shows similar results. The coefficient is positive, and significant 
regardless of the sample. Regarding the last component of globalization, we find economic 
globalization to positively and significantly relate to the EF of production, imports and 
exports. The effects remain significant in the imputed sample only for the EF of imports. 
Presumably, economically more open countries exhibit higher environmental pressures of 
the traded products.153  
                                                 
153 We also ran regressions on the constant sample for all different specifications using only the base variables 
and also controlling for the larger vector of robust controls. The findings are qualitatively similar to the ones in 
Table IV. 2. The main difference is that the systematic relationship of social and economic globalization to the per 
capita EF of production vanishes. The results for the ecological pressures of imports and exports are robust to 
different controls and sample size. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
CHAPTER IV 
 
182 
Overall, the main findings indicate that globalization has no unambiguous effect on 
Ecological Footprints. In terms of our hypotheses, we find no support for the `global 
environmental governance’ hypothesis. If at all the effect seems rather devastating 
positively relating to ecological pressures. Especially, in terms of the EF of exports and 
imports we robustly find that more globalized countries exhibit higher ecological pressures 
which both seems to be due to economic and social globalization.154 For social globalization 
we find mixed evidence. On the one hand, the coefficient is negative (but not consistently 
significant) for the EF of consumption and production, lending support to the ‘global 
environmental awareness’ hypothesis. On the other hand, we find positive coefficients for 
the EFs of production, imports and exports confirming our hypothesis of ‘socio-cultural 
distancing’. For economic globalization we find support of our ‘intensification’ hypothesis 
for EFs of production, imports and exports. These findings suggest that socially globalized 
societies increase their environmental awareness towards local consumption and 
production, but are rather ignorant when it comes to imported or exported goods. 
 In order to analyze whether GDP per capita is one channel through which 
globalization relates to the EF, we perform the analysis excluding both variables (GDP per 
capita and its square). The findings are robust to this application (results not shown). We do 
find evidence that the correlation of globalization and human pressures of consumption and 
production are driven by the wealth level. The coefficients of globalization increase and we 
find more to be statistically significant. However, the estimates suffer from an upward bias 
due to omitted variables. Given that we control for the main channels we are more 
restrictive, reduce omitted variable bias and are able to identify the pure effect of 
globalization that goes beyond income.  
IV. 4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We perform several additional tests to look into the relationship between ecological 
pressures and globalization and challenge our main results. First, one may argue that the 
                                                 
154 If we analyse whether there is a different relationship in developing and industrialized countries, we do 
find some indication that more developed countries drive our results.  
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main channel through which globalization affects ecological pressures is through GDP per 
capita. Therefore, we perform the analysis excluding both variables (GDP per capita and its 
square) in order to test whether the relation with globalization is altered. The findings are 
robust to this application (not shown). We do find some evidence that the correlation of 
globalization and human pressures of consumption and production are driven by the 
wealth level. The coefficients are larger in size and we find more to be statistically 
significant. However, the estimates suffer from an upward bias due to omitted variables.155 
Given that we control for the main channels we are more restrictive, reduce omitted variable 
bias and are able to identify the pure effect of globalization that goes beyond income.156 
Second, we observe that most ecological demand measured by the EF is due to land-
use needed to absorb carbon dioxide. Therefore, we disaggregate the Ecological Footprint in 
non-carbon and in carbon land-use types and explore whether the relationship with 
globalization differs between the two types. Table IV. 3 shows the results including the full 
vector of control variables. We find that there is no difference for the Ecological footprint of 
consumption and production. The only sign of a systematic relation is observed in the non-
carbon EF of production and economic globalization where we find a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1 percent level.  
The major differences are observed in considering the EF of imports, where we find 
indications for an increase in non-carbon and carbon pressures when overall globalization 
increases. For non-carbon elements this seems to be driven by social and economic 
globalization, whereas in the case of carbon EF this seems to be related to political and 
economic integration. One could argue that an increase in the carbon Ecological Footprint is 
related to an increase in political globalization, indicating that global governance fails in 
preventing carbon emission limitations in imports. We find some evidence that the non-
carbon footprint of imports is positively associated with social globalization while the 
carbon stressors are not systematically affected. Also, more economically open countries 
                                                 
155 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
156 We also exclude China and the USA from the set of countries, given that both are main CO2 polluters and 
China also observes a different growth pattern than many industrialized countries. The results are not changed 
by this test. 
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induce more pressures on both carbon and non-carbon EF of imports suggesting a 
devastating relation for both aspects. 
Table IV. 3: EF per capita and globalization (non-carbon and carbon) 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Driscoll and Kraay adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, country and period fixed-effects and the 
base variables: (ln) GDP pc and its square, (ln) energy/GDP, population (15-65 years), agricultural share in GDP, 
urban population, external conflict and bureaucratic quality measures. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. Non-carbon and carbon refers to the land-use types in the calculation of the EF. 
In terms of the EF of exports we find that carbon elements are positively associated with 
overall globalization at the 10 percent level of significance. In this separate consideration we 
find no indication for a significant relation to social globalization, but a positive correlation 
of the carbon EF of exports and political globalization as well as economic integration. The 
effects are significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, considering carbon and non-carbon 
stressors on the environment included in the calculation of the EF reveals that they are 
non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon
Globalization        0.000         -0.004                                        0.000         -0.001                                 
                 (0.001)        (0.004)                                      (0.001)        (0.001)                                 
Political                                      0.000          0.001                                       -0.000         -0.000   
                                               (0.000)        (0.001)                                      (0.000)        (0.001)   
Social                                     -0.001         -0.003                                       -0.001         -0.000   
                                               (0.000)        (0.002)                                      (0.001)        (0.001)   
Economic                                      0.001         -0.002                                        0.002***       -0.001   
                                   (0.000)        (0.002)                                      (0.001)        (0.001)   
# of Observations         2272           2272           2258           2258           2272           2272           2258           2258   
# of Countries          113            113            111            111            113            113            111            111   
R-squared (within)        0.365          0.216          0.367          0.217          0.656          0.665          0.661          0.665   
non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon non-carbon carbon
Globalization        0.003*         0.006***                                      0.002          0.005**                               
                 (0.001)        (0.002)                                      (0.001)        (0.002)                                 
Political                                     -0.000          0.002***                                     -0.000          0.001*  
                                               (0.001)        (0.001)                                      (0.001)        (0.001)   
Social                                      0.002*         0.002                                        0.001          0.002   
                                               (0.001)        (0.001)                                      (0.001)        (0.002)   
Economic                                      0.002**        0.002***                                      0.002**        0.002*  
                                   (0.001)        (0.001)                                      (0.001)        (0.001)   
# of Observations         2272           2272           2258           2258           2272           2272           2258           2258   
# of Countries          113            113            111            111            113            113            111            111   
R-squared (within)        0.712          0.773          0.714          0.774          0.661          0.702          0.670          0.702   
EF production
EF imports EF exports
EF consumption
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differently related to globalization. There are some indications that the carbon element is 
systematically related to globalization, however, no clear pattern emerges. 
Endogeneity concerns 
Finally, looking into the relation between human environmental pressures and globalization 
we may face an endogeneity bias if, first, the correlation is rather from ecological pressures 
inducing globalization, or if, second, an underlying dynamic factor has an impact on both 
phenomena. We now turn to address these issues step by step. 
On the one hand, an important issue regarding the relationship between the 
Ecological Footprint and globalization is the potential reverse causality in Eq. (IV.2). It could 
be that an increase in the EF causes global integration rather than being its outcome. 
Arguably, greater local human demand on the environment might also lead to higher levels 
of globalization. For instance, greater human environmental pressure of a country may 
increase the country's willingness to participate in international agreements or organizations 
to help reduce these pressures. We do three things to show that our estimates are not biased: 
first, we (already) lagged all explanatory variables, given that an increase of human 
pressures on the environment caused by further integration will be visible in the next year. 
Second, we follow Dreher et al. (2012) and perform Granger-causality tests. This test states 
that, according to Granger (1969) variable x causes variable y, if past values of x help explain 
y, once controlled for past influence of y in the following way: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (IV.3) 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. We estimate a fixed-effects panel estimator where 𝛼𝑗 and 
𝛽𝑗 are the parameters, m is the maximum lag length, 𝛿𝑖 is the country fixed-effect, 𝜉𝑡 is the 
time fixed-effect and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term clustered on the country level. The 
stationary assumption of the series is tested by employing a Maddala and Wu (1999) test for 
unbalanced panel data. The null hypothesis of all series being non-stationary can be rejected 
at the one percent level. We report the results of the Granger-causality test in Table IV. 4 
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where the F-statistic on 𝛽𝑗 together with the respective p-value is displayed testing the null 
hypothesis that x Granger-causes y. 
Table IV. 4: Granger causality (1981-2009, 146 countries) 
 
Notes: Table IV. 4 reports F-statistics (joint significance) and the  
respective p-values in parentheses using two lags. 
The first pair of results shows the values testing the null hypothesis that globalization does 
not Granger-cause EF. We fail to reject the null hypothesis in the case of social globalization 
on the EF of consumption and production and in the case of political globalization on the EF 
of exports. The second pair of results (column 2) tests for the null hypothesis that the 
Ecological Footprint does not Granger-cause globalization. We can reject the null hypothesis 
for EF of consumption and confirm that globalization Granger-causes the Ecological 
Footprint. In the case of social globalization the direction of the effect seems to be unclear 
and has to be interpreted with care. This is also the case for overall and political 
globalization and the three other perspectives of the EF. The exercise shows that we can 
interpret the effect of economic globalization as Granger-causing the EF and its components 
Overall 2.91 (0.057) 1.69 (0.188)
Political 2.84 (0.062) 2.03 (0.136)
Social 2.02 (0.136) 0.67 (0.514)
Economic 2.80 (0.065) 0.19 (0.831)
Overall 6.37 (0.002) 2.81 (0.063)
Political 3.45 (0.035) 3.13 (0.047)
Social 1.40 (0.249) 1.18 (0.312)
Economic 6.29 (0.003) 1.15 (0.319)
Overall 7.49 (0.001) 2.86 (0.061)
Political 3.89 (0.023) 1.45 (0.237)
Social 5.22 (0.006) 3.44 (0.035)
Economic 9.50 (0.000) 1.20 (0.303)
Overall 8.62 (0.000) 1.30 (0.275)
Political 1.63 (0.199) 1.00 (0.369)
Social 5.43 (0.005) 3.73 (0.026)
Economic 3.71 (0.027) 0.70 (0.497)
F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
y = EF, x = Glob y = Glob, x=EF
EF consumption
EF production
EF imports
EF exports
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as we never fail to reject the null but we have to be careful in the consideration of political 
and social globalization where Granger causality seems to be unclear. 
Third, we do a crude test where we exchange the globalization measures and the 
Ecological Footprint in Eq. (IV. 2) as dependent and independent variables. We report the 
results in Table IV. 5. The lagged EF as well as all components never turns statistically 
significant at conventional levels when regressed on the globalization indicators. Overall, 
the results suggest that we cannot rule out reverse causality. Overall, we provide evidence 
that causality runs from globalization to human ecological pressures. For social 
globalization a careful consideration of the underlying mechanism needs to be taken into 
account.  
The second source of potential endogeneity could be an omitted variable bias where 
an omitted factor influences ecological pressures and globalization simultaneously. To 
address this Wooldridge (2010) suggests the use of an instrumental variable approach. We 
apply difference and system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators with 
internal instruments to estimate Eq. (IV.2). The difference GMM estimator uses the second 
and higher lag levels of the endogenous regressors in a difference equation (Holtz-Eakin et 
al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggest the system GMM estimator which avoids problems of weak instrumentation by 
instrumenting levels with lagged differences and estimate the equation both in differences 
and in levels simultaneously. The system GMM estimator leads to consistent and more 
efficient estimates than difference GMM if the lagged differences are not correlated with the 
unobserved effects. We use two-step system GMM with a small sample correction 
suggested by Windmeijer (2005).  
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Although in general this seems a promising approach caution is still in order. The 
additional assumption made by system GMM is that the initial conditions (𝑦𝑖,1) represent 
a stationary process of the underlying data generating process. This requires that there is 
no correlation between variations from the long term mean and the stationary country-
specific long term mean of the dependent EF variable (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In the 
case of the Ecological Footprint this seems to be a very strong assumption, since there is 
no reason to believe that the speed of change in human demands is unrelated to its 
current level. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) shows that both differenced and system 
GMM estimates are often unstable and strongly depend on the instrument matrix used. 
Bun and Windmeijer (2010) also demonstrate that the level equation in system GMM 
similarly to the difference equation in difference GMM suffers from a weak instruments 
problem biasing the results. A possible solution to reduce the bias would be convincing 
exogenous variation in globalization that does not affect ecological demand which we 
think is very difficult to find.157 Given the caveats of the GMM estimator and the 
difficulty to find conclusive instrumental variables we are careful in interpreting the 
GMM results as our main findings. 
  
                                                 
157 We are not aware of any approach which develops a convincing instrument for globalization and does 
not affect ecological pressure other than through globalization. For instance, using average neighbouring 
values (i.e., political allies, geographical distance countries) of sub-components of the KOF index (see, e.g., 
Vadlamannati, 2015) has arguably the same disadvantages as the overall index. 
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Table IV. 6: System GMM dynamic estimates 
Panel A: 
 
Panel B: 
 
Notes: Significanc levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable 
and the control variables: (ln) GDP pc and its square, (ln) energy/GDP, population (15-65 years), agricultural 
share in GDP, urban population, external conflict and bureaucratic quality measure. The values reported for 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first 
differences equations. Hansen’s J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. 
In Table IV. 6 the results are presented. We find that the results are different depending 
on the specification of the instrument matrix. In Panel A we do not restrict the number of 
instruments. In Panel B we use the third and fourth lag as instruments to test the 
sensitivity to a different lag structure, where the lag length is an arbitrary choice. We do 
not find any statistically significant relationship between the EF of consumption and 
production neither for the overall globalization measure nor for the sub components in 
panel A. However, we do find a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1 
percent level for globalization and the per capita EF of imports. The effect is three times 
larger compared to our main specification (Table IV. 2) indicating that an increase of 10 
Globalization      -0.0004                       -0.0032                        0.0093***                     -0.0045                  
                 (0.003)                       (0.003)                       (0.004)                       (0.006)                  
Political                      0.0011                       -0.0009                        0.0027*                      -0.0038*  
                                (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.002)   
Social                      0.0014                       -0.0006                        0.0014                        0.0014   
                                (0.003)                       (0.002)                       (0.004)                       (0.004)   
Economic                     -0.0005                        0.0001                        0.0008                        0.0006   
                    (0.002)                       (0.001)                       (0.003)                       (0.003)   
# of Observations         2272           2258           2272           2258           2272           2258           2272           2258   
# of Countries          113            111            113            111            113            111            113            111   
Instruments           92            152             92            152             92            152             92            152   
AR1 (pvalue)        0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.000          0.061          0.060   
AR2 (pvalue)        0.759          0.467          0.018          0.010          0.568          0.596          0.548          0.544   
Hansen's J (pvalue)        0.183          0.998          0.092          0.997          0.416          0.999          0.183          1.000   
EF consumption EF production EF imports EF exports
Globalization      -0.0053**                     -0.0113                        0.0079                        0.0042                  
                 (0.002)                       (0.013)                       (0.005)                       (0.004)                  
Political                     -0.0012                       -0.0008                        0.0025                       -0.0001   
                                (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.002)                       (0.002)   
Social                     -0.0023                       -0.0039*                      -0.0004                        0.0047   
                                (0.002)                       (0.002)                       (0.004)                       (0.007)   
Economic                     -0.0028*                      -0.0008                        0.0029                        0.0013   
                    (0.001)                       (0.001)                       (0.004)                       (0.003)   
# of Observations         2272           2258           2272           2258           2272           2258           2272           2258   
# of Countries          113            111            113            111            113            111            113            111   
Instruments           40             48             40             48             40             48             40             48   
AR1 (pvalue)        0.000          0.000          0.203          0.000          0.008          0.000          0.044          0.047   
AR2 (pvalue)        0.522          0.386          0.449          0.013          0.592          0.603          0.502          0.493   
Hansen's J (pvalue)        0.356          0.214          0.439          0.333          0.241          0.090          0.427          0.220   
EF consumption EF production EF imports EF exports
CHAPTER IV 
 
191 
on the globalization scale is correlated with an increase in the EF of imports by 0.9 
percent. Looking at the different dimensions of globalization, the political measure turns 
out to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
In panel B we find indications for a negative relationship of globalization and the 
EF of consumption. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and 
much larger than in our main specification in Table IV. 2. Surprisingly, we also find a 
negative relationship between economic globalization and the EF of consumption. For 
the EF of production we find some support for the negative influence of social 
globalization. In this setting we do not find statistically significant relations to the EF of 
imports and exports. Overall, the estimates are larger compared to our preferred fixed-
effects setting which would suggest that we estimate a lower bound for the relation 
between the EF and globalization there whereas the true `causal’ effect might be larger. 
Judging on the validity of the approach in our sample we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of Hansen’s J-test of the validity of the over identifying restriction in most 
specifications except for column 3 Panel A and column 6 Panel B (Table IV. 6). However, 
in panel A the p-values are suspiciously high being one or close to one suggesting that 
the number of instruments is too large relative to the group size, although we collapse 
the instrument matrix as suggested by Roodman (2009). Already a reasonable period of 
observation leads to a rapid increase in the number of instruments and makes it difficult 
to find an instrument set which compensates the gain in efficiency with the loss of 
relevance (Newey and Windmeijer, 2009). In Panel B, thus, we restricted the number of 
instruments which shows that the results are fragile, depending on the lag structure. The 
p-values of first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first-differenced 
equation show high first order autocorrelation throughout both panels. For the EF of 
production we do also find evidence for significant second order autocorrelation 
suggesting instrument endogeneity for this outcome variable. Taking the caveats of 
GMM into account and looking at the inconsistent results, we refrain from putting too 
much weight on them and base our main findings on the fixed-effects specification 
presented in Table IV. 2. We are quite confident that our main results present lower 
bound estimates of the relationship between ecological demand and the process of 
globalization, even though we are not able to identify a true causal effect. 
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To summarize, globalization relates differently to the per capita EF of consump-
tion, production, imports and exports. The relation with overall globalization seems to 
be mixed and not informative in the case of per capita ecological pressure of 
consumption and production. But we find consistent positive evidence for the 
relationship between the EF of imports and exports regardless of the sample. We also 
find some evidence of differences between non-carbon and carbon elements of human 
demands. The carbon component of the EFs is positively correlated with political 
integration, suggesting that the global governance is not able to limit carbon emissions. 
Interestingly, we find evidence for a global environmental awareness hypothesis in 
human pressures of consumption and production whereas we find evidence for our 
social-cultural distancing hypothesis in human pressures of imports and exports. 
Presumably, societies value national production and consumption more and are more 
restrictive, but are less strict towards imported and exported products. These findings 
suggest that the process of multidimensional globalization is related to ecological 
demand beyond the influence of income, population size and technology, but is much 
more diverse than suggested by simple correlations. The Granger causality tests suggest 
that ecological pressure may also cause social globalization. Thinking of the immense 
migration flows in the last few years, this could be one explanation. Social mobility is 
then a result of increased environmental degradation and human induced pressures. 
IV. 5 CONCLUSION 
Summing up, this chapter provides a systematic empirical analysis of the drivers of 
ecological pressures and examines if and how globalization as a multidimensional 
process is related to these human-induced environmental stressors. In contrast to the 
existing literature, we apply comprehensive measures of both phenomena using the 
Ecological Footprint and a multidimensional globalization index. We identify basic 
drivers and extract a robust set of relevant factors before we test our hypotheses. We 
then employ a panel data setting with fixed country and year effects accounting for 
cross-section interdependence in the standard errors. We address endogeneity issues in 
various ways. First, we exploit the time structure of the data set and show that 
globalization Granger-causes ecological pressures rather than the other way round for 
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most dimensions. Secondly, we use the dynamic panel data estimator of two-step system 
GMM, which points in the same direction. 
Our main finding is that globalization is related to ecological pressures in a diverse 
manner. We try to capture these diversities by looking not only at the EF of 
consumption, but also the EF of production, the EF of imports and the EF of exports 
separately and disaggregate globalization into economic, social and political aspects. 
Social globalization is identified as robust factor relating to ecological pressures of 
consumption and production negatively and to imports and exports positively. On the 
one hand, this support the hypothesis that increased social connectedness may help to 
reduce environmental stressors and foster sustainable development especially in 
national consumption and production. Regarding ecological pressures induced by 
imports and exports, this effect disappears and we find social globalization to even 
enhance human demand. The more socially globalized a country is the less care is given 
to environmental stressors embedded in imports and exports. Societies in more socially 
globalized (developing) countries seem to care less about sustainability concerns in 
traded goods, presumably because they are increasingly confronted by materialistic and 
consumerist values. However, since we cannot rule out reverse causality completely, 
social globalization may also be caused by ecological pressures. 
The findings for overall globalization are mixed depending on the sample. For 
economic and political globalization we find some support of an enhancing influence, 
but not robust to different tests. Interestingly, political globalization seems to be of less 
importance in shaping human demands on the environment. This is surprising since 
international intention is to reduce environmental stressors and pressure on the 
ecosystem. However, our findings suggest that international efforts do not influence 
these pressures in the short run. Since we only investigate the short term relationship, 
there might still be a long-term influence which we do not capture here. As suggested by 
the IPAT notion the main drivers of ecological pressures are the income level of 
countries, the share of the economically active population and technology. Furthermore, 
a larger vector of important controls is identified by our Extreme Bounds Analysis and 
includes the agricultural share in GDP, external tension, urban population share, and 
institutional quality. 
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Thus, in contrast to the simplifying statement of Borghesi and Vercelli (2003) we 
do diverse relationships of globalization and environmental human demands. The 
analysis reveals that a careful consideration of the perspective of examination is 
important when claiming that globalization increases environmental human demands. 
There are no clear policy implications of this study. Our evidence suggests that 
human pressures are, or rather have been induced by the focus on standard of living, 
disregarding the consequences on the earth system and exhausting recourses. Thereby, 
the single most effective leverage point to unambiguously reduce human demands 
seems to be income per capita. Nevertheless, we find that increasing awareness has the 
potential to reduce ecological pressures and shape human environmental demand. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Table A IV. 1: KOF Index of Globalization (2014) 
 
Source: Dreher (2006), updated version 2014.   
 Indices and Variables Weights 
A. Economic Globalization [36%] 
 i) Actual Flows (50%) 
  Trade (percent of GDP) (21%) 
  Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (27%) 
  Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (24%) 
  Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (27%) 
 ii) Restrictions (50%) 
  Hidden Import Barriers (24%) 
  Mean Tariff Rate (28%) 
  Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (26%) 
  Capital Account Restrictions (22%) 
    
B. Social Globalization [38%] 
 i) Data on Personal Contact (33%) 
  Telephone Traffic (25%) 
  Transfers (percent of GDP) (4%) 
  International Tourism (26%) 
  Foreign Population (percent of total population) (21%) 
  International letters (per capita) (24%) 
    
 ii) Data on Information Flows (35%) 
  Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%) 
  Television (per 1000 people) (37%) 
  Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (27%) 
    
 iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (32%) 
  Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (45%) 
  Number of IKEA (per capita) (45%) 
  Trade in books (percent of GDP) (10%) 
    
C. Political Globalization [26%] 
  Embassies in Country (25%) 
  Membership in International Organizations (28%) 
  Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) 
  International Treaties (25%) 
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Table A IV. 2: Variables and Sources 
 
  
Variable Description Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(ln) EF pc of consumption Natural logarithm of the Ecological Footprint (EF) per capita 
of final consumption
Global Footprint Network 
(2014) 0.88 0.69 -0.72 2.83
Overall globalization Globalization multidimensional index: 1 (not globalized), 
100 (completely globalized)
Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. 
(2008); version 2014 53.47 17.89 15.04 92.50
Economic Globalization Economic globalization including restrictions and flows (1 
low; 100 high)
Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. 
(2008); version 2014 54.02 19.14 9.94 99.16
Social Globalization Social globalization including cultural proximity, personal 
contacts and information flows (1 low; 100 high)
Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. 
(2008); version 2014 44.93 22.62 4.64 93.68
Political Globalization
Political globalization (1 low; 100 high)
Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. 
(2008); version 2014 63.07 20.99 6.47 98.26
(ln) GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP  (constant 2005 US$) per capita World Bank (2014) 8.15 1.57 4.72 11.38
(ln) GDP per capita squ. Squared natural logarithm of GDP  (constant 2005 US$) per 
capita
World Bank (2014)
2.53 2.58 0.00 12.02
Energy/GDP Energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1,000 GDP (constant 
2005 PPP)
World Bank (2014)
5.29 0.60 1.94 7.36
Population (15 -65 years) Share of population between 15 and 65 of the total 
population
World Bank (2014)
60.98 6.63 45.29 84.68
(ln) Arable land share Natural logarithm of arable land (% of land area) World Bank (2014) -1.77 1.23 -9.00 1.12
Agriculture/GDP Agriculture, value added (percent of total GDP) World Bank (2014) 14.51 12.78 0.04 68.88
Oil energy Electricity production from oil sources (percent of total) World Bank (2014) 21.44 28.32 0.00 100.00
Altern. and nuclear energy
Alternative and nuclear energy (percent of total energy use) World Bank (2014)
8.64 13.30 0.00 119.48
(ln) Area pc
Natural logarithm of total area available 
Global Footprint Network 
(2014) 7.55 1.25 3.17 11.19
Fuel energy consumption Fossil fuel energy consumption (percent of total) World Bank (2014) 65.77 31.10 0.00 103.55
Road energy Road sector energy consumption (kt of oil equivalent) World Bank (2014) 15.04 8.14 0.56 56.03
Road energy  per capita Road sector energy consumption per capita (kg of oil 
equivalent)
World Bank (2014)
341.05 445.18 1.85 4880.06
(ln) CO2 per capita
Natural logarithm of CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank (2014)
0.83 1.52 -5.59 4.15
GDP growth GDP growth (annual, percent) World Bank (2014) 3.59 5.65 -42.45 88.96
(ln) Military exp./GDP Natural logarithm of military expenditure as share of GDP World Bank (2014) 0.69 0.71 -3.36 3.68
Manufacturing/GDP Manufacturing industry value added (percent of GDP) World Bank (2014) 16.49 7.19 0.00 43.54
(ln) Population density Natural logarithm of population density (people per square 
kilometer of land area)
World Bank (2014)
4.05 1.37 0.21 8.84
Urban population Urban population (percent of total population) World Bank (2014) 56.78 22.03 6.09 100.00
Population growth Growth rate of the general population World Bank (2014) 1.62 1.51 -5.92 17.48
Years in office Chief executive years in office. Beck et al. (2001) 7.10 7.72 1.00 46.00
Regime type Six-fold regime classification: 0. Parliamentary democracy; 
1. Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy; 2. Presidential 
democracy; 3. Civilian dictatorship; 4. Military dictatorship; 
5. Royal dictatorship.
Cheibub et al. (2010)
2.11 1.58 0.00 5.00
Physical integrity rights The composite index of physical integrity rights is the 
additive of torture, extrajudicial killings, political 
imprisonments, and disappearance, ranging from 0-8
Cingranelli and Richards (2011)
4.92 2.30 0.00 8.00
Bureaucracy quality Bureaucracy quality:  4(very low risk), 0 (very high risk) ICRG (2012) 2.29 1.17 0.00 4.00
Corruption Corruption within the political system: 6(very low risk), 0 
(very high risk)
ICRG (2012)
3.17 1.37 0.00 6.00
Democratic accountab. Democratic accountability: 6(very low risk), 0 (very high 
risk)
ICRG (2012)
3.94 1.61 0.00 6.00
External conflict External conflict: 12(very low risk), 4(very high risk); 3 
components
ICRG (2012)
9.88 2.05 0.00 12.00
Internal conflict Internal conflict: 12(very low risk), 4(very high risk); 3 
components
ICRG (2012)
9.04 2.52 0.00 12.00
Government stability Government Stability: 12(very low risk), 4(very high risk); 3 
components
ICRG (2012)
7.86 2.13 1.00 12.00
Socio econ. conditions Socioeconomic conditions: 12(very low risk), 4(very high 
risk); 3 components
ICRG (2012)
5.90 2.23 0.00 11.00
Law and order Law and order: 6(very low risk), 0 (very high risk) ICRG (2012) 3.85 1.48 0.00 6.00
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Table A IV. 3: List of countries 
 
 
Albania Cyprus Korea, Rep. Sao Tome and Principe
Algeria Czech Republic Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Angola Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Senegal
Antigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Latvia Singapore
Argentina Ecuador Lebanon Slovak Republic
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Slovenia
Australia El Salvador Libya South Africa
Austria Equatorial Guinea Lithuania Spain
Azerbaijan Eritrea Luxembourg Sri Lanka
Bahamas, The Estonia Macedonia, FYR St. Lucia
Bahrain Ethiopia Malaysia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bangladesh Fiji Maldives Sudan
Barbados Finland Malta Sweden
Belarus France Mauritius Switzerland
Belgium Gambia, The Mexico Syrian Arab Republic
Belize Germany Moldova Tajikistan
Benin Ghana Mongolia Tanzania
Bhutan Greece Morocco Thailand
Bolivia Grenada Mozambique Togo
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Namibia Tonga
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Nepal Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil Guyana Netherlands Tunisia
Brunei Darussalam Haiti New Zealand Turkey
Bulgaria Honduras Nicaragua Turkmenistan
Cabo Verde Hungary Nigeria Ukraine
Cambodia India Norway United Arab Emirates
Cameroon Indonesia Pakistan United Kingdom
Canada Iran, Islamic Rep. Panama United States
Chile Iraq Paraguay Uruguay
China Ireland Peru Uzbekistan
Colombia Israel Philippines Venezuela, RB
Comoros Italy Poland Vietnam
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Portugal Yemen, Rep.
Congo, Rep. Japan Qatar Zambia
Costa Rica Jordan Romania
Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Russian Federation
Croatia Kenya Samoa
Countries under Study
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